Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to comment on this important matter. I'm here on behalf of Canadian Unitarians for Social Justice. We're a faith-based organization that provides opportunities for Unitarian Universalists and others to apply their religious, humanistic, and spiritual values to social action. Most Unitarian Universalists agree that spiritual values are relevant to the everyday world and that a free and democratic society is a prerequisite for full spiritual development.
In our view, Canadians are held together by a number of defining ideas. The most important of these is the concept of a democratic society. This does not refer just to our machinery of elections and government. It implies that power is vested in the people, and that there is an equality of rights and privileges. It has a spiritual dimension. It is an expression of faith in the power of human beings to shape their own lives.
Earlier today, Professor Levi talked about research which shows that people comply with the law not so much because they fear punishment as because they feel that legal authorities are legitimate and their actions are generally fair. The perception of legitimacy depends on whether citizens are treated with proper respect, each with their own needs for dignity and privacy. These principles are intangible, but they are ultimately what has made Canadian society peaceful and safe.
Acknowledging equality as part of the democratic vision does not just mean that every person is treated equally. It also means that when citizens deal with the government, they do so on an equal footing. In the 801 years since the Magna Carta, mechanisms have evolved to enable this vision. We require the government to obey the law, just as citizens must. When citizens come into conflict with the government, they have access to impartial judges and juries and appear before them on an equal footing with their government adversaries.
We are concerned that the present legislation and the green paper contemplate a creeping dilution of the equality between citizens and security agencies. Security agencies claim that they must operate in secret, but court orders based on secret hearings that exclude the affected people are fundamentally incapable of delivering justice.
This is even more true of extrajudicial authorization of privacy intrusions. Two weeks ago in this committee, Wesley Wark aptly described the present system as “paternalistic”, and these mechanisms fit that description. To reverse the trend, Parliament should reaffirm that the only fully legitimate way to authorize searches or other actions against people is through court proceedings at which the affected person is represented. In cases such as hearings for search warrants, it may be necessary to keep the hearings secret, but in every case, the affected party should be notified as soon as is practical after the fact, providing an opportunity to challenge the court order. As well as creating a mechanism for accountability, this allows legislation to be refined by the development of case law.
I have another nine minutes, but I will not—