Public Safety Committee on June 4th, 2024

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

This is a really strong panel, with people with diverse experience. I'm sorry to those I don't get to with questions. So many interesting and important things were said.

Mr. Soleimani, thank you for highlighting the need to list the IRGC as a terrorist organization and to use our existing laws to combat foreign interference. As the proposer of two of those non-binding motions in Parliament, I completely agree with you: Non-binding motions are not enough. We want to see executive action listing the IRGC as a terrorist organization.

As opposition members, we use the tools we have to try to highlight the issue, and the goal is to push the government to act. The government has, while voting in favour of both of those motions, sadly still not acted.

Conservatives have also tabled Bill C-350, which would list the IRGC as a terrorist organization. We've tried to expedite that bill, but Liberals have blocked those efforts.

Mr. Soleimani, I was particularly struck by something you revealed in your testimony. It was that law enforcement in Canada—if I heard correctly—are asking activists in the Iranian community to keep a low profile, essentially encouraging them not to speak out about important issues, not to be doing their important work of highlighting human rights issues in Iran for fear of their safety here in Canada.

Can you clarify if I understood that right and speak to who is delivering these messages and who is receiving them?

[Javad Soleimani]

Thank you so much, Garnett.

It was my personal experience and that of some other active members of the Iranian Canadian communities. It was in the middle of the Woman, Life, Freedom revolution that I was contacted by a person from security services. He clearly mentioned to me that maybe the best way to avoid attraction from the Iranian regime was to keep a low profile.

Then where is freedom of speech? Here in Canada, should we be afraid of the Iranian regime? This is exactly what the Iranian regime wants. Many Iranian Canadians do not feel safe in Canada. Why? It is because agents and supporters of the Iranian regime are here. Obviously, they identify and report active members of the Iranian Canadian community to the Iranian regime. Then the Iranian regime contacts their families inside Iran.

It's so clear that the Iranian regime agents are here among us. It's a national security threat. We don't feel safe.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Yes, absolutely.

Moreover, of course people don't feel safe if the message they're getting from law enforcement, instead of “Exercise your rights and we'll have your back”, is “Don't exercise your rights; be quiet. That's the only way you'll be protected”. That is shocking and horrifying to me.

If I were told as a member of Parliament by security services that I should be quiet about certain issues and keep a low profile for my own safety, that would clearly be unacceptable. Members of the public and citizens and activists, regardless of their background, must be free to exercise their charter-guaranteed rights and know that they will be protected in doing so.

Could you clarify specifically which security agency delivered that message?

[Javad Soleimani]

It was CSIS.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

That's very troubling. I think that's something we'll need to follow up on.

Very quickly, Mr. Fung, I think you mentioned in your opening statement that foreign state-controlled media outlets are here. There's a private member's bill, Bill C-281, from my colleague Philip Lawrence, that would seek to limit the ability of foreign state-controlled media to get broadcasting licences in certain kinds of situations when those are hostile authoritarian states.

What would be your view on such provisions? Should we consider restricting broadcasting licences from entities that are controlled by hostile foreign states?

[Benjamin Fung]

Yes, definitely we should control that. Currently, basically the Chinese government is buying airtime from some popular Chinese radio stations in the Vancouver and Toronto areas to broadcast their propaganda.

Of course, another channel that we should consider is social media, such as WeChat and TikTok. Those are creating even more problems in terms of propaganda from foreign governments.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Genuis.

We'll go now to Mr. Gaheer for five minutes, please.

[Iqwinder Gaheer, Liberal, Mississauga—Malton, ON]

Great. Thank you, Chair.

I'm very appreciative of the witnesses for appearing before the committee.

Mr. Stanton, my questions are largely for you. They're actually along the lines of what Mr. MacGregor was asking about. I want to talk about disclosure and how it currently works at CSIS.

You mentioned a range of disclosures in your opening testimony. If there is pertinent information—let's say with regard to foreign interference—who can that information be shared with? Is there a limitation on who it can be shared with? Who decides whether that disclosure should be made or not?

[Daniel Stanton]

It depends on the purpose.

CSIS is collecting intelligence all the time. Their mandate is to collect, report to government, provide advice and then do some other activities. They're not hard-wired in such a way that they have to always disclose or need to. Obviously, if it's threat-related, and certainly if it's a physical threat or anything like that, they will do everything they can to make sure that it's disclosed, either directly from them or maybe through law enforcement for something like that, if it's something involving a physical threat. We call it “life or limb”.

If it's something like the issue that came up earlier in some House committees about members of Parliament, for example, and things like that, obviously they're looking at a better way of giving CSIS the authority to make the disclosure. That's the point. That's the reason I raised section 19 amendments. The reason CSIS hasn't been making those disclosures isn't that they lack imagination or they're obsessed with secrecy; it's because it's the law. They're actually prohibited from disclosing intelligence to the outside. You will be in non-compliance, and there are all sorts of things like that.

There are disclosures that will be made as part of carrying through an investigation, for example. A bit of information is given to get information in an interview, and things like that, but this will be new. This will be new for the service. This will be new territory. They'll have to come up with strategic reasons that it is in the interest of Canada, basically, the public interest, to make these disclosures of intelligence.

[Iqwinder Gaheer, Liberal, Mississauga—Malton, ON]

I guess one of my fears is that perhaps CSIS has a few pieces of that puzzle and perhaps other law agencies also have a few, but it's only when you combine all of that information that you see a full picture, or enough of the picture, that it can be raised to a certain level where perhaps charges are laid or an investigation is launched.

Do you think the bill will change this regime so that more information is shared?

[Daniel Stanton]

If more is shared or provided to those traditional non-partners....

However, let's forget if there are any changes coming. There's constant co-operation and sharing going on with various entities. You don't have to have a disclosure regime if they're meeting with a municipal police force or a provincial police force or whatever. There's information shared and assessed. They don't necessarily have to have a framework and authorities to pass it on. What we're talking about here is when they're not going to that typical orbit of partners, we'll say—those that aren't part of that normal group of sharing to whom you can actually give intelligence—and they give them something, for example, in a university.

However, in terms of a threat, let's say, in a community, CSIS would be liaising with everybody, with all levels of government or entities that might have, I guess you could say, an equity in these investigations.

[Iqwinder Gaheer, Liberal, Mississauga—Malton, ON]

This was raised in earlier testimony as well. Would there ever be a situation in which CSIS could share information with a foreign entity—perhaps a consulate or an embassy?

[Daniel Stanton]

They have arrangements with hundreds of foreign agencies—security and intelligence agencies, police agencies internationally, in various scopes and ranges of co-operation—so there's a lot of sharing going on, and of course there's a lot of care from a human rights perspective with sharing.

Yes, they share with many international partners in whatever venue or means. It's whatever is, I guess you could say, secure and convenient.

[Iqwinder Gaheer, Liberal, Mississauga—Malton, ON]

Could you talk a little bit about what checks and balances are in place so that the wrong information is not shared with a foreign actor, which could be used against a Canadian or perhaps their families overseas?

[Daniel Stanton]

Yes, absolutely.

CSIS exercises a lot of due diligence in terms of information they're going to pass to a foreign agency that has, for example, a terrible human rights record, and there are lots of them overseas. In many cases CSIS won't pass anything if that person could be subject to all sorts of things.

It's the same in receiving information. They're very skeptical about whether that information came from coercion or financial incentives—all sorts of things. It depends on the relationship and the reliability of that foreign agency. They're very careful about any information that's going to go over into intelligence channels in another state and the implications of how it's going to be handled are beyond their control.

[Iqwinder Gaheer, Liberal, Mississauga—Malton, ON]

Great. Thank you so much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Gaheer.

Mr. Villemure, you now have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Stanton, in your opinion, would the passage of Bill C‑70 have prevented the situation that occurred at the National Microbiology Laboratory located in Winnipeg?

[Daniel Stanton]

I don't think so, because my take on that, just from what I've read—and it's no different from anyone in the public—is that there were very shoddy security practices, to say the least. That was conducive to somebody possibly committing economic espionage or possibly taking advantage of the situation.

I think the pressure there is more on that department's internal security and physical security practices for signalling that there was a problem here, and then CSIS coming in, as you know, in the security clearance assessment. It wasn't as though CSIS came in on some big investigation; they were just doing a clearance assessment, and they discovered all this was there.

I think that's probably a breakdown outside the CSIS mandate in a way, and more of a government problem.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you.

My next question is for Mr. Juneau.

Mr. Juneau, we've talked a lot about transparency. I'd like to talk to you about the report that was released yesterday by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Today, people were asking for the names of parliamentarians to be released. However, the law on the classification of information, among other things, does not allow this.

We're talking about the necessary secrecy to accomplish the mission of the committee of parliamentarians and the desire for transparency. How can we reconcile these two imperatives, which may seem paradoxical?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

That is an excellent question, one that arises in all contexts as soon as we talk about national security and intelligence, not just in the context of the work of the committee of parliamentarians.

There are several elements to this answer. While respecting the imperatives of the different levels of classification, there is a great deal of information that I believe can be made public. However, it isn't by the community at large, for all sorts of reasons: a culture of secrecy, a—

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Is overclassification one of the possible reasons?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

That's my next point. Absolutely. Overclassification is an epidemic within the Canadian government and other governments, too. We are by no means unique in this regard.

Another reason is, notably, the risk-averse culture, where—I'm simplifying this massively—you get penalized for mistakenly releasing information that shouldn't have been, whereas you don't get penalized for overclassifying any. So the incentive system is completely tilted in that direction.

Also, there can be a lack of clarity. It's one thing to tell employees of CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or the RCMP to be transparent, but what does that mean in practice? Under whose authority must they be transparent? What do we say? What don't we say? Are you protected by your bosses? Are you protected by politics? Sometimes, it's not the bureaucracy that shows resistance, but rather the political milieu, not for security reasons, but to avoid the political embarrassment to which disclosure of information could lead.

The question you raise is therefore extremely important, and is at the heart of all debates on transparency. In several respects, there is the cultural aspect and there is the aspect linked to the authorities in place.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, gentlemen.

We will end with Mr. MacGregor.

You have two and a half minutes, please.