Public Safety Committee on June 3rd, 2024

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Yes, thank you, because I did read NSIRA's report on the CSIS dataset regime, and it was pretty scathing. I'm concerned that if they blew past the legislative safeguards that exist today, I'm just a bit cautious as a legislator about giving them even more. I understand the rationale, but I don't want to be here in another five years reading another scathing NSIRA report because they blew past their legislative safeguards again, so I take your point on that.

Very quickly, I've had multiple witnesses talk about the problem with the definition of “arrangement” and being in an “association with a foreign principal” in part 4 of this act. Do you have any concerns about that? Do you think we need to tighten up the language there?

[Tim McSorley]

I think there needs to be some clarity around that, which I think would help improve the effectiveness of such a regime so that it's not overly broad and capturing all kinds of things that maybe aren't being envisioned.

For example, one of the concerns we have is with the definition of a “foreign economic entity” or “foreign entity”, and whether or not that could capture, for example, public broadcasters from other countries who are essentially under the control and ownership of a foreign government. Moreover, could that mean that journalists who work in conjunction with them, or Canadians who appear as pundits and speak about important policy issues, could then be forced to register? We're worried that this would have a chilling effect on journalism, and there are other questions around academic freedom and other areas as well.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

We'll suspend for a minute and do the vote.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Can we not just keep going? There's 10 minutes for each of us to vote. Or if you need to—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I'm happy to keep going. We can vote in the process?

This is so unusual that we have such agreement all the time.

Okay, so let's start our second round and we have Mr. Caputo for five minutes.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

I want to focus on one aspect, and this was actually raised by another witness. It's something I asked about previously: the independence of the commissioner of the registry. Sorry, I don't have the formal name, but you know what I'm talking about.

At this point there would have to be, as I understand it, consultations with the House Commons and the Senate on the naming of that person, but the commissioner would be appointed by an order in council. Is there any way to strengthen the independence of that person? Does the commissioner appear sufficiently independent based on that sort of appointment process to the witnesses?

[Aaron Shull]

There are a number of commissioners who report directly to Parliament, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada being one, and you look at the Commissioner of Lobbying.

I watched the previous witnesses as well and if I could understand the reason behind it—and again, I'm just some guy, so take this for what it's worth—it's that they nest within the department so they have access to the material, because ultimately once you start issuing compliance notices, where is that information going to come from? It's going to be coming from intelligence sources, so I think the idea is to have them nest and that might gravitate towards bringing them closer into the department, but I definitely hear your point about the independence.

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

We focus very much on the positive element of people having to register and their having to voluntarily report within 14 days, etc.

What happens in the execution when we have delinquents, people who do not want to report or who try to hide the meetings they had with people in office or with elected officials? That's where we need to have the investigative capabilities.

Now, somebody will say that we'll give it to the RCMP. As I tried to demonstrate a little bit earlier, the RCMP and CSIS do not co-operate very well together currently. They have not been capable of resisting the influence coming from the Prime Minister's Office, in particular.

That kind of interference that comes from within our system is to the detriment of the quality of our democracy.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Can you elaborate on that? What interference from the Prime Minister's Office are you referring to?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

When you have CSIS reporting that one of the candidates has been greatly compromised, that buses of foreign students have been brought in, and they say they're not really sure that the intelligence is really good and they disregard it and continue on, then somewhere, somehow, there is sort of a lack of responsibility and respect for the professionalism of that institution that we have created, which is there to protect our country.

It's the same thing when certain investigations are not initiated when they should be initiated because it might embarrass the Prime Minister's Office or something like that. That separation that had been sought at the beginning between the judicial, legal and the executive is missing now. It has been missing for a long period of time.

We need, at this crucial moment, to try to recreate that separation by having an element of independence as much as possible, both financially and in terms of authority.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

You've struck me with this idea of independence and you had a very good example of it.

I think that one of the arguments against somebody who's truly independent, like the conflict of interest commissioner, who is not part of the government, is that the commissioner is going to have to have access to departmental information at the ready.

Is that an argument to perhaps not have the same requisite level or degree of independence? Does that make sense?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

We can legislate to make sure that he or she has access to all of the information that is needed for the investigation. That is a sine qua non for the success of their investigation and a deterrent that we want to apply to foreign agents.

Rest assured, foreign interference will not finish with the passing of Bill C-70. It will continue. It has been in place for a long period of time. We dragged our feet for so long now that they have been capable of embedding themselves within all levels of government. It will continue.

My problem is with the execution. Are we giving tools to law enforcement to be capable of working adequately?

That's especially when we have evidence and testimony now that tell us that influence from the higher office has been exercised many times.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Caputo.

We go now to Ms. O'Connell, please, for five minutes.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you, Chair. Thank you to all of the witnesses for being here.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya, I want to follow up on that line of questioning, certainly given your experience.

On the issues around independence, I think it might be unfair to suggest that in dealing in some of these areas, all of a sudden independence is gone. Turning information into evidence is challenging in itself. At what point do you stop and say that here's information that is relevant, let's make an assessment? Then more information comes in and the assessment has to change.

Doesn't that then also compromise Canada's ability to make good policy or for CSIS to provide advice if there is a cut-off point for information, instead of actually being able to review puzzle pieces of information to form that greater picture?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

I do not want to lack respect, but we do not act on information. We act on intelligence, and we produce intelligence. We do not collect intelligence. Intelligence comes from information plus an analytical process that puts together the intelligence. From the intelligence, we take a course of action. We turn that into actionable intelligence.

The independence we've been talking about currently is necessary because, unfortunately—and I stress not only in the current years but for the last 30 years—we've seen agents of influence being capable and to literally hijack the process and deter taking the right actions by the government or other departments. It doesn't need necessarily an army. It needs just the right person at the right place. It's called a minister, it's called a director general and it's called a deputy minister who will say, “No, that's not really good.”

I reported back in 1998 foreign interference. We had evidence at that period of time. I was ordered to destroy my documents and my information because it would embarrass the government at that point. I was doing my job. They would rather kill the messenger than go after what was a threat to our national security.

That's the problem here. That's why we need to be able to have, just like the Auditor General.... That's the example I prefer to use. The Auditor General sometimes talks about issues that are difficult, that are sensitive and that are embarrassing, but it needs to be said. This is the only way that we'll have a healthy and solid democracy: by having this transparency and this element of accountability that I was mentioning earlier.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Perfect. Thank you so much.

Mr. Shull, I wanted to move to you.

Actually, both of you mentioned the issues around including other orders of government and, certainly, I appreciate your reading out the intro of the bill, because the intention is quite clear: to make sure the CSIS Act, which right now doesn't allow for information sharing at all and is quite restrictive, opens it up.

I'm curious about your specific advice around the definition of “public office holders” and to bring that in line, because it's not just municipal and provincial. It could be indigenous leadership that holds critical infrastructure, as an example. Is there a definition in another act or in other countries that you think would be more in line with keeping it more broad?

[Aaron Shull]

Yes.

Through you, Mr. Chair, it's a great question.

It's in this bill. It's actually in the SOIA. All I would do is take the SOIA definition and move it over and then you're home free. Then you have congruity between between your pieces of legislation. That's all I would do.

I would also just add municipalities in explicitly. The honourable member's point is a good one. You could probably make an argument that municipalities are creatures of the province, but if I were defending somebody on this, that's the first place I would go. Just forestall it at this stage.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you.

Following up on that, I certainly was in municipal government, so I understand, thinking about my time then and knowing what I know now, but the challenge—and I want to hear your thoughts on this—is the assumption that all information will then just be shared. Part of the challenge is making sure that the information is shared and different orders of government are given that, but in a way that doesn't compromise the information.

How do we find that balance to make sure, whether it's universities, whether it's private businesses that are targeted.... How do we ensure that we can create legislation that's broad but doesn't create this expectation that everyone's going to receive a national security briefing and then therefore that information no longer is protected?

[Aaron Shull]

Through you, Mr. Chair. It's another good question.

We're talking about two things.

One is the requirement to register. At the municipal level, if you're trying to influence a municipal official on behalf of a foreign principal, you should have to register, period. The reason is so that we can have some transparency. Then, if you don't, it's a bit like Al Capone. They didn't get Al Capone on murder. They got him on tax evasion, right? This just provides another tool in the tool kit. That's point number one.

Point number two, with respect to the sharing of classified or secret information, I'm going to leave that to experts. They don't teach you anything about how to share top secret information in law school, so I didn't even want to hazard a guess.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Ms. O'Connell.

Mr. Juneau-Katsuya.

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

Let me just add that one of the challenges—and it's an excellent challenge that you're talking about—is about the culture. Canada has been a real prude about sort of hiding and sharing information, for decades and decades. We need to be capable of being a little more mature, a little more grown up, about sharing information. What is shared is not always going to be to our detriment. On the contrary, it is to reinforce our national security.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Mr. Villemure, you have two and a half minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I only have two and a half minutes, so I'm going to go quickly.

I will ask the same question of Mr. Juneau‑Katsuya and Mr. Shull.

After their tenure, some government officials, elected officials or ministers collaborated with China. Should there be some kind of three-year or five-year moratorium prohibiting dealings with China, for example, since that could cause problems?

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

Absolutely.

If we take our cue from what's done in the private sector, when people go to work for certain companies, they're required to keep a certain distance, a certain silence. Sometimes, they're not even allowed to work in certain areas for a certain period of time to counter the risk of becoming a competitor or sharing information that is too sensitive.

In this case, it's national security. In one of the last governments, not the current one, but one of the previous ones, five cabinet members went straight to work for Chinese companies as soon as they left office. That's abhorrent. It's absolutely abhorrent to allow Cabinet members, who have had the right and privilege to be granted access to the highest level of state secrets, to go and work for these companies and personally benefit from sharing classified information.