We are concerned about the ability to extend by the one-year period, but we think it's important that where there's a significant change in the scope of the authorization, it be brought to the commissioner's attention. We think that's important.
We want to also raise that the authorization framework for active and defensive cyber-operations is extremely problematic from our point of view, insofar as those operations have the capacity to significantly interfere with express privacy or security interests of Canadians and persons in Canada and persons elsewhere. We don't believe that ministerial authorization through the minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs is sufficient. We would prefer to analogize these types of powers to the disruption or reduction powers in the CSIS Act. We note that there is a much more rigorous system for oversight and prior authorization in that context.
I would also note that if the committee decided not to adopt these aspects of the CSE Act that allow CSE to engage in active defensive cyber-operations unbound from other aspects of its mandate, CSE could continue to assist CSIS through its assistance mandate in the course of threat reduction activities.
Thank you.