Mr. Chair, thank you for the opportunity to speak to the committee.
I am going to echo the sentiments of my colleague, in that the security of Canadians is extremely important to us. At the same time, it's important to acknowledge that we can never be 100% safe.
The balance between fundamental rights and security at times requires compromise, but the two are far from mutually exclusive. There's no question that fundamental rights rely on security. One cannot enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms in a climate of fear and insecurity. At the same time, security is enhanced by respect for fundamental rights. One of the most powerful tools that our national security agencies have is to be able to engage with communities that have trust and are willing to cooperate with them. Unfortunately, the agencies have to act in ways that are not conducive to transparency and openness with those communities, so we must look to other mechanisms to give confidence that this balance is being struck.
We would suggest two things that would assist in that respect. The first is precise drafting of legislative restrictions, and although not everyone can be privy to the detailed functioning of the national security apparatus, we can at least understand the law that structures them. Second is comprehensive and effective oversight of the national security apparatus as a whole. A number of individuals have commented on that. We would point out that oversight is not something to be feared by the intelligence services; it's something to be welcomed.
The proposed information sharing act is a good example of those problems. On multiple occasions during these hearings, the committee has been read passages on the definition of an activity that undermines the security of Canada. But we have yet to hear a single explanation as to why the definition is so much broader than the definition of what constitutes a threat to the security of Canada, as set out in the CSIS Act, a definition that is already very broad.
Make no mistake that the definition is much broader than the CSIS definition. For example, it's difficult to imagine any activity of the Canada Border Services Agency that would not be covered by the language of the definition. We're talking about a definition that talks about border operations. Any interference with those operations, everything the CBSA does, is covered by these information-sharing provisions, and the CBSA is an agency that has no independent civilian oversight, zero. It answers to the minister; that's it.
The fact that indigenous people, Muslims, activists, and others are coming before you with fears they will be targeted should be deeply disconcerting, precisely because the stated intention of the promoters of this bill is that it's not to target those individuals and communities. In the national security context, imprecise drafting and lack of oversight are fatal to the trust and cooperation that are by far the most valuable tools our national security agencies have.
We welcome the opportunity to work with you to assist in crafting effective legislation.