Yes, we're calling for both of those things. This committee heard from Justice Major and one of the criticisms and one of the difficulties arose, for example, when CSIS was hived off from the RCMP leading up to the investigation of Air India. CSIS was in possession of lots of information and intelligence about certain actors, but ultimately they were an intelligence gathering mission. They didn't share that information and some of it was destroyed. That was a crucial mistake and it was one that hampered the ability of the crown to prove the allegations against the accused in that case. That kind of mistake can't happen in the future.
In a situation where now we're giving operational kinetic powers to CSIS we're going to see the same kind of turf wars that we saw in the early 1980s. If there's no one person at the head of the ship, as Justice Major said, keeping the entire national security apparatus cooperating, talking, and sharing information, it makes us less safe, not more safe.
There's a difference between on-the-ground operational oversight as opposed to an after-the-fact review. We've heard a lot of testimony even tonight about the changing nature of the threat that we're facing and the CBA doesn't disagree with that. The after-the-fact review that we have today is the same as it was 30 years ago and that's not sufficient. It's just not. There were bills that were proposed in 2005. Mr. Easter, I think you were a part of those. The minister was. It was a good idea. It was a good idea then and it's a good idea now. It's time for Canadians to have it. This committee can help with that.
