Absolutely.
The government has failed to demonstrate why this publicly available information exception as worded is necessary or proportionate, or what risks it's meant to mitigate in the first place. The CSE has identified a need to access reports on the global infrastructure as a justification for this provision, yet a more narrowly defined list of information types would easily respond to such a need.
While section 7 specifies that privacy must be considered, the nature of the protection is vague; the regulations setting out the scope of protection are likely to be secret, and the potential for invasive information collection and abuse is high.
The parallel term “publicly available dataset” in the CSIS Act remains undefined but appears to replicate the same types of problems.
Finally, we welcome the new accountability mechanisms in Bill C-59 and strongly support the creation of the new, integrated review body, and the introduction of an intelligence commissioner with the ability to exercise quasi-judicial oversight. However, we are concerned that significant gaps remain. The commissioner only issues reasons when rejecting an authorization. The reasons are kept secret from the public. There is no adversarial input. The authorizations will continue to be issued on a class basis, and there is no framework for appeal or review of decisions except by the minister and the intelligence agencies themselves.
Without amendments that strengthen the role of the commissioner, his or her ability to exercise meaningful oversight and control will be limited in practice.
We welcome questions from the committee about these issues and other aspects of Bill C-59.