What would happen with respect to giving them subpoena powers is that it would result in having a process that has become more judicialized, if I may say so. The subpoena would have to be enforced somehow. That would normally take the form of a court order. That is against the whole concept of how we've tried to draft the bill.
We've tried to draft it as a very high-level Westminster-style bill in which ministerial responsibility and trust between the minister and the committee will provide for the flow of information. We also have an express provision, as you know, in clause 31 that indicates that a decision of the minister is final and would not be adjudicated.
Introducing a subpoena power into it would necessitate the judiciary's taking a look at the process and might very well have them take a look at section 31 and say, “This really isn't an overall structure in which we are looking for political solutions. The courts are entitled to take a look at every decision that is being made here, including high-level ministerial decisions as to what is injurious to national security.” It's contrary to what the bill is proposed to do and really does defeat the purpose of proposed section 31.