I'll read very quickly.
Number one, clearly define the scope of activities that constitute a “security threat to Canada” under section 2 of the SCISA, as well as “advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression”, which are excluded from the scope of the act.
Two, strike out provisions within the act permitting inter-agency information sharing to prevent losing control over sensitive information potentially harmful to Canada's national security. If disclosing information sensitive to national security can be so harmful as to warrant the limitation of fair trial rights within the existing framework—i.e., non-disclosure of classified information to the defence in a criminal case—how is this risk mitigated by inter-agency information sharing among heads of agencies who are neither experts in the right to privacy nor experts in national security?
Three, establish an office of the national security adviser “to review all national security activity, and to ensure effective information sharing” from government agencies to CSIS and the RCMP.
Four, amend the Privacy Act to compel heads of agencies to share all information that will adversely impact Canada's national security with the Canadian service intelligence agency via the office of the national security adviser. It is problematic that discretion rests with the heads of agencies as to whether to disclose information regarding “activities that undermine the security of Canada”, as they are not traditionally experts in the field.
Five, introduce regulations to track what type of information has been shared, by whom, and for what purpose, via the office of the national security adviser.
Six, follow up on cases where an individual has been cleared and ensure all relevant government agencies and other entities with which information has been shared are aware of this.
Seven, set out clear access to a remedy where information shared has resulted in adverse consequences for innocent individuals or disproportionate consequences for guilty persons.
Eight, more intrusive information sharing should require authorization through the issuance of a judicial warrant.
If the SCISA continues to allow inter-agency information sharing regarding the activities set out under section 2, I likewise recommend that it ensure that revisions to schedule 3 adding or deleting a Government of Canada institution are accompanied by a clear justification, including an explanation of how the agency's duties directly relate to national security.
I wish to end with this final point: “...respect for human rights legal obligations is a prerequisite for effective security”, not a hindrance. Canadian domestic legislation should reflect this by striking an appropriate balance between the right to privacy and the protection of national security.
Thank you.