Evidence of meeting #110 for Public Safety and National Security in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was csis.
A video is available from Parliament.
4:25 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ron McKinnon
Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.
We'll start our second round now with Mr. Shipley for five minutes, please.
4:25 p.m.
Conservative
Doug Shipley Conservative Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON
Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
I'd like to start with Mr. Kempa, if I could.
In your opening remarks, you mentioned that Bill C-70 was a good platform or a basis to get started with this. I tried to scribble down quickly what you said here. You mentioned there was definitely a lack of RCMP capabilities to investigate, and that really needed to be built on or this legislation wasn't going to be that good. I didn't quite get completely what you meant there. If you could expand on that, I'd appreciate it.
4:25 p.m.
Associate Professor, Criminology, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Sure. I think what I was getting at is that, given that we have a five-year requirement to review this legislation, it enables us to come back to some of the lessons that we will pick up over how well the institutions on the ground, some of which are significantly evolving their mandates, are able to enact or carry out what you have here.
In the 1980s, of course, the Emergencies Act, the RCMP Act and the CSIS Act were all written over a period of a couple of years with reference to one another. Obviously, CSIS was created from taking national security and intelligence issues away from the RCMP.
Given that there's an ongoing debate about the capacity of the RCMP to fulfill its federal policing functions, including investigations in national security, it would be great if CSIS now becomes more effective at sharing information or intelligence with the RCMP, but if they're not in a position to carry that out, it will be very difficult. There's an ongoing debate as to what the future of the RCMP will be. Will they carry on, and to what extent, with contract policing across the country? Will they become two organizations, with one principally focused on federal policing issues? We don't have the answers to that today, nor will we have them in a year.
What we have laid out here, and how the RCMP manages its new responsibilities with CSIS sharing information, could inform what's done with the RCMP Act in five years' time, for example, and the review of the CSIS Act in five years' time, taking into consideration what happens with the RCMP and CBSA, for that matter, and other partners down the line. It's a learning basis here for what ends up working well and poorly for review in five years.
4:25 p.m.
Conservative
Doug Shipley Conservative Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON
Thank you for that. Hopefully, a lot of it works in the good way and not the poorly way.
Mr. Burton, I had a whole bunch of questions here specifically on Bill C-70, but you've mentioned a few things that I need to get a little more clarification on or it's going to bother me for a while.
You mentioned that some of your colleagues have left to join other entities. You mentioned specifically China. Could you give me some examples? What do you mean by that?
4:25 p.m.
Senior Fellow, Sinopsis, As an Individual
There are certain agencies that are identified with promoting interests that favour greater engagement between Canada and China. For example, the Canada China Business Council, the Asia Pacific Foundation, and the China Institute at the University of Alberta are all institutions that enjoy funding, some of them from Chinese sources. In fact, the China Institute at the University of Alberta received 10 years of sustaining funding from a Chinese billionaire who is vice-chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The University of Alberta will not say how much money or the terms of that funding, but one gets the feeling that if the University of Alberta's China Institute produced a report that was supportive of this bill, that funding might terminate.
You have these very complicated relationships and interactions between people in the government and these agencies that are troubling to me. Senator Woo, for example, was associated with the Asia Pacific Foundation for quite a long time and continues to support their purposes in Canada. I can think of three ambassadors who are working in China trade. I don't think there's any harm in my mentioning John McCallum as someone who has been highly regarded by China, because the Chinese have said that in as many words. I believe they've referred to him as the “son of China”. There are others whose relationship I feel a little bit uncomfortable about. We have some cabinet ministers who are also working on things relating to China, which then causes me to wonder how they were performing when they were in a position of public trust.
Because we don't have this commissioner set up yet, all of it is just smoke and mirrors. I can't condemn people. I think that if anybody was doing anything illegal, our RCMP would be pursuing it. However, I just feel that there does seem to be a lot of Chinese influence in our country, which is why we have the commission going. We need to root it out.
This legislation is particularly important in trying to maintain our security and sovereignty against a foreign threat.
4:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ron McKinnon
Thank you, Mr. Shipley.
We'll go now to Mr. MacDonald, please, for five minutes.
June 3rd, 2024 / 4:30 p.m.
Liberal
Heath MacDonald Liberal Malpeque, PE
Thank you, Chair.
Dr. Burton, I want to touch base on the transparency issue that you addressed in your preamble, possibly relevant to foreign governments and individuals. What's missing or what should we be doing to enhance that level of transparency in Bill C-70, or is it appropriate as it is?
4:30 p.m.
Senior Fellow, Sinopsis, As an Individual
There are clearly a lot of institutions that are pretending to be civil institutions but that in fact, as we know from some of the leaked CSIS documents, are under the supervision of the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist Party. We know that some of those leaders, 100- some in number, have been vetted by the Chinese embassy. One can assume that those institutions to some extent have a mandate to serve Chinese purposes. They often have addresses that are the same as the so-called police stations that we are concerned about, where the Chinese government is engaging in activities off-site that probably involve some degree of influence or espionage activities.
I think we need more transparency on that. The commissioner can provide that kind of information so people are aware, when they're dealing with institutions that may have a function which serves the interests of a foreign state in addition to their social function, that these are institutions that sign petitions in newspapers that support the Hong Kong national security law, urge that Meng Wanzhou be released early, or other things that the Chinese government feels are positive and that probably most Canadians would feel are not in the Canadian interest.
That being said, I think people have the right to have a political choice, and if their political choices correspond with the interests of China in Canada, that's well within their rights as Canadian citizens.
What it really comes down to is whether they are receiving funding or support from a foreign power. When you look at things coming up on the Internet for elections, it's perfectly legitimate for governments to put together videos of politicians saying things they wish they hadn't said or doing embarrassing things. However, if those videos are funded and supported by a foreign power, it's a different level of participation in our democratic process.
4:30 p.m.
Liberal
4:30 p.m.
Liberal
Heath MacDonald Liberal Malpeque, PE
You also talked a bit about the individuals at the other end of this question. If someone is compromised and they're unaware of it, what should the process be? What is the administrative, investigative process at that end of it? How do they, in layman's terms, contact those individuals and ensure that those individuals are not compromised in their situation of, say, their workplace or what have you? What is the process now?
What does the U.K. do in trying to eliminate those types of compromised individuals, who aren't even aware that they're possibly under the influence of foreign state actors?
4:30 p.m.
Senior Fellow, Sinopsis, As an Individual
The U.K. exposed an actor who was active in funding political candidates, and sent around a message to all of the MPs to warn them about this individual. They also found that there were staffers in parliamentary offices who they believe are under the influence of China. There are now legal cases ongoing about that.
We know from the CSIS documents about staffers in our Parliament and parliamentarians whom CSIS regards as being under the influence of a foreign power. They may sort of half understand the implications of what's going on.
I think once we have this process in place and we have this commissioner, the commissioner can make it clear to people where the lines are in terms of one's engagement with a hostile foreign power, and maybe inform their boss that this person may be providing information to a foreign power that they would prefer wasn't provided to a foreign power.
4:35 p.m.
Liberal
Heath MacDonald Liberal Malpeque, PE
How's my time, Mr. Chair? I have 16 seconds.
I want to go back to Mr. Kempa for a quick moment with regard to the function of CSIS now, compared to what will and should be the function of CSIS after this bill is passed.
Can you quickly say if it is just based on resources or working closely with the RCMP?
4:35 p.m.
Associate Professor, Criminology, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
It basically changes its role from being an entity that serves the government to an intelligence agency that circulates essential information to all manner of partners. It's a fundamentally different role. There's a capacity issue for sure, but also the purpose would require a shift in the culture of the organization.
4:35 p.m.
Associate Professor, Criminology, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Certainly. In a sense, this bill supports where CSIS is currently heading and has publicly stated it needs to head—
4:35 p.m.
Associate Professor, Criminology, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Am I finished? I'm sorry.
4:35 p.m.
Associate Professor, Criminology, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
No, I'll wait for another question to elaborate on the point.
4:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ron McKinnon
We're here for your answers, not for our questions.
Mr. Villemure, you have two and a half minutes.
4:35 p.m.
Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Since I only have two and a half minutes, I'm going to ask both witnesses the same question and ask them to give short answers.
Dr. Burton, in its current form, could the registry have prevented what happened at the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg?
4:35 p.m.
Senior Fellow, Sinopsis, As an Individual
If the register showed that there were people who were responsible for the lab and seemed to have influence with China, that would be one thing. We are puzzled by who authorized the presence of People’s Liberation Army researchers and some students in the lab. I don't want to get too political about this, but no one has been made accountable for what happened.
I'm also puzzled by how the two scientists—who, according to the minister, are still under investigation by the RCMP—were able to leave for China and continue to work in sensitive areas under new names.
4:35 p.m.
Senior Fellow, Sinopsis, As an Individual
I'm just at a loss as to how this situation came up, and I'm very disturbed about what it does for our reputation with other countries. Of course, there's the damage of the transfer of technologies to the Chinese state, which may not be using them for good public health purposes.