If you were relying on the port as a last resort or as your only defence, it would not be very successful because of the number of issues around documentation. We don't physically open every box because it's sealed prior to arrival. If that was your only line of defence, it would not be a very successful one. We need a broader one.
To me, one of the problems is that we don't have good data transfer from agencies to ports and terminals. We can't access CBSA data because of the way the legislation is written. Once it goes into the CBSA, it can't come out. Therefore, we have issues in data sharing amongst ports, terminal operators and supply chains.
Things like that would help us notice the anomalies. If more data could be shared amongst the agencies, players and stakeholders, that would be there.
The other side is that if you don't have a good security card or clearance system that's deep enough into the system, organized crime will get hold of trusted insiders or threaten people within the chain. That makes it much easier to pass through. Boxes will be missed on that sort of thing.
To me, it's increasing data and also broadening the card for more people.
With the IMO legislation or rules that they're talking about, affiliation with or belonging to organizations that are affiliated with organized crime will discredit you from being able to get a security card. That is a big shift that's coming in many other countries. It's a really important shift.
Even if you don't look at the contraband—I've raised human trafficking and drugs as additional to cars—it's just the fact that terrorism can use organized crime as a means of passing dangerous goods. It's something that has to happen.