Public Safety Committee on April 29th, 2024

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you for that.

I want to move on to another question.

You are very knowledgeable about the technology that exists to deter car thefts. I agree with you that no technology is going to be 100% foolproof, but some are better than others and can greatly decrease the chances that a successful theft will happen.

My colleague Mr. Schiefke, in previous committee hearings, in looking at the sticker price of cars, has alluded to the profits that car manufacturers are making. Given your knowledge on the existing technology that's out there and the costs associated with it, in your opinion, what would be a reasonable amount for a car company to invest in a vehicle—a dollar figure per unit—to make sure that it had much less likelihood of getting stolen?

[Dr. Mitra Mirhassani]

That is a very hard question to answer. I don't have that number about the actual numbers that can go into the vehicle to make it secure, so unfortunately I can't answer that question.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Is there anything more broadly speaking? We've heard from a number of witnesses who have said that car manufacturers are not living up to their end of the bargain in this whole issue.

[Dr. Mitra Mirhassani]

In the big picture, yes, there are certainly things that the car manufacturers can do. Some are taking this more seriously than others.

Since 2016 and before, some of the car companies and OEMs actually started looking into the issues of cybersecurity. However, the technology is advancing much faster than we can find the loopholes in the security and fix it. A lot of times when the car is on the market, the security loopholes are just identified. We are playing a game of cat and mouse a bit with this feature, and that could be one of the reasons why the carmakers are falling behind. The process of adjusting their technology might take them some time to get into the market. That could be one of the reasons.

[The Chair, Liberal, Heath MacDonald]

Thank you.

We're now moving on to the second round, and we're going to have a hard stop, so we can get at least four questioners in.

Mr. Kurek, you're up first, please, for five minutes.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I'll be splitting my time with Mr. Viersen here.

Mr. Gray, I have a couple of questions for you.

You mentioned before that when it comes to Transport Canada security clearance, currently connections to organized crime are not a consideration when somebody is granted security clearance to a port.

[Capt Allan Gray]

Yes. Currently, it's focused on weapons-based crime—so, things that are associated with terrorism—because the transport security card came in from the IMO's ruling, which was based around the prevention of terrorism. Their focus at that time was really around weapons or violence-related crimes.

Only now the IMO is saying that there's too much evidence that says that organized crime is related to terrorism and that this should be extended, but—

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

I'd say it's certainly past due for that recognition. That is astounding—that that's not the case—and that's certainly something that needs to be addressed.

I'm curious. Could you provide any data as to the number of interactions that your port has with the CBSA, the RCMP, CSIS, CSE and other federal investigative entities in terms of containers that might be going out from your port? We've heard a lot about Montreal. We've heard a lot about Vancouver. However, I'm just curious. Do you have that information? Is that something that you could provide to this committee?

[Capt Allan Gray]

I could have a look into it, but in my own interactions, we very seldom talk about cargo going out of the port. Most of the focus is on cargo coming into the port. Even then, it's kept very close to the chest. There was a recent announcement about a drug bust in Halifax. As the port authority, we weren't aware of that occurring until after the event.

So, they keep that sort of information very close. That's something that I'm not used to from my previous jurisdiction where we had a trusted information network, and multiple agencies would come together and share information around multiple things, including terrorist information and other organized crime information.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

I have just one final question. Just answer yes or no. Is that something that needs to be improved in Canada?

[Capt Allan Gray]

Yes.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

Okay, thank you very much.

Mr. Viersen.

[Arnold Viersen, Conservative, Peace River—Westlock, AB]

Hello, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

Professor, I am old enough to remember.... I'm an auto mechanic, and I worked at a Chrysler dealer for a long time. I remember when the SKIM code came in on the Jeep Grand Cherokee in 1998. As that SKIM technology came in, we watched a nosedive in vehicle thefts in general. However, with that, over time, we've also lost the column lock. I don't know if people remember this, but you used to have to put the key in the side just to get the steering wheel to turn. Most modern vehicles don't have that anymore. This is more of a hardware rather than a software situation.

Is there any desire from the industry to bring back the column lock or other hardware? There's been a lot of discussion around software, but is there any discussion around hardware pieces to prevent theft?

[Dr. Mitra Mirhassani]

Just remember that hardware is also easy to capture, so with those mechanical car keys, you also have the ability to reproduce and remanufacture them. If you're thinking about organized crime, they certainly have access to generating those car keys mechanically and distributing them through their system.

As to whether industry is planning to bring that in, I am not aware of such motivation.

[Arnold Viersen, Conservative, Peace River—Westlock, AB]

The column lock is just an example of a hardware theft deterrent. We see the aftermarket steering wheel lock; people put The Club on the wheel. Those are aftermarket. Is there any desire from the industry to bring in something else that we haven't heard of yet?

[Dr. Mitra Mirhassani]

I'm not aware of anything in that regard.

[Arnold Viersen, Conservative, Peace River—Westlock, AB]

The SKIM key that Chrysler came out with in 1998 had been, until about 2015—maybe you can correct me on that.... Up until 2015, people hadn't been able to get around it. Today they can just duplicate the key, the electronic side of that key, really quickly, so that has basically made it moot. Is there any light at the end of the tunnel around the reintroduction of something like that?

[The Chair, Liberal, Heath MacDonald]

Answer very quickly, Ms. Mirhassani.

[Dr. Mitra Mirhassani]

I'm not sure if they are going to bring those cases. If there is any intention of that, I'm not aware of it. However, at this stage of information availability, I'd say that even those mechanical car keys can be manufactured rather easily.

[The Chair, Liberal, Heath MacDonald]

Thank you.

We're moving on to Mr. McKinnon.

[Ron McKinnon, Liberal, Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here.

I'm going to direct my questions to Mr. Gray.

We are particularly interested in the ports, because we see them as the last line of defence for interdicting the export of stolen vehicles. I understand this doesn't really apply to you. You don't have data in this regard. However, I want to look a little further up the logistics chain.

You mentioned that many of these containers are filled at terminals in the vicinity, presumably. I'm wondering if any of these terminals have some sort of trusted status or bonded relationship, so you can decide whether, based on whoever filled the container, this manifest may be more or less reliable.

[Capt Allan Gray]

Some packing houses are customs warehousing, so they've gone through a customs system to have customs brokerage. There would be some that are more reliable than others. I would think you would approach it in the same way you risk assess import cargoes: look at where they're coming from, who has packed it and what the shipping line is. You would take a similar approach, such as whether they put good electronic seals on—that sort of thing. If they're a reliable, trusted customs broker, it would be less likely you're going to have a problem there. If it's something packed by an individual or by a warehouse you're unaware of, that would be a higher risk profile.

Again, the port doesn't have that information. The CBSA would have that information going through. We don't get told the origin of that cargo. We aren't given that information.

[Ron McKinnon, Liberal, Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, BC]

Would it be helpful to have it be required to offer you that information, so that, if and when you were able to, or had a need to scan export containers, you might be able to filter them on that basis?

[Capt Allan Gray]

Yes, that sharing of information would help the risk assessment process. It all helps. The more information we get, the more the terminal can make assessments. If the CBSA were advising us that these are higher risk and they want them scanned, it would be a process that would help.

[Ron McKinnon, Liberal, Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, BC]

Who—if anyone —is responsible for verifying that the manifest matches the contents? Is there someone who can be held accountable if they find out there's a significant material error or discrepancy there?