Mr. Chair, I understand the concern that's been voiced.
What it turns on is section 1 of the charter, which provides that the rights referred to in the charter are guaranteed only to the extent that they are not restricted by reasonable limits prescribed by law in a free and democratic society. That's what it turns on.
The judge may determine that a particular right referred to in the charter, be it mobility or something else, is violated, and that's in a sense the preliminary stage. The point that goes to the judge is, is that violation a reasonable one because the restriction is prescribed by law in a free and democratic society? That's the judicial inquiry that has to take place on the warrant process. When the provision ends with the indication that unless authorized by a warrant, it's precisely that. A right may appear to be infringed or be infringed and that's fine. The judge has to determine whether that infringement is a reasonable one or whether it's a reasonable restriction. If the judge, in terms of illegality, determines that a particular measure will give rise to a legal conduct, then the judge has to determine whether the judge, by way of a warrant, will authorize that otherwise illegal conduct. That's the rider about what a warrant is designed to indicate. The judge does what a judge does to determine whether that charter right that is affected and violated is reasonably restricted by the measure, or whether the particular conduct that would give rise to otherwise illegal conduct is in fact one that should be authorized pursuant to warrant. It reinforces that it is a judicial decision, not a CSIS decision, to take the measures that do these particular activities.