Public Safety Committee on June 4th, 2024

[Daniel Stanton]

I think that's the hope. I think one thing that's saddened me a bit in the last few years, with all the talk on foreign interference in committees and media and things like that, is that some Canadians are going to start profiling communities, which is fundamentally wrong.

I think that's why the more education we have, the more we're talking, and the more we have things like this initiative, Bill C-70, and the reviews we've had, the less likely we are to see stereotyping and profiling. We've now had, I think, five commissions or inquiries related to national security, and Canadians are actually learning more about it.

That has always been my concern. That's part of the reason I speak out publicly on this. I don't want Canadians to think , because of what we're hearing through the media, that a particular group or community is in any way of questionable loyalty or reliability.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

It's now Mr. Villemure's turn.

You have the floor for six minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I thank all the witnesses who are with us today, those who are present virtually as well as those who are here in person.

Mr. Juneau, I'll start by addressing you.

You made an impressive case for transparency that fosters trust, which is, at its core, the ability to rely on others without always having to exercise control.

As for the registry, what do you think of the idea of dual registration for foreign agents? So the agent himself would have to register, as would the person who is the subject of the solicitation, transaction, whatever you want to call it.

The purpose of this double registration would obviously be to enable us to better identify the people involved in the event that someone declared something at one end, but not at the other.

For transparency purposes, do you think this dual registration could be an additional tool?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

It's a good question, and I have to admit, in all humility, that it's not an aspect I understand well. So I don't have a firm position, either for or against. I think I'd need more details on how the process works.

I know you put this question last week to officials from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness during a meeting of this committee, and their response referred to the workload it would involve.

As I said, I don't understand this specific issue well enough to take a position and say I'm for or against it. However, I must still express some sympathy, in general, for the answer they gave you, insofar as this department, like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, like other departments or community agencies, suffers from a serious lack of human, financial and other resources, and not only in terms of their powers; this is what Bill C‑70 will improve, in part.

Any new initiative, such as Bill C‑70, and particularly this notion of dual registration, implies an additional burden, and it's a very real problem.

In general, I'd like to point out to the committee that this issue of resources is a major problem.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

I'm glad you recall that answer that was given last week, because the idea of double registration is a bit…. The lobbyist registers with the Lobbyists Registry, but the other person doesn't; so the aim is to establish a more direct relationship. The answer that had been given was the fact that it was a financial and organizational burden.

Subsequently, looking at the report released yesterday by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, I said to myself that we couldn't afford not to do it. I understand the department's response. However, it surprised me.

In fact, if we deal with foreign interference the way we want to, the financial burden cannot be the only criterion that will counterbalance the issue.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

I quite agree, in general, that this cannot be the only criterion. However, it still reflects a reality and I think it represents a constraint on public comment and ideas that are expressed in the media or by governments, by the opposition or by civil society. This constraint, which is very often ignored, is, in practice, very real.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Indeed, the constraint is real.

Of that, we can be sure.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

Yes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

I'd like to continue on the subject of the registry. I really like Mr. Stanton's comment that foreign undercover agents are obviously not registered. For the moment, I'm ignoring that.

Do you think that, for holders of public office, a three-year post-tenure restriction period, for example, would be a laudable thing? It would mean, for example, prohibiting cabinet members from being on the payroll—I don't like that expression—or rather from working for a foreign entity and benefiting from information that only they can have.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

I fully agree with the notion of a restriction period, in general, and specifically in this case. I think it's necessary. Again, to draw a parallel with a point mentioned earlier in response to your colleague's question, there's the issue of perception. Public trust is essential, especially when there is no restriction period. Is the ideal restriction period one, three or five years? We could argue about that, but generally speaking, I think the principle is fundamental.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

I agree with your notion of perception and reality when it comes to trust. It's all very well to say that the commissioner is independent, that there's a registry and certain provisions, but if the perception isn't there, reality doesn't matter.

With regard to the independence of the commissioner, you've stated quite clearly that he or she must be truly independent and perceptibly so.

At the moment, the way the commissioner is appointed is problematic. In my opinion, the three parties should be involved in the choice rather than simply consulted.

You mentioned the five-year review. If I remember correctly, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act came into force in 1984, and was reviewed in 1990. The Privacy Act of 1983, on the other hand, has not been reviewed. It seems to me that governments don't tend to do these revisions.

This is problematic because the Privacy Act existed before the Internet was created.

What could be done to ensure that this is done? Should an annual report be requested from the commissioner?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

I think the production of an annual report by the commissioner is essential. If there isn't one, there's a serious problem. In addition to the review every five years or at some fixed period, the commissioner must produce an annual report, table it in Parliament and set out all his activities and everything that is normally in an annual report.

The five-year review is essential. Bill C‑59, which was passed, established the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. I'm still looking for the French acronym. The bill provided for a review every five years. It was due in 2022 and it hasn't happened yet. For me, this is a problem, because when the committee was created, the world was a bit different. It's going to be even more different in three, seven and twelve years' time. These reviews are fundamental to adapting, reforming the law and making even minor changes. What's more, it's an opportunity to ask ourselves whether we have the right resources or the right powers.

I know I'm repeating myself, but the public dimension of these revisions is crucial to show the public, civil society and parliamentarians that we're thinking about these issues, making the necessary changes, among other things. When we don't, we miss important opportunities.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, sir.

We go now to Mr. MacGregor. You have six minutes, please.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I appreciate all of the witnesses being here today. Thank you very much for your testimony thus far.

Mr. Stanton, I'll start with you. I'm glad that you clarified for the committee a bit more about the CSIS disclosure process. There are still some very important safeguards in there requiring security clearance, the safety of the information transmitted and so on.

Very briefly, when I'm looking at this section, can you just walk me through the process within CSIS? Is this a director-level decision on making a disclosure ruling?

[Daniel Stanton]

That's a good question.

Let me start with how it begins. For example, when I was a field officer in the region—I worked in three regions—I would want to talk to someone, and let's say they had an interesting contact with someone, so I would make a disclosure. I would say what organization I'm with and, “I'm Dan.” At some point during an interview, without my saying too much, they're going to know that I'm interested in “Mr. Blah-blah”.

In order to carry out their mandate, CSIS people themselves, in various capacities, can make disclosures. In many ways it's to carry out the mandate; it could be a bit of gaining someone's confidence or at some point getting support and maybe even eventually having a source relationship. They can do that. However, the day-to-day stuff that's reported to government is going to government readers, and it won't be a high-up sign-off, really. It will be just a regular process, as we've seen with these inquiries, in which there are all sorts of intelligence products going to various government departments—assessments, raw material—and it won't be much higher than a middle manager decision.

It gets really dicey when you get into things like intelligence being provided to law enforcement. That's when people start getting nervous and when you're going to have higher involvement. A director general will have input into it, or something even more sensitive is obviously going to be bounced up to the executive level.

There are protocols in place.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you.

Also during your opening statement, you made mention of the term “transnational repression”, which is what we heard from our witnesses yesterday representing Uyghurs and, of course, Tibetans. They were urging the committee to include a definition of transnational repression. In my opinion, we're probably looking at the SOIA section of the bill, given that we already have amendments here that deal with intimidation and threats or violence. There are numerous sections that go after foreign interference from the clandestine foreign operations in our country.

Do you have thoughts on a definition of transnational repression, or do you think the way the SOIA amendments are currently written addresses that in its entirety?

[Daniel Stanton]

I think it addresses it. I have to say, first of all, that I don't have a legal background, so I'm looking at it from a threat perspective, and most of my career was in counter-intelligence.

CSIS has their definitions, for example, from the CSIS Act. In this case, it would fall under section 2. What we call transnational repression is foreign interference that actually targets the émigré communities, manipulating and threatening and potentially killing. I don't know if a definition is going to give CSIS any more authorities that they don't need. I don't think, in terms of indictable offences and the criminalization of transnational repression, that it's really going to make a difference. Then again, I'm not a lawyer.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

As I was following their testimony, everything they thought should be included in the definition of transnational repression seemed to already be included in this bill, just in different sections. I appreciate your thoughts on that.

Professor Juneau, I'm going to reference part 4 of the bill, which sets up the new commissioner.

There have been a few different opinions about this bill being country-agnostic. Other private members' bills have opted for a scheduled list, because some countries certainly are worse, in our opinion, than others, given what they're trying to do here on Canadian soil.

Do you have any thoughts about this bill being country-agnostic and just leaving it open to any country?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

I find that there are good arguments on both sides. I'm not avoiding the question, but I wouldn't say that there's one really good and one really bad option in country-agnostic or not. I would tend to very cautiously lean on being against the country-agnostic approach, but barely, if only for what we were discussing in one of the previous questions, which is the issue of workload.

The reality is that the community as a whole is overstretched. It's hollowed out. Threats are proliferating. We all know that. Would it simplify or streamline it a bit by having a list of countries that pose a threat at this level? I think the answer might be yes to that. That might be a good argument. Building that list would obviously be controversial. There would be disagreements, but I still think it could be doable.

Government does complicated things all the time, and establishing a list of countries that pose a foreign interference threat is something that I think we should be able to do and adopt, even if it means changing it every six months or every year as situations change.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

I mentioned that because right now we have a very complicated relationship with India. Sometimes there can be trade interests versus national security interests, and I'm wondering about that.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

In a way, having a country-agnostic list is a way of avoiding that debate.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you for that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

We'll start our second round. We will end this round with Mr. MacGregor down the way.

We'll go now to Mr. Genuis for five minutes, please.