Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The testimony today has been interesting. I think it's led the committee down a few different paths as we consider Bill S-210.
Mr. Ripley, we've heard a lot about the potential pitfalls with the term “sexually explicit material” as referenced in the Criminal Code and how it could be overly broad. If we go down further in the bill—still on page three, in proposed subclause 6(2)—it says:
No organization shall be convicted of an offence under section 5 if the act that is alleged to constitute the offence has a legitimate purpose related to science, medicine, education or the arts.
Wouldn't that “legitimate purpose” phrase, from the department's standpoint, save streaming companies like Netflix, since they would be under the arts category? How do you interpret that section?
Does that add further clarity to the concerns you raised about the definition of sexually explicit material?