Public Safety Committee on May 30th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 109 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee commences its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents.

Please take note of the following preventive measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters: Use only an approved black earpiece; the former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you are not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose.

Thank you all for your participation.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses today.

From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère, associate assistant deputy minister, national and cybersecurity, and Richard Bilodeau, director general.

From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Sarah Estabrooks, director general, policy and foreign relations, and René Ouellette, director general, academic outreach and stakeholder engagement.

From the Department of Justice, we have Heather Watts, deputy assistant deputy minister; Mark Scrivens, senior counsel; and Karine Bolduc, counsel.

I thank you all for coming here on such short notice.

I now invite Public Safety Canada to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Go ahead, please.

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère, Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

As you know, Canada and allies face numerous geopolitical challenges that threaten to destabilize democratic nations and the global economy. Every day, the strength of Canada’s national security and public safety is being tested. Notably, threats from China, Russia and Iran continue to threaten our national security and social cohesion.

What has captured the attention of many Canadians is the insidious threat of foreign interference. This remains a critical threat to our national security.

Foreign interference encompasses malign activities undertaken by foreign states, or those acting on their behalf, to advance their own strategic goals to the detriment of Canada's national interest and that of our allies.

Foreign interference targets the integrity of our political system, democratic institutions, social cohesion, academic freedom, economy and long-term prosperity.

The threat of foreign interference is not new, but it has increased in recent years as the world becomes more competitive, interconnected and digital.

The Government of Canada is best served when engaging with those directly affected by national security threats on potential solutions. For this reason, we consulted with a diverse group of Canadian stakeholders and partners on potential updates to modernize our counter-foreign interference tool kit in a way that balances various important considerations, such as privacy and charter-protected rights and freedoms.

On May 6, 2024, the Government of Canada introduced an act respecting countering foreign interference, known as Bill C-70, that reflects the valuable input received through consultations with stakeholders across Canada.

The changing global threat landscape and the way in which foreign interference materializes necessitated a modernization of Canada's tool kit for countering foreign interference in all its forms. While others will speak to the various amendments to the CSIS Act, to the Security of Information Act and to the Criminal Code aimed at better detecting and disrupting the strategic threat, I would like to highlight part 4 of the bill for you, the foreign influence transparency and accountability act.

As mentioned, foreign interference takes many forms, but malign foreign influence, a subset of foreign influence, remains particularly difficult to detect and counter. Some governments and their proxies may leverage individuals or entities to undertake non-transparent influence activities that are intended to shape Canadian policy outcomes or public opinion, deliberately obfuscating the foreign ties.

The intent of the foreign influence transparency and accountability act is to promote openness and transparency around ties to foreign states and, in doing so, to deter and to introduce robust consequences for those who seek to exert influence in non-transparent ways.

Foreign influence transparency registries are increasingly considered an international best practice. We've engaged with our closest allies and like-minded partners to learn from their experiences in designing our own registry.

There are three criteria that, when taken together, would trigger the requirement to register under the FITAA.

The first is when an individual or an entity enters into an arrangement with a foreign principal and the individual or the entity acts at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign principal to engage in foreign influence activities.

Second is when that person or entity undertakes any of the following foreign influence activities: communication with a public office holder, communication or dissemination of information to the public, or disbursement of money or things of value.

Third is when activities are undertaken in relation to a political or government process.

I want to be clear that it's not the foreign principals who would be required to register. Instead, those individuals or entities acting at the direction of or in association with those foreign principals would have the registration obligation. There's no registration obligation imposed on anyone who is the subject of this influence activity either.

Before turning to my colleague, I would note that the registry was designed to be country-agnostic, and it's a tool to protect, not persecute, communities of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds in Canada.

With that, I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

We now invite CSIS to make an opening statement of up to five minutes as well.

Go ahead, please.

[Sarah Estabrooks, Director General, Policy and Foreign Relations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to be here in support of this important study.

Since its creation 40 years ago, CSIS has had to adapt to major changes in the threat landscape to protect Canada and Canadians. From our inception at the height of the Cold War to today's era of global cyber-enabled threats, CSIS has had to continuously evolve its operations.

Although foreign interference is not new, the complexity of the modern threat, fuelled by technology, highlights the need for appropriate tools and authorities.

Gaps in the authorities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, which have become more acute with rapid technological change, limit CSIS’s ability to detect, investigate, and respond to, foreign interference in a timely way to protect Canada’s interests.

Bill C-70 proposes a set of focused amendments that will improve CSIS’s operational response to foreign interference with three objectives.

First, the targets of foreign interference extend well beyond the federal government. They include Canada's diverse communities; democratic processes at all levels of government; Canada's rich research system; our private sector, which drives the innovation economy; and the critical infrastructure upon which we rely. Amendments would authorize CSIS to equip national security partners outside the federal government.

We have learned from Canadians—especially other levels of government, businesses, diaspora and minority communities—that they would like more information about the threats they face so they can build resilience against them.

Second, amendments seek to ensure that CSIS can operate successfully in a digital world. CSIS has adapted to and embraced technology through its history, but the pace of technological development today is creating blind spots and vulnerabilities that foreign state adversaries and violent extremists are exploiting every single day.

Finally, amendments would enable CSIS to keep pace with emerging and rapidly evolving threats.

The proposed amendments address five areas of the CSIS Act.

Amendments to current disclosure authorities would authorize information sharing outside the federal government to build resiliency to national security threats.

New judicial authorizations are proposed that are tailored to the requirements of modern digital investigations.

To better leverage data in investigations, amendments are proposed to CSIS's existing data authorities.

A tactical amendment to CSIS's foreign intelligence collection mandate to account for the borderless nature of data would better equip CSIS to collect on the intentions and capabilities of foreign states.

Finally, a review of the CSIS Act by Parliament every five years would ensure that CSIS can continue to adapt to emerging threats and changing technology.

All of the proposed amendments were designed with strong safeguards in mind. We heard the importance of this from Canadians during our consultations.

As well, CSIS remains accountable to the Minister of Public Safety, who can issue specific direction on any aspect of CSIS’s activities.

Certain CSIS activities will also continue to be reviewed and approved by the intelligence commissioner.

All CSIS activities can also be subject to review by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency or the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

By maintaining strong review and oversight, including the vital role of the Federal Court, the legislation would ensure that all CSIS activities to protect Canada and Canadians comply with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

With that, I welcome the opportunity to discuss any aspect of the proposed amendments to the CSIS Act.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

We go now to the Department of Justice for remarks for up to five minutes, please.

[Heather Watts, Deputy Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Justice]

Good morning. Thank you very much, Chair.

I'm here to speak to the Department of Justice Canada proposals in Bill C-70 that amend the Security of Information Act, the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act.

The Security of Information Act, or the SOIA, as I'll call it, is the primary legislation dealing with foreign interference. Part 2 of Bill C-70 would create three new offences in the SOIA.

The first is a general foreign interference offence. This would make it an offence to do any surreptitious or deceptive act for a foreign entity knowing that it would cause harm to Canadian interests.

The second is the commission of an indictable offence for a foreign entity, which would apply when someone commits an indictable offence for a foreign entity. It could be any indictable offence, such as extortion or bribery.

The third proposed offence is an interference with democratic processes offence. The bill would create a new offence of committing a surreptitious or deceptive act at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign entity to influence a political process or educational governance in Canada. This offence would apply to all levels of government—territorial, provincial, indigenous and municipal—and would apply to the nomination processes of political parties. This offence would apply at all times, including outside of the formal election period.

The bill also amends some of the existing offences that we already have in the SOIA. Section 20 already deals with threats or violence in relation to a foreign entity. Bill C-70 would make it easier to prove this offence by removing the necessity for prosecutors to prove the offence was committed for the purposes of aiding a foreign entity or was likely to harm Canada. This is a significant modification to section 20 that would aid in the investigation and prosecution of persons involved in transnational repression, because the intimidation of critics of foreign regimes doesn't always engage the interests of the Canadian state in a direct way.

There is also a proposed amendment to section 22 of the SOIA, which deals with preparatory acts.

The bill would increase the maximum penalty for the commission of a preparatory act from two years to five years and would expand the application of that penalty to most of the offences in the SOIA, including the new ones proposed in this bill. For all of the SOIA offences, including the new ones, there will be a requirement to obtain the Attorney General's consent before commencing a prosecution.

Bill C-70 also contains a proposed amendment to the definition of “special operational information” in the SOIA to address the inappropriate sharing of military technology and knowledge.

I'll turn now to the Criminal Code, which currently contains an offence of sabotage that has not been revised since 1951.

The amendments in Bill C-70 would modernize this offence. The bill would create a new sabotage offence, focused on conduct directed at essential infrastructure, and it contains a list of what would constitute essential infrastructure for this purpose, including transportation, energy, health and communications infrastructure, among other categories. The current sabotage offence already provides for exemptions from criminal liability for work stoppages related to labour action or safety concerns; the proposed new offence would also recognize, for greater certainty, the right to advocacy, protest and dissent.

Finally, the bill would add a new companion offence to criminalize making, possessing, selling or distributing a device to commit the offence of sabotage. The maximum penalty for these three sabotage offences is 10 years.

As with the new offences in the SOIA, the bill would add an additional safeguard by requiring the Attorney General's consent before a prosecution for the offence of sabotage can be commenced.

Turning now to the amendments to the Canada Evidence Act and the Criminal Code in Bill C-70, currently the Canada Evidence Act provides a regime that protects sensitive information from disclosure in court proceedings but generally does not allow the courts to consider that information when deciding the matter before them.

However, there are some stand-alone regimes that allow for the protection and use of sensitive information in administrative proceedings. Judges can take the sensitive information into account when making their decision.

Such stand-alone regimes exist on judicial review—for example, in connection with charities' registrations and revocations, terrorist entity listings, the passenger protect program and some passport revocations and refusals.

The bill repeals these existing stand-alone regimes and establishes a universal process.

This is a universal procedure for the use of information and administrative proceedings that we call a secure administrative review proceeding. This would apply to federal administrative proceedings, such as judicial reviews and appeals to the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal when sensitive information is part of the record.

Finally, with regard to criminal proceedings, the bill makes two specific changes involving interlocutory appeals and sealing orders to improve efficiency and limit delays in the criminal process.

Thank you for having us, and I'm happy to take any questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you all for your remarks.

We'll start our questioning with Mr. Cooper for six minutes.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I will direct my questions to the Public Safety officials.

How long will it take to implement the foreign influence registry after Bill C-70 receives royal assent?

[Richard Bilodeau, Director General, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

It's something that is currently before Parliament, and we're going to see where it goes. It is going to be a priority for us to set up the office based on the legislation, if and when it is adopted through Parliament.

We recognize there's significant interest in making sure it is up and running before the next federal election. It is going to be a priority for us to set it up.

There are numerous pieces of work that need to be done in terms of bringing in regulation to support implementation of the act before we can bring it into force. It will be up to the Governor in Council to determine that coming into force.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you for that.

Through you, Mr. Chair, there is regulation that needs to be set out. As well, the commissioner who's going to oversee the registry needs to be set up.

Would it be fair to say this would take a number of months? My understanding, at least from the technical briefing, is that it may in fact take up to a year. Am I correct?

[Richard Bilodeau]

It could take up to a year.

Not to get too into the weeds in terms of bringing in regulations, but there's a process, as the chair is aware. There's also a need in the legislation. The commissioner for transparency would be obligated to publish a registry to make known those individuals who have registered. There is going to be a need to stand up a system so people can register. The commissioner can then publish that registry online to make that information available.

During the technical briefing, we indicated that a year is what we're working towards. It is the goal we will attempt to meet.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much for that.

There's clearly a lot of work to be done. When I look at the calendar, it's May 30. There are only a few more weeks left before the House rises for the summer. Looking at the next election, we see that it's in October of 2025. That's about a year away right now, having regard for the fact we only have a few sitting weeks left. This underscores a real concern I have that this will not be in place in time for the next election.

It's as a result of a government that has dragged its feet and was dragged kicking and screaming to finally introduce a foreign influence registry, despite calls for years by security experts, by diaspora communities and by Conservatives. Indeed it is, I would submit, not a coincidence that this legislation was introduced the first sitting day after the damning report of Madam Justice Hogue, a damning report, an indictment of the government and an indictment of the Prime Minister. This is nothing more than an attempt by this government to use this bill for political cover in the face of conclusions that demonstrate that we have a Prime Minister who turned a blind eye to foreign interference.

I have to say that the delay is unacceptable, because consultations for a foreign influence registry ended one year ago, and therefore, had the government introduced legislation a year ago, we would have a foreign influence registry in place well ahead of the next election, but because these Liberals have delayed and failed to act, here we are with the very real possibility we won't have a foreign influence registry in place. If there is one in place, it will be right at the time the election is called, which raises questions about its effectiveness during the campaign period.

Given the timeline we have, Conservatives believe it is absolutely imperative that we move this legislation forward quickly. It's why my colleague Mr. Chong, the member for Wellington—Halton Hills, introduced a motion yesterday in the House of Commons to see that this bill would pass through all legislative stages in the House by June 12, but incredibly, yesterday in the House, the government's coalition partner, the NDP, blocked Mr. Chong's motion.

Here we have the coalition partner of the Liberals, who have dragged their feet for years, now obstructing moving this bill through Parliament. I can't help but wonder why that is.

It certainly demonstrates that Jagmeet Singh, once again, is an unserious leader, having regard for the fact that he—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

—doesn't see the need—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

—to move this along, and it raises questions—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Mr. Cooper, come to order, please.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

—that the NDP is doing the government's dirty work.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Mr. Cooper—

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, St. Catharines, ON]

Follow the rules. You're new to the committee. Follow the rules, please.

[An hon. member]

You follow the rules.

[Some hon. members]

Oh, oh!

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

We'll going now to Ms. Zahid.

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, St. Catharines, ON]

You're heckling me for heckling.

[An hon. member]

That's right.