Public Safety Committee on May 12th, 2021

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

This is the 29th meeting of the public safety committee. We are about an hour and 15 minutes, from what I can see, behind, so we are going to have to extend the meeting.

We have with us very experienced and able witnesses, all of whom will introduce themselves. I'm given to understand that the Department of Public Safety wishes to go first, followed by CSIS, the RCMP and CSE. We've asked them to cut back their remarks to five minutes each.

Mr. Clerk, if you could send me the order of people's questions, I would appreciate it.

With that, I'll turn it over to the Department of Public Safety.

[Dominic Rochon, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, National Security and Cyber Security Branch, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, committee members. Thank you for the invitation to appear today to discuss ideologically motivated violent extremism in Canada.

My name is Dominic Rochon. I'm the senior assistant deputy minister of the national and cybersecurity branch here at Public Safety Canada. I'm pleased to be joined today by my colleagues Tim Hahlweg from CSIS; Michael Duheme and Mark Flynn from the RCMP; Artur Wilczynski from the Communications Security Establishment; and Jill Wherrett, assistant deputy minister at Public Safety Canada, joining us in her role representing the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence.

Preventing and countering violent extremism in all its forms is a complex and ever-evolving issue. Effective and sustainable efforts require a comprehensive approach, combining domestic and international efforts, and involving a range of stakeholders.

Public Safety Canada, its portfolio agencies and partners such as the Communications Security Establishment have distinct but complementary roles as they relate to violent extremism, the terrorist listings process and related enforcement measures, which we will be pleased to discuss with you today.

Ideologically motivated violent extremism, or IMVE, is the term that Canada has adopted to describe what was previously referred to as right-wing and left-wing extremism. My colleague from CSIS will expand on this in a moment, but in brief, the violent actions and rhetoric of IMVE actors are fuelled by white supremacy, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, violent misogyny, anti-authority and, often, all of the above, making IMVE one of the most serious threats we are facing today.

The listing of terrorist entities is one tool that is available to the Government of Canada.

In 2019, as you may recall, the Government of Canada added the international neo-Nazi network Blood & Honour and its armed affiliate Combat 18 to the list.

[Kamal Khera, Liberal, Brampton West, ON]

On a point of order, Mr. Chair—

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Chair, I'm not getting translation.

[Kamal Khera, Liberal, Brampton West, ON]

Yes, I'm not getting translation.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Can we check into that?

I can hear the interpretation service.

Mr. Rochon, continue on.

[Dominic Rochon]

Shall I continue from where I left off, or would you like me to restart where I started in French?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

From where you started in French I think would be most helpful. Thank you.

[Dominic Rochon]

Certainly.

The listing of terrorist entities is one tool that is available to the Government of Canada.

In 2019, as you may recall, the Government of Canada added the international neo-Nazi network Blood & Honour and its armed affiliate Combat 18 to the list.

Operationally, those listings contributed to the removal of the groups’ online presence. This meant that social media platforms that had previously sold group-affiliated merchandise banned any associated accounts. Additionally, Canadian service providers also shut down affiliated websites.

Earlier this year the government placed 13 new groups on the terrorist list, including an additional four IMVE groups: the Russian Imperial Movement, Atomwaffen Division, The Base, and the Proud Boys. Being listed as a terrorist entity can carry significant consequences. Although it is not a crime to be listed, once listed, an entity falls under what are defined as terrorist groups in the Criminal Code, which apply to several terrorism offences, including recruitment, training, travel and terrorist financing. A listing, therefore, may help support criminal investigations by the RCMP that could trigger potential charges. A listing may also trigger non-criminal measures such as the deregistration of a charity or the inadmissibility of a foreign national into Canada.

A broad Government of Canada approach is taken to identify entities to prioritize for listing. This work is then further supported by criminal or security intelligence reports, which are ultimately independently reviewed by the Department of Justice to ensure that entities meet the threshold test as set out in the Criminal Code. It is important to note here that the legal criteria are not restricted to groups that actually commit violent acts. The threshold also applies where there are reasonable grounds to believe that an entity attempted, conspired for or counselled the commission of a terrorist activity.

In order to ensure that the listings process is balanced and fair, there are several safeguards built into the regime. A listed entity may request that the Minister of Public Safety recommend to the Governor in Council that it be removed from the list. This can happen at any point. The Criminal Code also allows for a review of the minister’s decision by the Federal Court. Finally, there is a statutory requirement to review each entity on the list every five years to ensure that it merits continued listing.

We recognize that addressing the ideologically motivated violent extremism threat is not only an enforcement or technological issue.

The Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence leads the Government of Canada’s efforts to prevent and counter radicalization to violence. The centre provides funding to support the efforts of researchers and frontline practitioners to understand, prevent, and counter radicalization to violence in Canada through its grants and contributions program.

The Government of Canada is actively working with Five Eyes partners and G7 allies, the technology industry, experts, and civil society to more effectively counter ideologically motivated violent extremism in the online space.

Canada is also a signatory to the Christchurch Call to Action to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.

Our government will thus continue to bring the full range of resources we have to bear in dealing with this issue and to keep our communities safe from violent extremism.

Thank you. I will now turn the floor over to my colleague, Mr. Hahlweg.

[Timothy Hahlweg, Assistant Director, Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm grateful for the opportunity today to appear before this committee and appreciate your taking the time to study the issue of IMVE in Canada. The threat that IMVE poses remains a high priority for CSIS.

As mentioned, my name is Tim Hahlweg, and I'm the assistant director of requirements at CSIS.

As this committee is well aware, CSIS has the mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, to advise the government on these threats and to take steps to reduce them.

Since 2014, Canadians motivated in whole or in part by extremist ideological views have killed 21 people and wounded 40 others on Canadian soil. This threat is a multi-faceted problem, going well beyond law enforcement and national security, and requires a whole-of-government response, engaging social, economic and security mandates. You will likely hear this refrain from all of my colleagues here today.

Using accurate terminology when discussing national security threats, particularly as they relate to violent extremism, is important. In 2019, CSIS, in consultation with other security intelligence community members and our Five Eyes partners, took a leading role in developing terminology that more accurately reflects and depicts the violent extremist threats facing Canada.

Thanks to this effort, the Government of Canada now uses the following terminology in its discussions of the violent extremist threat landscape: religiously motivated violent extremism, politically motivated violent extremism and ideologically motivated violent extremism.

With respect to the IMVE landscape in particular, our analysis demonstrated that the traditional terms of right-wing and left-wing extremism were overly simplistic and politicizing and did not accurately reflect the complexity of this threat landscape.

While it is difficult to perfectly label the threats in this diverse and very fluid landscape, this new terminology, RMVE, PMVE and IMVE, was also chosen to mirror existing domestic legislation, paragraph 2(c) of the CSIS Act, and section 83.01 of the Criminal Code. None of these categories are necessarily mutually exclusive, as extremist narratives often derive from the personal grievances of the individual.

Even within IMVE, there is no one-size-fits-all ideology. IMVE adherents are driven by a range of grievances, ideas and narratives, including conspiracy theories. They may be motivated to commit acts of violence against others or incite violence to achieve societal change.

CSIS identifies four subcategories of IMVE: xenophobic, gender-driven, anti-authority and other grievance-driven violence. These categories are not silos, however, and threat actors may be motivated by more than one grievance or shift from one to another. IMVE threat actors continue to target equity-deserving groups, including racialized individuals, religious minorities, LGBTQ2+ community and women.

As we know, it is not illegal to be hateful, racist or misogynist. Freedom of speech is constitutionally protected, and CSIS is expressly forbidden from investigating lawful dissent, advocacy and protest.

CSIS only investigates threat actors who rise to the threshold outlined by the CSIS Act. The actor must engage in activities “directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence...for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective”. Only a small fraction of individuals who adhere to the IMVE narratives go beyond the chat rooms to mobilize to violence. CSIS investigates those suspected of posing a threat to the national security of Canada, working closely with law enforcement partners, including the RCMP, to ensure the appropriate response.

The rapid spread of IMVE narratives online adds to this challenge. Online platforms can serve as echo chambers of hate. IMVE adherents are able to connect and communicate anonymously online and mobilization to violence can occur rapidly. Particularly troubling is the number of youth who are espousing these narratives and inspiring others to violence.

The COVID-19 pandemic has only amplified the IMVE threat. We have seen that COVID-19 public health measures have intensified xenophobic and anti-authority narratives as well as conspiracy theories, some of which rationalize violence. We are continually seeing these narratives play out during the vaccine rollout.

In addition to my testimony today, I invite you all to read the “CSIS Public Report 2020”, which we released earlier this spring. It details the very important work that CSIS did last year to keep Canada and Canadians safe in a rapidly evolving threat environment.

The public report makes clear that violent extremism continues to capture a significant portion of our attention and our efforts, particularly IMVE-inspired online and real-world threats. IMVE is a complex and multi-faceted threat that erodes social cohesion, and CSIS, working closely with communities and our partners across the country, is committed to fulfilling its mandate to keep all Canadians safe.

Finally, I would like to thank the employees of CSIS, our police colleagues and everybody else working in the national security space. It's difficult work, often requiring exposure to vile and abhorrent content to detect and investigate these threats, and for that I thank them.

With that, I'll be happy to respond to any questions throughout this session.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Hahlweg.

Deputy Commissioner Duheme, you have five minutes, please.

[D/Commr Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police]

Good evening, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

My name is Michael Duheme. I am the deputy commissioner for federal policing.

With me, I have assistant commissioner Mark Flynn, who is the executive director for national security, as well as protective policing, for the RCMP.

We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to answer questions about IMVE, along with our federal colleagues who are also impacted by this highly concerning issue.

The IMVE threat environment is rapidly evolving and complex, and it requires close collaboration among security and intelligence partners at all levels, both nationally and internationally. From a law enforcement perspective, hate-motivated violent incidents and criminal threats related to IMVE are increasing in frequency across the country. The most common threat actors we see are individuals with no clear group affiliation, who are motivated by highly personalized and nuanced ideologies that lead individuals to incite and/or mobilize to violence.

Perhaps most importantly, the RCMP is seeing a rampant growth in hateful and IMVE content online. We are gravely concerned with the extremist views that are first fostered online, which can lead to actual physical violence—and have. The RCMP has seen several examples of this evolution, although I can’t provide details in this open forum, as several of these investigations are either ongoing or currently proceeding through the courts.

The increasingly individualized and leaderless nature of this threat environment, combined with the amplifying effect of the online space, carries detection and other challenges that are driving a shift in the RCMP’s national security priorities. With this in mind, we are re-evaluating elements of our current counterterrorism posture, our strategies for countering IMVE threats and our resource capacity requirements. The RCMP takes its preventive mandate very seriously, and the key to prevention is timely information and intervention before it’s too late.

The nature of the IMVE threat also raises jurisdictional and mandate considerations that enhance the need for coordination and information sharing between domestic law enforcement partners and the security and intelligence community.

The RCMP’s federal policing national security program is mandated to investigate IMVE-related criminal activity that rises to the level of a national security threat as defined in the CSIS Act. As such, we maintain close partnerships with CSIS and other domestic security and intelligence agencies and engage in tactical information sharing with foreign partners to counter IMVE threats.

On the other hand, police of jurisdiction have primary responsibility to investigate hate-motivated criminal activity. These jurisdictional realities highlight the importance of law enforcement coordination at all levels to combat this evolving threat and the value of intelligence-led policing.

Since there is often overlap between hate-motivated crimes and IMVE-related criminality, the RCMP works closely with police of jurisdiction to identify criminal threats of national security interest and conduct coordinated investigations. We are also working internally to develop uniform guidelines and indicators for assessing when a particular threat or criminal activity falls within the national security mandate of the RCMP.

In terms of criminal investigations, the RCMP’s foremost priority is protecting the safety and security of Canadians. It is also important to note that minority Canadians are disproportionately the victims—and not the perpetrators—of hate-motivated and IMVE-related violence. It is incumbent upon the security and intelligence community to use every tool at our disposal to protect these communities against violent acts.

The RCMP has a robust mandate to prevent criminal activity, and we can pursue various investigative avenues to mitigate potential threats to public safety or national security when they are brought to our attention. Where criminal charges are applicable, the RCMP works together with Crown prosecutors, including the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, to carefully consider which offences have the best chance of successful prosecution.

On that note, I thank you. I'm hoping that my presence and that of Mark Flynn can help you clarify the situation with regard to IMVE.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you so much. We appreciate that.

With that, the final witness is from CSE.

[Artur Wilczynski, Assistant Deputy Chief SIGINT, Special Advisor, People, Equity, Diversity and Inclusion, Communications Security Establishment]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for the invitation to appear today to discuss ideologically motivated violent extremism in Canada.

My name is Artur Wilczynski, and I am the assistant deputy chief of SIGINT at the Communications Security Establishment, known as CSE.

CSE, reporting to the Minister of National Defence, is one of Canada's key security and intelligence agencies, with a mandate to provide foreign intelligence in support of a broad range of government priorities. CSE is also the country's lead technical authority for cybersecurity.

As my colleagues have indicated, the threat landscape as it relates to ideologically motivated violent extremism continues to evolve, amplified through the increased use of the Internet and social media by threat actors. Through these outlets, there has been a surge in violent extremist and terrorist media production, as groups continue to spread their extremist messaging while attempting to recruit like-minded individuals to their cause and planning activities.

Under its foreign intelligence mandate, CSE works to uncover foreign-based extremists' efforts to carry out attacks in Canada and abroad, including those that are ideologically motivated. It is important to emphasize that CSE cannot direct its activities at Canadians or at anyone in Canada. Our efforts must be focused on foreign actors outside Canada.

In addition to foreign intelligence, CSE can provide technical support to key Government of Canada partners, those in national security or federal policing roles as well as defence agencies. Any assistance that we provide is conducted under the authorities of the requesting agency and in alignment with the legal and policy parameters of their mandate.

CSE has a strong and valuable relationship with our international partners. We regularly share information on a wide range of threat actors, including IMVE. This exchange has a significant effect on protecting our respective countries' safety and security.

Addressing ideologically motivated violent extremism requires collaboration from our federal and international partners, and I want to assure you that CSE will continue to work within our mandate and with these partners to support efforts to fight extremism.

Thank you.

I look forward to answering your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, witnesses.

We will now turn to our first round of questions, for six minutes each.

We'll go to Mrs. Stubbs, Ms. Damoff, Madame Michaud and Mr. Harris, in that order.

You have six minutes, Mrs. Stubbs.

[Shannon Stubbs, Conservative, Lakeland, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

For Mr. Hahlweg, I just wonder if you could expand a little bit on what you touched on regarding the fluidity of the definitions related to the categories that fall under IMVE, but also with regard to other activities, say under politically motivated and religiously motivated violent extremism.

Could you also comment on the chart that's in the 2019 report where it breaks up subcategories under ideologically motivated violent extremism? There's sort of an extra category that says “other”. Is that a catch-all for mass casualty attacks? What would be included under there?

[Timothy Hahlweg]

Thank you very much for the question.

Maybe I can start at the bottom. I think I can work my way through that a little more clearly if I start with the “other” category, because it helps to describe the narrative in the IMVE space.

For the IMVE space, the “other” category is obviously part of the four that I articulated at the outset, which include xenophobic, linked to white supremacy or neo-Nazism and ethnonationalism; anti-authority and targeting of government and law enforcement; and gender-driven, which can lead to violent misogyny. The “other” category is an example of the fluidity of this environment because we have a number of individuals who don't have a defined ideology, who aren't linked to a certain conspiracy or who move around to various groups, and it's very difficult to place them.

In the RMVE space, we have additional threat actors like al Qaeda. We have ISIS. We have a group ideology that these people adhere to.

In the IMVE space, it's quite different. We see a lot of movement depending on the nature of the grievance, and those grievances change all of the time, depending on what situation is happening. We see this in the COVID example, where that has galvanized some individuals in that space, so it's not as fluid as the other typical and more traditional categories in the RMVE space.

I hope that answers your question.

[Shannon Stubbs, Conservative, Lakeland, AB]

Yes, it does. Thank you.

It's illuminating, and it makes sense, then, that the definition also has been adapted to move away from what could be perceived to be partisan or political definitions. Also, I think it's instructive that there probably is a thread of these actors through ideologically motivated violent extremism, as well as religious and politically motivated violent extremism, if I've got you right.

I wonder if you're able to give us a sense of what the attacks were that caused the deaths of the 21 individuals, as cited in the 2020 report. I'm not sure what can be discussed in terms of investigations or which agencies might be involved to some degree—probably all—but can you give Canadians a sense of exactly what caused those deaths and which attacks they were?

[Timothy Hahlweg]

I absolutely can.

Starting in 2014, we have the Moncton shooting perpetrated by Justin Bourque. In that shooting, three were killed and two were wounded. In 2015, we have the Halifax mall plot. That plot was disrupted and there were no casualties. In 2016, we have the Edmonton stomping attack. One individual was killed. In 2017, we have the Alexandre Bissonnette attack on the Quebec City mosque. Six individuals were killed and 19 were wounded in that attack.

In 2018, we have the Toronto van attack by Alek Minassian. Ten people were killed and 16 were wounded in that attack. In 2019, we have the Sudbury knife attack, and two people were wounded in that attack. Finally, in 2020, we have the Toronto spa attack, where one person was killed and one person was wounded.

I think I've covered that. If I've missed anything in that depiction, I will defer to my colleagues in the RCMP.

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

No, you've covered it, Tim.

Thank you.

[Shannon Stubbs, Conservative, Lakeland, AB]

Thank you.

Can you give us a sense of how many plots were foiled last year that would have been planned ideologically motivated extremist acts?

[Timothy Hahlweg]

Unfortunately, given the nature of this call, I won't be able to get into the specifics of those investigative activities, specifically on the foiled plots. Some of those investigations are still ongoing.

I can assure you that your colleagues in NSICOP and the service meet regularly to discuss those classified discussions.

[Shannon Stubbs, Conservative, Lakeland, AB]

Can you give us a general sense in terms of scale or scope? Dozens or hundreds or thousands...?

[Timothy Hahlweg]

I can say generally that because we take the threat activity very seriously and we have a lot of assets at play in the organization.... We have regions across the country, as you know, and we have stations abroad. All these employees of our organization are working in concert with their law enforcement partners and other members in the S and I community to identify and disrupt this activity.

You will know that we have a threat reduction mandate as well in the service, so we actively take measures to try to disrupt plots. Given the fact that the activity has increased, our disruption activity, in correlation, has increased as well.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Ms. Stubbs.

Ms. Damoff, you have six minutes, please.