Thank you, Mr. Chair.
As you know, Canada and allies face numerous geopolitical challenges that threaten to destabilize democratic nations and the global economy. Every day, the strength of Canada’s national security and public safety is being tested. Notably, threats from China, Russia and Iran continue to threaten our national security and social cohesion.
What has captured the attention of many Canadians is the insidious threat of foreign interference. This remains a critical threat to our national security.
Foreign interference encompasses malign activities undertaken by foreign states, or those acting on their behalf, to advance their own strategic goals to the detriment of Canada's national interest and that of our allies.
Foreign interference targets the integrity of our political system, democratic institutions, social cohesion, academic freedom, economy and long-term prosperity.
The threat of foreign interference is not new, but it has increased in recent years as the world becomes more competitive, interconnected and digital.
The Government of Canada is best served when engaging with those directly affected by national security threats on potential solutions. For this reason, we consulted with a diverse group of Canadian stakeholders and partners on potential updates to modernize our counter-foreign interference tool kit in a way that balances various important considerations, such as privacy and charter-protected rights and freedoms.
On May 6, 2024, the Government of Canada introduced an act respecting countering foreign interference, known as Bill C-70, that reflects the valuable input received through consultations with stakeholders across Canada.
The changing global threat landscape and the way in which foreign interference materializes necessitated a modernization of Canada's tool kit for countering foreign interference in all its forms. While others will speak to the various amendments to the CSIS Act, to the Security of Information Act and to the Criminal Code aimed at better detecting and disrupting the strategic threat, I would like to highlight part 4 of the bill for you, the foreign influence transparency and accountability act.
As mentioned, foreign interference takes many forms, but malign foreign influence, a subset of foreign influence, remains particularly difficult to detect and counter. Some governments and their proxies may leverage individuals or entities to undertake non-transparent influence activities that are intended to shape Canadian policy outcomes or public opinion, deliberately obfuscating the foreign ties.
The intent of the foreign influence transparency and accountability act is to promote openness and transparency around ties to foreign states and, in doing so, to deter and to introduce robust consequences for those who seek to exert influence in non-transparent ways.
Foreign influence transparency registries are increasingly considered an international best practice. We've engaged with our closest allies and like-minded partners to learn from their experiences in designing our own registry.
There are three criteria that, when taken together, would trigger the requirement to register under the FITAA.
The first is when an individual or an entity enters into an arrangement with a foreign principal and the individual or the entity acts at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign principal to engage in foreign influence activities.
Second is when that person or entity undertakes any of the following foreign influence activities: communication with a public office holder, communication or dissemination of information to the public, or disbursement of money or things of value.
Third is when activities are undertaken in relation to a political or government process.
I want to be clear that it's not the foreign principals who would be required to register. Instead, those individuals or entities acting at the direction of or in association with those foreign principals would have the registration obligation. There's no registration obligation imposed on anyone who is the subject of this influence activity either.
Before turning to my colleague, I would note that the registry was designed to be country-agnostic, and it's a tool to protect, not persecute, communities of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds in Canada.
With that, I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.