Public Safety Committee on June 4th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 111 of this House of Commons standing committee.

Pursuant to the order of reference referred the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents.

Please take care to note the following preventive measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters: Use only the approved black earpiece. The former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you're not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose.

Thank you all for your co-operation.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format.

I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking, and I remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I have some specific comments on BillC-70.

I would like to remind members that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Friday, June 7, 2024. It is important for members to note that pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses for today.

With us we have Mr. Thomas Juneau, associate professor of public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa. We have Mr. Dan Stanton, former manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service. By video conference, we have Mr. Benjamin Fung, professor and Canada research chair at McGill University. We also have Mr. Javad Soleimani, director, Association of Families of Flight PS752 Victims, also by video conference.

Welcome to you all, and thank you for joining us today. Your interventions will be most helpful to us, I am certain.

I now invite Mr. Juneau to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Please go ahead, sir.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau, Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Today, I'm going to analyze Bill C‑70 from the perspective of transparency.

For three years, I chaired the National Security Transparency Advisory Group, an independent body that advises the deputy minister of Public Safety Canada and the intelligence community.

We produced three reports between 2019 and 2022, one of which focused on relations between security and intelligence agencies and minority communities. This is a relevant topic for the committee. I have stepped down as chair of the group, but am continuing my research into transparency issues.

In general, transparency is a tool that democracies underuse in the fight against their adversaries. More transparency, up to a point, of course, improves our national security. It's not an obstacle, quite the contrary.

In the context of the fight against foreign interference, transparency must occupy a central place. Our first line of defence against interference is often societal resilience. Public trust in institutions is an essential ingredient of this, and transparency is key to building that trust. Transparency is also essential to raise awareness among the public, civil society and the private sector, all of whom have a role to play in the face of the threat of interference. Lack of transparency, a major issue today, undermines our ability to protect ourselves against interference.

In Canada, the situation regarding transparency and national security is much better today than it was 10 or 20 years ago, but we can do much better.

I will address part I of Bill C‑70 on the modernization of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, or CSIS Act.

The first element I'm interested in is enabling CSIS to better communicate with actors outside the federal government. The service is seriously handicapped, given that the targets of foreign interference are often outside the federal government. However, greater transparency is essential in the exercise of these potential new powers. As part of the work of the National Security Transparency Advisory Group, we heard from a number of civil society activists. Mistrust of CSIS remains very high. We must patiently build bridges.

Concretely, what does this mean? Transparency must be practised more broadly. Communication with new partners, particularly in civil society, must be proactive and sustained, not just reactive or passive. This communication will be the result of exercising these new powers. We need to build trust, understand these new partners, and actually pass on information, not just symbolically. After the fact, CSIS must be transparent with Canadians and clearly explain what was done, why it was done, and disclose the results.

It's easy to say, but I recognize that it's very difficult to put into practice. It takes additional resources, which CSIS is sorely lacking at the moment. It also takes a change of culture, without which it will only partially work at best, because CSIS, despite the progress it has made, remains today far too insular an organization.

Bill C‑70 would also confer new powers on CSIS in terms of investigations, data collection and data management. Transparency is essential here, too. We must ensure that the relevant accountability mechanisms are adapted to the new powers. For example, the CSIS annual report should include as much information as possible on the use of these new powers. CSIS could also communicate proactively not only with the public and its partners, notably in civil society and the media, but also with parliamentarians, about the use of these new powers. This is essential, once again, to gain the public's trust and to enable accountability mechanisms to function properly.

Next, Bill C‑70 will also lead to the creation of the position of foreign influence transparency commissioner. Here again, transparency is essential. In concrete terms, the procedures to be followed to register will have to be transparent, clear and simple, and not cumbersome and bureaucratic, including in terms of possible mechanisms for receiving and managing complaints. The National Security Transparency Advisory Group has often heard the criticism, particularly from minority communities, that various mechanisms of this kind are not sufficiently accessible. There will also need to be an important dimension of public education, for example, through newsletters and notices.

Once again, it's much easier said than done. You need the right people with the right skills, authority and mandates. In reality, this isn't always available in Ottawa. All of these elements are essential for the proper functioning of accountability mechanisms, especially to help build awareness and, again, to improve societal resilience.

Finally, it will be essential to review this law every five years to improve and adapt it. In addition, ideally, the review process will include a public and transparent element to satisfy, again, all the societal resilience and awareness objectives, which were mentioned earlier. This commitment must be binding, if possible, and respected.

In the case of Bill C‑59 and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, we passed the five-year period two years ago, and this review has still not taken place, which is very unfortunate.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Juneau.

We now go to Mr. Stanton for an opening statement of up to five minutes.

[Daniel Stanton, Former Operations Manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon, committee members.

I'm going to talk about the disclosure of intelligence, the new regime that's proposed in Bill C-70, as well as the criminalization of foreign intelligence. I'm going to echo in some ways Thomas Juneau's remarks with respect to transparency, and I do confess we didn't have time to collaborate on this. It's purely coincidental.

The proposal to amend section 19 of the CSIS Act is going to amplify the range and scope of disclosures from where they are currently. It is something I had some personal experience with. I was an intelligence officer in CSIS for 32 years and I was seized with the disclosure regime.

The proposal, of course, under the rubric of building resiliency against threats, is that the service may disclose intelligence to those outside federal departments. We're hearing about the private sector. We're hearing about universities, particularly those engaged in sensitive research. We're hearing about other levels of government, including indigenous government bodies as well, and municipal government and law enforcement. A wider orbit is being proposed where intelligence will be shared in the interests of national security.

This is going to be a significant overhaul in terms of both the mandate of CSIS and of national security. I do say that this is way beyond foreign interference. This covers other programs that CSIS collects intelligence on. The government is going to decide in some ways how this intelligence is going to be shared.

Nobody's going to be opening taps and turning on spigots and declassifying information, but I think there's a lot of expectations in various sectors in Canada that this is actually going to be happening. We're still going to have the need-to-know principle. We're still going to have to have people who are security cleared to receive that intelligence. They're going to actually have to have a clearance. They're going to have to have background checks. We're going to have to ensure that this intelligence has the physical and IT protection to safeguard it. You can't have intelligence being provided to new partners and then a week later be reading it on social media.

I'm enthusiastic about it. I think it's going to really enhance the government's more holistic view and assessment of threats. It gives CSIS a lot more leverage as well. Echoing my colleague's remarks, it makes more transparency clearly with government.

The other aspect I wanted to make reference to is the criminalization of foreign intelligence and the measures to counter foreign intelligence. We're talking about clause 50. We're talking about the foreign interference and security of information act for the amendment. I'm very enthusiastic about this. When I testified at a committee a year ago in March, one of the comments I made was that unlike for terrorism and for espionage, there actually is no legislative hammer. There actually are no legal consequences of any significance for enablers of foreign interference. That's changing with this new legislation. I'm very excited about it. This will allow the government to basically prosecute, whether it's transnational repression or whether it's interference in our democratic processes.

I also find it interesting that in this bill there's an extraterritorial application going into this foreign interference and transnational repression. This makes a lot of sense, because CSIS's mandate in security intelligence is not limited to Canada; CSIS works around the world. In many ways this will complement their subsection 2(b) activities in terms of intelligence collection on transnational repression as well as interference in an election so that it can actually be prosecuted.

I'm going to quote specifically. They're saying that “Despite subsection 26(1), a person who commits an act referred to in subsection (1) while outside Canada is deemed to have committed it in Canada if...the victim is in Canada” or if the victim is abroad.

Let's say they're in India or they're in the People's Republic of China; they can still be prosecuted in Canada. There's no sanctuary in the fact that this activity or an aspect of this activity is taking place outside of Canada.

The legislation also calls for the same thing with consequences on influencing political government processes. Proposed subsection 20.4(1) reads:

20.‍4 (1) Every person commits an indictable offence who, at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign entity, engages in surreptitious or deceptive conduct with the intent to influence a political or governmental process

and continues:

2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable to imprisonment for life.

This is serious. This is what you get with espionage and this is what you get with terrorism. I'm delighted to see this coming into the foreign interference file. The particular SOIA amendments will offer criminal sanctions against clandestine foreign interference designed to benefit a foreign state in actions against the Canadian state, its interests or the exercise of democratic rights. This will open the way to laying foreign interference charges in Canada—something we have not seen and that I think we'd all agree is fairly relevant these days.

Lastly, I want to mention that there have been some adjustments to CSIS authorities in section 16. That's the non-threat-related foreign interference. I'm very enthused about that. I know it's giving CSIS a lot more of a holistic view in terms of the foreign intelligence mandate they have. I know the bill has its limitations, but I would like to see, at some point, the government scrap section 12 and section 16, because it's an anachronistic classification we have from the Cold War. I think this change signifies that the government is recognizing that we don't need collection within Canada of what is considered to be foreign intelligence.

That's it, and thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

We'll go now to Mr. Fung.

Mr. Fung, please make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

[Benjamin Fung, Professor and Canada Research Chair, McGill University, As an Individual]

Thank you.

Good afternoon, Chair and committee members.

As a professor and Canada research chair at McGill University, I focus my work on AI, cybersecurity and social media analytics. I would like to express my concern about foreign interference in Canadian academic institutions.

I would like to begin by sharing a personal experience. Over the past few years, a prominent Chinese 5G enterprise, which I will refer to as “Company H,” has repeatedly approached me with various research collaboration proposals. They offered me a consulting position on their AI team with a salary that is three times my earning as a professor. Despite my rejecting their offers, they persistently contacted me every few years. Just last year, they explicitly expressed interest in my work on malware analysis. Let me emphasize this again: This company is specifically interested in computer viruses. Clearly, this raises national security concerns.

Another tactic they use is offering research contracts through external organizations owned by professors. This would bypass any university or government approval processes. I'm sure Company H is not the only foreign state-controlled organization operating under the guise of a Canadian company.

As a scientist, I really hope this bill can address this national security risk. I urge our government to disclose a list of organizations, or have some mechanism that allows universities to query which companies are controlled or influenced by foreign governments in Canada and pose a national security risk. This transparency will help Canadian researchers avoid compromising collaborations.

In 2024, the Canadian government released a list of named research organizations in three foreign countries. This is a commendable step towards safeguarding our scientific contributions. However, it is crucial to understand that research projects conducted in any Chinese university can be repurposed for military use. The determining factor is not the collaborating organization but the potential application of the technology itself. Therefore, the assessment should be conducted at the country level regarding the sensitivity of research topics.

The second concern I have is that Chinese consulates in Canada maintain close ties with many Chinese student associations in Canadian universities, as seen in their co-organized events. For instance, the first event of Chinese student orientation is often a meeting with the Chinese consulate, rather than the university administrators or professors. This arrangement sends a clear message to the international Chinese student: “Be compliant. Big Brother in China is watching you.” This pressure can lead students to disclose information about their research, schoolmates or professors to foreign governments. If this bill is passed, it is crucial for university administrations to inform international students of its provisions. This bill will empower students to confidently reject requests from foreign governments.

I'm supportive of the bill with the following amendments.

First, I suggest removing the administrative monetary penalty. Maybe I don't fully understand that part, but this punishment seems to be too weak.

Second, currently, the CCP government purchases airtime from Chinese radio stations in Canada to broadcast their propaganda. I wonder whether these Chinese media should be registered in Canada.

Third, I support the idea of having two-tier registrations like the U.K. model. This will allow the Canadian government to impose more accurate restrictions on selected entities.

Fourth, with the advancement of AI technology, foreign interference activities are expected to change rapidly, so a more frequent periodic review of this act may be needed.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, sir.

We will now go to Mr. Soleimani to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Please go ahead, sir.

[Javad Soleimani, Director, Association of Families of Flight PS752 Victims, As an Individual]

Hello, everyone.

Thank you for this opportunity.

On January 8, 2020, I lost my wife, Elnaz, in the downing of Flight PS752 by the IRGC and the Iranian regime's missiles.

Before this meeting, I reached out to several active members of the Iranian-Canadian community, and today I will share first-hand experiences concerning the Iranian regime's threats on Canadian soil.

First, three months after the downing of Flight PS752 in March 2020, Hassan Rezaeifar, the lead investigator of the Flight PS752 case in Iran, contacted me. During a long conversation, which I recorded, he invited me to meet in Iran or France and later threatened me about removing an Instagram post criticizing the government of Iran. I refused, and shortly afterward my family was contacted by Iran's security intelligence services. Notably, Rezaeifar was one of the main individuals responsible for bulldozing the crash site and destroying evidence.

Second, the families of Flight PS752 victims have endured immense pressure from the Iranian regime, including summonses, detentions and physical torture. Some families have been banned from leaving Iran, and a judge in Iran has explicitly stated that the regime in Iran could target and remove those in Canada who oppose it.

Third, the IRGC perpetuates terror and threats both within Iran and globally. Members of the Basij, an IRGC branch, freely study, work and live here in Canada. Iranian Canadians across the country have been threatened by the regime's agents and supporters to remain silent or face consequences. The contact between IRGC and the families of Iranian Canadians in Iran who have protested against the regime clearly shows regime agents actively monitor and report on Iranian Canadians.

Fourth, there is reliable evidence that the Iranian regime has been actively promoting its agenda in Canada through various Islamic centres and groups, both at universities and within communities across the country. This should be investigated.

Fifth, Canadian officials have hesitated to list the IRGC as a terrorist organization and have explained that significant investments are made by the Iran regime and its members in Canadian real estate and businesses, which could potentially lead to chaotic conditions if they designate IRGC as a terrorist organization, so we shouldn't be surprised that the former head of the Tehran police, known for suppressing protests, stays freely in Canada.

Sixth, in July 2021, following the disclosure that the Iranian regime planned to kidnap Masih Alinejad, a prominent Iranian-American activist, and three others in Canada, the Canadian security services contacted some Iranian Canadians, including me, to ensure our safety. This incident highlights that our security services were previously unaware of the threats on Canadian soil.

Seventh, Canadian authorities have advised some active members of the Iranian-Canadian community to reduce their activities or maintain a low profile to avoid attracting attention. This advice raises serious concerns about public safety and national security in Canada.

To conclude, foreign interference by the Iranian regime in Canada is undeniable. Despite clear evidence of a threat to national security, there has been hesitation among Canadian officials to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization. It is crucial for Canada to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization in practice, not just symbolically with non-binding motions.

Thank you so much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, sir.

We will start our questions at this point.

We will go now to Mr. Caputo for six minutes, please.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank our witnesses, both here in person and on video, for being here on short notice on such an important matter.

I know it feels like I'm a really long way from our witnesses, but I'll try to direct my questions in as personable a way as possible.

Before I begin, Mr. Soleimani, I offer my deepest condolences on your loss. I can't imagine what it's like to lose somebody so close to you and somebody you love and then come here and talk about it when you haven't seen the requisite change.

I hadn't planned on asking you this, but I'm going to ask anyway: What impact do you think has occurred by virtue of the fact that we, as Canadian parliamentarians, despite multiple votes and the will of Parliament saying that it should be a terrorist entity and recognized as such, have not recognized the IRGC as a terrorist organization?

[Javad Soleimani]

Thank you so much.

As I mentioned earlier, designating the IRGC with non-binding motions is not effective. That's why we see top IRGC commanders in Canada right now. We can easily see active members of Basij, an important branch of the IRGC, coming to Canada to study, work and live, as well as identify and report Iranian Canadians to the Iranian regime.

Clearly, what we have done so far can't stop IRGC operations in Canada, and I don't understand why Canadian officials haven't listed the IRGC as a terrorist organization. Definitely there are some concerns about not affecting innocent people who had compulsory military service in Iran, but it's not rocket science. There are some legal ways to figure it out and list the IRGC as a terrorist organization without affecting innocent people.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Thank you for that.

This is for Mr. Stanton, and perhaps Mr. Juneau can chime in.

Professor Fung talked about what I would call an insidious mechanism of interference. It's somebody who's on a university campus, or.... I taught at a university in three different faculties, and this isn't something I ever saw, but from what Professor Fung was saying, this is happening fairly frequently.

Is that something you've experienced, sir, as somebody who worked for some time at such a high level in CSIS?

[Daniel Stanton]

I guess the question is whether the individual on campus would be considered a threat to national security. They'd have to meet that criterion under part 2, with the service already them.

I guess if something like what Mr. Fung raised came up, and then the service made some inquiries and was able to link it in any way to a foreign state, they would be investigating it. They would focus on the threat. There would have to be an individual that they would investigate.

The fact that they're in university.... It's a sensitive institution, but sensitive institutions in Canada are not sanctuaries in any way for threats, so they would still be pursued, regardless of the sector they're in.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Thank you.

Professor Juneau, do you have anything to add to that?

You don't. Okay.

I've asked this question before, and I've heard a range of answers. It's about the commissioner who would be appointed under this act with respect to foreign influence and transparency.

The commissioner would presumably be working at arm's length from the government, but may be a part of the government, as opposed to being fully independent. In this case, the commissioner would be appointed through an order in council. I believe there would be consultations with the House of Commons and the Senate, but approval would not be required through the House and the Senate.

Do you have any comments on that and the independence of the potential commissioner that we're debating in this legislation?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

If I can jump in quickly on that, I think it is absolutely essential that the commissioner be fully independent and be perceived as being fully independent, given the sensitivity of the issue and the very negative consequences of perceptions of a lack of independence. Even if it's an inaccurate perception of a lack of independence, if it's still a dominant perception, it will be very damaging to the work of that commissioner, which will be so reliant on trust and a perception of independence.

I would add that in terms of the nomination of that individual, consultations will be essential, but they should be public consultations. There should be some public and transparent elements to these consultations, again so that there's an element of consensus and legitimacy around that individual.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, sir.

We will go now to Mr. Dhaliwal. Please go ahead,

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today on this very important matter.

My questions will be for Mr. Stanton.

Mr. Stanton, following the tragic killing of Mr. Hardeep Singh Nijjar—a Canadian on Canadian soil, my constituent—at a place of worship in my riding of Surrey—Newton, I introduced a private member's motion, M-112, for the government to take action to deal with foreign interference, whether it's intimidation, violence or interference that they create.

Following that, the government brought in Bill C-70 to combat foreign interference. It is clear that there have been, and likely currently are, agents in Canada working on behalf of foreign states in order to undermine our sovereignty and our democratic institutions.

Do you believe that the amendments to the Criminal Code and the Security of Information Act will sufficiently address concerns related to transnational threats and violence to Canadians? If not, what else can be done?

[Daniel Stanton]

That's a good question.

I would say, sir, that, yes, the bill does address those, but when I look at the tragedy of what happened with Mr. Nijjar, I see that more as state assassination, state murder. I mean, I'll be blunt about it.

We can call it transnational repression, but “foreign interference” is used pretty broadly. For a lot of Canadians, when you say “foreign interference”, all sorts of things come to mind. In this case, we're looking at a considerable shift in the operations of a hostile foreign intelligence service, at sovereignty issues with Canada, and, of course, at the murder of a Canadian.

I can't say that the provisions that are going to come in with the legislation would have prevented that, but I would say they would probably mitigate the transnational threat environment, which was allowed to grow, develop, become sophisticated and become conducive to what they did.

That's sort of a half answer. I think the measures are good, but I don't think they would have prevented the tragedy that happened.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

It's my understanding that agents of foreign governments may have played through a chain of command. It may be very difficult to trace that chain of command to individuals abroad. Does Bill C-70 do enough to address and deter foreign interference and to penalize those who are not in Canada but overseas, or would we do something to do that?

[Daniel Stanton]

I would say that in a perfect world, they would be subject to a law enforcement investigation and a prosecution in the courts. If those foreign agents or intermediaries were in any way tied to this through evidence, I would rather see that sanctioned through our due process and a good prosecution.

I don't have enough understanding of the SOIA legislation to see where that would be a penalized. Maybe it could for someone who's not involved in the actual dirty work but maybe in some facilitation. Yes, they are abroad. That could be tied into it.

I would hope that if there's going to be any justice in this case, it would be within our courts and through our Criminal Code.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

Mr. Stanton, under the proposed legislative framework, those who undertake activities to influence government or political processes in Canada would be required to register publicly. What types of penalties or consequences should be imposed on those who may deliberately or knowingly not register?

[Daniel Stanton]

I don't have a background on the registry. To be frank, in the past I've said that I don't see it as being a great mitigator of foreign interference. I have to be candid on that. I think it will be helpful in terms of buttressing the Lobbying Act and a few things like that.

The more egregious acts of foreign interference, and certainly the interference in our democratic processes, are clandestine. The foreign agent registry provisions are to get people to identify as having agency with a foreign entity. However, they're not the clandestine actors; they're not the ones who are repressing our diaspora communities, tormenting people, harassing them, or meddling or interfering in our elections.

I'm not an authority on the registry, but I wouldn't look to that for any threat reduction in the interference realm in our democracy.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

The legislation proposes to enhance the capability of CSIS to collect and utilize datasets, and protecting privacy and personal information will be very important. Could you please give your thoughts on the steps taken to ensure that the data is properly used and protected?

[Daniel Stanton]

I have to say humbly that I have absolutely no background on that. I'm mostly a human source guy. I really don't have any expertise on datasets or their privacy implications.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

In your opinion, do you believe that Bill C-70 does enough to ensure that the diaspora communities are not stigmatized and victimized by the efforts to combat foreign interference?