This is exactly where I was coming from on the CSIS informer point. If you don't read someone their paragraph 10(b) rights under the charter, you're going to make it more difficult to prosecute them. One of my concerns about that, and one of my concerns about the CSIS informer privilege, is that we may actually be making it more difficult to prosecute people. I actually think that we don't want to go the American route, where you have people who are essentially impossible to prosecute because of the way you violated their rights. Terrorism is violence, and if someone is planning violence or someone has committed violence, the appropriate response is with a prosecution. This is why I did not understand why the previous government gave CSIS this privilege, which is triggered any time they promise a human source confidentiality.
I can tell you, in the Air India investigation, which we spent four years examining, that sort of practice would have made it impossible even to have brought a prosecution because all of the witnesses were first, as perhaps they should be, CSIS sources, but then they had to be turned over to the RCMP to facilitate a prosecution.
Again, this is the importance of evidence-based policy-making. I don't know what the rationale was, except maybe to reverse a Supreme Court decision in Harkat, but I actually genuinely feel that we may be placing Canadians' safety and terrorism prosecutions at risk because of a decision that was made by Parliament in 2015 to give CSIS human sources an absolute privilege from any identifying information being disclosed or used in a terrorism prosecution.