If I can just build off one thing, it's easy to be lost in the amendments and the clauses, but just observe that this would be the biggest change in a generation to the intelligence review system in Canada. This is something big and important, and part of what would make it a success is if it can build trust. It's what we heard from the British parliamentarians. It's what Minister Goodale heard when he looked at different models: build trust in the committee of parliamentarians so that the information flows effectively. It's trust within the committee, it's trust with the public service, and it's trust between the committee and the public service.
What we're trying to build here, then, is something that uses the role of the minister and a minister's central role in the Westminster system to provide the flow of information through to the committee. If we do it right, we know that the committee would receive information that they have certainly never seen before, and it would help inform the debate in Parliament and indeed within the country.
I would say too that if the committee is not satisfied with the information it's receiving, it's very important that it does have remedies. It can complain in Parliament. It can complain to the Prime Minister. It can complain publicly in the annual reports, and indeed, it can complain it its special reports. It has remedies.
As we get up the learning curve on how to ensure there is a good flow of information, it's important that rather than judicializing it—which, I would argue, will set different parts of the system against each other—we can work it through together and build a trust environment.
By the way, you also have a five-year review mechanism, so if you're finding that this isn't giving the committee of parliamentarians the access that is anticipated, it can be reviewed within five years and adjusted.