Yes, absolutely. The section with CSIS is subsumed within the court warrants that they do get there. We have a different mandate than they have. We all have to adhere to the charter, and we have things in this legislation, in the CSE act, that reflect our mandate.
The charter statement does walk through what the charter.... In active and defensive cyber-operations, it makes very clear that prohibitions against...can't direct at Canadians or anyone in Canada; that it's essential to international affairs, defence, and security—so the compelling nature in terms of a section 1 justification that this be done—prohibitions around obstruction of justice and democracy; prohibitions around death and bodily harm; reasonable and proportionate review, and the like.
I would say that the spirit of what's being looked at here is reflected within that preamble, reflected for what's to come around the reasonable expectation trigger, because I think that shows a desire to make explicit what implicitly we're already required to do under the charter. But all the other elements baked into the CSE act are in response to the charter. They're just straight prohibitions and tests and tests against which will be reviewed....
In terms of doing this in the CSE act, I don't know the impact of that, frankly. Where, let's say, the charter is engaged under “ministerial authorizations”, it's making very clear what the state of action is there, which is acquiring information for which there is reasonable expectation. On the element of “not infringe” and where that will fall in, separate from being subsumed under some other kind of regime as you have with the CSIS warrants, I'm just not sure what the impact would be. I fear there could be an unintended consequence in terms of that amendment.