In the interest of clarity, I will answer in English.
I think there are a couple of key risks. One is the pyramidal structures of the switches within the Internet. The higher up you are in that pyramid, the more traffic you can extract from the Internet. Currently, our adversaries have to try to get very high up in the Internet to extract as much traffic as they can. In the absence of that, they will reroute traffic. If the technology is embedded throughout the entire Internet, you don't have to make an effort to get at those switches anymore. You can just extract the entire traffic from the infrastructure as is.
The other problem is that even though we might test the technology,
—and this technology seems entirely safe to us—but we have to be able to update it. That is the problem.
There's always the ability for the manufacturer or an adversarial government to reach into that technology and, in the update process, install vulnerabilities in the technology. As for anything in life, it's an insurance policy that we take out.
Look at the November release by the joint congressional commission for the common defence, co-chaired by Ambassador Edelman. In its report, which you can download from the United States Institute of Peace, the commission concludes that if the U.S. today got into a war with Russia, China, or both, the U.S. would likely lose. Why? Because the war would start with a massive attack on the vulnerabilities within the critical infrastructure of, let's say broadly, the national grid; I don't mean just electricity. As a result, it would create such vulnerability, chaos and instabilities within the country that the U.S. would not have an opportunity to respond. It sure was a wake-up call in the United States. Countries such as China reserve the privilege of a first strike when it comes to cyberspace. This is part of the Chinese doctrine.
How much vulnerability and risk are we willing to expose ourselves to as a country? If we find ourselves in that situation, then it's a little late to go back.