Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My area of expertise is Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy. I was educated in China, and I've worked in the CSE, in the Canadian diplomatic service and as an academic. I have published several articles and reports on Chinese influence operations in Canada.
I will focus my remarks on part 4 of Bill C-70, the foreign influence transparency and accountability act part, as it impinges on the activities of agents of the Chinese Ministry of State Security targeting politicians, civil servants and others involved with shaping Canada's relations with the People's Republic of China regime.
Justice Hogue's report earlier this month noted that her mandate is to investigate potential foreign interference with “Executive decision-making by Cabinet and its ministers in relation to their departments, including indirect foreign interference with ministerial decisions when such decisions are based on information originating at a lower level of government covertly influenced by a foreign state (or its proxy, agent, etc.).”
I'm not sure why Justice Hogue's mandate is limited to “a lower level of government covertly influenced by a foreign state”. In the previous meeting of this committee, Mr. Genuis raised the possibility of a future Attorney General of Canada being in a conflict of interest because he or she had benefited from foreign interference in his or her riding. My knowledge of China's united front strategy around the world is that there is enhanced Chinese Ministry of State Security early targeting of politicians deemed likely to, in future, assume influential positions such as Attorney General of Canada.
We know from a leaked December 2021 CSIS report how China's Ministry of State Security uses three colour-coded political interference tactics to gain influence over Canadian government officials here in Canada and those travelling to China. Blue refers to sophisticated cyber-attacks on targets' computers, smart phones and hotel rooms for possible blackmail. Gold refers to bribes. Yellow is what CSIS described as “honey pots”. That's how China employs sexual seduction to compromise a target.
Bill C-70 and existing legislation should go a long way to addressing this kind of concern, but I would put forward that there are more sophisticated operations by the Chinese regime here in Canada and other countries that are more challenging for us to counter.
For example, former Australian prime minister Bob Hawke recalls in his biography that shortly after he retired from politics, he travelled to Beijing and met with Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, who told him, “Mr. Hawke, China never forgets its friends. I want you to know that we regard you as one of our best friends.” In the years that followed, Mr. Hawke took on several directorships and consultancy positions relating to China, which enabled him to achieve considerable financial success.
Here in Canada, we observe former cabinet ministers, former ambassadors to China and people retired from senior roles in our foreign ministry who have assumed lucrative opportunities relating to China after leaving government. Government career options in law firms, businesses and other sectors with associations with business networks identified with the Chinese Communist Party would, clearly, not be open to those identified as unfriendly to China while in a position of public trust, because we know that the Chinese regime keeps extensive files on all of us. They know who their friends are.
A concern is whether Canadian officials, because of the very subtle Chinese influence process of implied future benefits after retirement for Canadian policy-makers, which Bill C-70 cannot track, would perhaps not act immediately on intelligence assessments they receive that would call for Canadian government action that goes against Chinese interests in Canada, but leave these for others to respond to, for fear of being identified with actions the Chinese embassy would not feel well disposed towards.
If I could just conclude, I would say from this that just as government officials cannot exploit classified information to serve personal interests after retirement and have to keep the secrets that they derive in the course of their service secret for life, perhaps we need to restrict public servants from receiving benefits from foreign entities for life as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.