Mr. Chair, to enhance intelligence accountability, we have suggested five recommendations.
The first is that Bill C-59 does not describe if and how NSIRA, which is the national security and intelligence review agency, will support the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. In the existing system, the committee of parliamentarians could apply to OCSE, the office of the CSE commissioner, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, or the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, if they needed additional assistance. However, if Bill C-59 is passed, it will only apply to NSIRA or the CRCC. In regard to this recommendation, we consider how much support NSIRA will give the committee of parliamentarians and what kind of support they will give the committee of parliamentarians.
The second suggestion is that the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission should retain its ability to review issues and investigate complaints related to national security. The existing legislation giving NSIRA the ability to review matters related to national security issues goes against the recommendations from the O'Connor commission. Also, in the end, it would give the CRCC undue influence over what NSIRA reviews in regard to national security, because NSIRA will remain the principal point of contact for the complaints and reviews, which it would then refer to NSIRA.
The third recommendation is that NSIRA should have the ability to conduct joint investigations with provincial police and complaint bodies. The CRCC has this power as well. Basically, a lot of the federal intelligence and security agencies work with provincial police bodies, so that is also a consideration.
NSIRA should develop and establish standards for intelligence accountability.
Last, NSIRA should take reasonable steps to co-operate with the committee of parliamentarians to avoid unnecessary duplication of work in relation to the fulfillment of their respective mandates.