Evidence of meeting #110 for Public Safety and National Security in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was csis.
A video is available from Parliament.
6:45 p.m.
Conservative
6:45 p.m.
Conservative
Doug Shipley Conservative Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON
There have been some discussions and I think you might find UC to have us all vote remotely and just work through it now.
6:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ron McKinnon
I understand there have been discussions among members that we will carry on through the vote, and we will vote through the magic of our telephones and pause only very briefly. For those uninitiated, we have to do this funny thing. It's not magic; it's technology.
We will carry on with Mr. Villemure, if you wish, for six minutes, s'il vous plaît.
6:45 p.m.
Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Juneau‑Katsuya, what do you think of the notion that the registry require dual registration, i.e., that of the foreign agent himself and that of the person who is the subject of influence?
6:45 p.m.
Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Desk, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
That's absolutely necessary.
The Registry of Lobbyists is already in place, and we see all sorts of manoeuvring and strategizing behind closed doors right now. To ensure transparency and accountability, not only must the foreign agent report his or her meeting and the content of the conversation within 14 days, but so must the person who received the visit as well. This ensures that everyone remains honest. If there's a discrepancy between the two individuals' reports, a much more thorough investigation can be carried out.
6:45 p.m.
Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
All right, thank you very much.
Mr. Shull, I'll ask you the same question. What are your thoughts on dual registration?
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Managing Director and General Counsel, Centre for International Governance Innovation
I think the registry, the way that it's structured, is pretty good. It fixes a gap. It's not the end state, though. It's one tool in a broader tool kit, so I think the way it's written currently is okay.
You're raising some good questions around this table about independence and where the commissioner should sit and all of that, but as it's currently structured, I think the registry does a pretty good job of remedying the evil that it's designed to catch.
6:45 p.m.
Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Thank you very much.
Mr. Juneau‑Katsuya, in your opinion, if the proposed registry had been in place at the time, would it have prevented the situation that occurred at the Winnipeg lab?
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Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Desk, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
That's a good question.
I can't say at this point whether it could have been avoided. Checks should certainly be much more thorough. Existing policies and monitoring mechanisms were not followed, and that was the main aspect of the breach that took place. In this case, they were not foreign agents, but people who became Canadian citizens for a certain period of time. It could therefore be said that this was the case, theoretically.
That said, as soon as they co‑operated with a foreign agency, which is directly linked to the People's Liberation Army, by the way, they should have declared that contact, or risk being found culpable.
6:45 p.m.
Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
What do we do if scientists somewhere are stealing intellectual property? We can't expect them to register as intellectual property thieves. Certain monitoring measures will have to be tightened up.
6:50 p.m.
Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Desk, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
Yes, indeed, and that is where a new culture of national security must be developed, as I mentioned a moment ago. I believe that Bill C-70 is a step in the right direction to begin shaping the operational framework for investigators, who will be able to determine whether there are threats.
In fact, I tip my hat to the government for including educational institutions. That is a very good idea, as they've been the site of the largest theft of intellectual property for decades.
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Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
If I understand correctly, it's good to have a structure, but we should also establish a culture of national security.
6:50 p.m.
Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Desk, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual
Absolutely. To establish that culture requires leadership, and it must come from the federal government, which will authorize and promote awareness campaigns and partnerships with the private sector and the provinces, precisely to raise Canada's collective consciousness.
6:50 p.m.
Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Juneau‑Katsuya.
Mr. Shull, I'll now turn to you.
Earlier, you talked about including municipalities. Could we not also consider including universities and Crown corporations, for example? That's because part I of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act authorizes CSIS to transmit information to universities. However, part 4 of Bill C-70, which concerns the registry, is silent on universities and Crown corporations.
6:50 p.m.
Managing Director and General Counsel, Centre for International Governance Innovation
There's an important thing to be said for universities. For instance, when the debate was going about about Huawei and 5G, I brought forward an ATIP, and I pulled the access record called "Compute Canada". There's no reason that you should know what that is.
Compute Canada was set up as an intensive computing processor for many of our most research-intensive universities. Guess who built the back end? It was all Huawei.
That goes to what I was saying about my broader approach to national security as a strategic framework. It's not just investments over here. It's not just minerals over there. It's not just foreign registry over here. It's all of it. It behooves us, because hostile state actors are behaving in a strategic way, to have a strategic response.
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Bloc
René Villemure Bloc Trois-Rivières, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Shull.
As Mr. Bittle so kindly did, I will cede my time to my colleague.
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Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ron McKinnon
We have five minutes and 27 seconds.
Do you wish for us to pause for the moment, or do you want to start your questions?
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NDP
Alistair MacGregor NDP Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC
I'll just go right to the voting time. Thank you, Chair.
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NDP
Alistair MacGregor NDP Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Shull, I'd like to start with you.
I'm glad you brought up the consistency between SOIA and the new foreign influence transparency and accountability act. When I questioned Department of Justice officials last week, they said, to paraphrase them, that the definitions used in SOIA are within the context of SOIA, and there's a reason for this difference.
It can be confusing because the definition of "public office holder", specifically in part 4, does reference other acts that are more comprehensive.
I guess you're arguing to this committee that, for harmony's sake, SOIA and this act should have the exact same list.
6:50 p.m.
Managing Director and General Counsel, Centre for International Governance Innovation
They're going after the same evil.
I know exactly what you're saying. It references the Lobbying Act, but if you go to that provision of the Lobbying Act, it's actually enumerating things to which the Lobbying Act does not apply. It's a double negative and a circuitous definition. Just call it: just say what you mean.
6:50 p.m.
NDP
Alistair MacGregor NDP Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC
Thank you for clarifying that.
Mr. McSorley, I'd like to continue with you.
You've outlined the multiple concerns you have with some of the provisions in this act. I just want to centre in on the disclosure rules as written in this for CSIS.
I think I understand the rationale behind it. We do want to make it easier for the service to notify people who may be in positions of concern, but other than a few exceptions that govern how CSIS can release this information, it's really just up to the service, and it's not clear to me what the recipient of the intelligence would then do with it.
Do you have some suggestions for what this committee should do with that particular section? Are there additional safeguards you would like to see in this to govern how CSIS releases that?
6:50 p.m.
National Coordinator, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group
Certainly.
There are two key areas there. One is about personal information that could be shared with ministerial authorization, and there's information that doesn't contain personal information but can be shared more broadly for building resiliency.
In terms of what the minister can share, including personal information, we're concerned that's being opened up to any person or entity. We have grave concerns about international information-sharing and how that can have effects on the rights of Canadians who are travelling or people abroad. So we think there should be greater safeguards around how even ministerial authorizations can be shared.
It's important to note that under that there's a safeguard that requires that those kinds of disclosures be reported to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, and that's a very important safeguard. Unfortunately, under the new provisions for sharing information for resiliency, no such safeguard exists, so we think that maybe one of the things that could be considered is that there be reporting and transparency when CSIS is sharing that information for resiliency. The reason for that is, as I mentioned, that there have been reports, through NSIRA and others, about how the information is used as a follow-through. For example, even when CSIS shares information through its threat-reduction measures, NSIRA found that they don't take responsibility for charter breaches that could arise from how that information is being shared.
We think that having more accountability and transparency, even if it's just with NSIRA, could help to ensure that there's follow-up and some kinds of ways to ensure that it's not being used to violate the charter. Also, it could help to ensure that the veracity and accuracy of that information is being shared, because as we've heard today, sometimes that's at issue, too, in what CSIS is sharing. If it's shared with a university, how would they know whether or not it's accurate or right unless there were some kind of follow-up by another body?