Public Safety Committee on June 5th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 112 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents.

Please take note of the following preventative measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters in particular. Only use a black, approved earpiece. The former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you're not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose. Thank you all for your co-operation.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. I will remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I have specific comments to make on Bill C-70. I would like to remind members that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m., eastern standard time, on Friday, June 7, 2024. It is important for members to note that, pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.

I will also note, for all members of the committee, that the charter statement on Bill C-70 has been distributed, and you should find it in your inboxes.

I'd like to now welcome our witnesses for today.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

I have a point of order, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to make sure that the sound checks have been completed for the interpreters and those participating in the meeting by video conference.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Yes, all tests are done.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

I'd now like to welcome our witnesses for today.

With us, as an individual, we have Mr. Richard B. Fadden.

Welcome back. I remember having you here before.

From Canada-Hong Kong Link, we have Gloria Fung, immediate past-president. By video conference, for Hong Kong Watch, we have Katherine Leung, policy adviser.

I'd like to thank you all for your participation in our meeting today and for your flexibility in appearing so quickly.

I now invite Mr. Fadden to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Please go ahead, sir.

[Richard Fadden, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you on Bill C-70. I am especially grateful for this opportunity because it addresses a number of issues that I and many others have advocated on for some time.

Bill C-70 is a relatively complex and, in some cases, quite technical piece of legislation. However, its overarching thrust goes a considerable distance towards dealing with the threat of foreign interference—again, a threat that has been with us for some time. In particular, the creation of offences relating to foreign interference and the creation of the foreign influence transparency commissioner and of the registry he or she will be required to maintain will provide tools that Canada is lacking. These measures will not make foreign interference go away, but they will help deal with the threat.

As well, the provisions amending the CSIS Act, permitting the service to disclose information much more broadly than is currently the case, will assist government institutions, as well as the private sector and civil society, in understanding and dealing with threats to our national security. In this respect, these amendments will help deal not only with foreign interference but also with other threats to national security.

I have two last comments. The first deals with concerns that I have seen reported in the media to the effect that some provisions in the bill risk charter compliance issues. I am not a charter lawyer. Indeed, I am a lapsed lawyer. However, I do not see this risk in the actual words of the bill. Is there a possibility that its implementation might increase the risk? Possibly.

Having said this, it seems to me that this is frequently the case with any law that creates offences. However, I do not believe—and I hope you will agree with me—that such concerns should prevent you from approving Bill C-70. I think that there are four reasons for this. First is the certificate of the Minister of Justice, which the chair just referenced. I also think that Parliament is entitled to believe in the good-faith implementation of the law by ministers and officials. If there is a real problem, there is always recourse to the courts. Finally, if there are really serious problems, you can change the law.

My last comment relates to what I understand is the view of some: that Bill C-70 should not be dealt with on a fast track. I would suggest to the contrary that the expeditious review and passage of Bill C-70 is in the national interest. I can see no possibility that our geopolitical adversaries will in any way in the foreseeable future modify their behaviour so as to lessen threats to our national security. These threats are real and affect virtually every part of our country: the private sector, civil society, individuals and governments at all levels. NSICOP, NSIRA and the Hogue inquiry all clearly support the view that the threats you are considering are real and require action. To not deal with Bill C-70 in the days and weeks ahead and—if you'll forgive me for saying so—in an environment increasingly affected by the possibility of an election could mean the demise of Bill C-70.

My last thought is that, even if Bill C-70 were to receive royal assent next week, implementation will take some time, and I hope you will take this into account as you consider time frames relating to the bill.

Thank you for your attention, and in due course, I'd be more than happy to try to answer your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, sir.

I now invite Ms. Fung to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Please go ahead.

[Gloria Fung, Immediate Past President, Canada-Hong Kong Link]

Mr. Chair and distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to comment on Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act.

I'm the immediate past-president of Canada-Hong Kong Link and convener of the Canadian coalition for a foreign influence transparency registry. The coalition established in 2021 consists of 33 multicultural community organizations, think tanks and human rights groups across Canada. Our mission is to advocate for a foreign influence registry to be enacted in Canada to enhance transparency in the democratic process.

Over the past two decades, both CSIS and Canadian civil society have repeatedly warned our government about foreign interference and transnational repression in Canada, but they have remained complacent. The transnational repression faced by diaspora communities includes telephone threats, cyberbullying and smearing of Canadians through disinformation campaigns, surveillance, coercion and harassment through counterprotests and physical attacks.

The Chinese Communist Party is by far the most active state player in this interference operation through its sophisticated network involving hundreds of proxies, posing a major threat to our national security, sovereignty and democracy. Canada is at the back door to the U.S., China's adversary. By infiltrating Canada, China can access sensitive intelligence information of the U.S., the Five Eyes allies and NATO.

CCP agents capitalize on the openness of our democratic system to infiltrate community, media, academic and business sectors. They are active in undermining our democratic institutions at all levels of government.

As we recently brought together eight MPs from all five federal parties to call for the immediate introduction of legislation to counter foreign interference, our coalition welcomes the bill and strongly supports the emerging non-partisan consensus to get the registry passed and to get it up and running before the 2025 election call. We hope the House can send it to the Senate before it rises for the summer.

I would like to make the following recommendations.

Number one, the government should set up an independent commission to coordinate and monitor the implementation and future periodic reviews of the act.

Number two, the act and corresponding regulations should be reviewed and updated within one to two years after the 2025 federal election. After this, they can be reviewed once every five years in accordance with the rapidly evolving foreign threats.

Number three, for the purpose of the registry, “political activity” defined in the act needs to be expanded to include elections to internal political offices; political party leadership contests; appointments of individuals to public offices; government hiring decisions; third party political advertising; decision-making within parliamentary and legislative caucuses, such as the selection of officers, expulsion of members and removal of leaders; law enforcement decisions; and decisions of tribunals and regulators.

Number four, legislation should allow authorities to be proactive in implementing the registry. In Australia, for instance, authorities can send a request for information to determine whether or not individuals or entities need to register.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

You're right on the dot. Thank you very much.

We go now to Ms. Leung to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Please go ahead.

[Katherine Leung, Policy Adviser, Hong Kong Watch]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm the policy adviser for Hong Kong Watch in Canada, and I am before the committee today to speak to Bill C-70.

Hong Kong Watch supports the speedy passage of the countering foreign interference act such that it will be in place before the next election. We support the bill as a whole, but I will use my time to speak with emphasis on suggested amendments that would ensure that the scope of the bill would thoroughly address foreign interference.

We support the proposed amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, especially amendments related to equipping national security partners to build resiliency to threats by enabling broader disclosure of CSIS information to key partners beyond the Government of Canada. Foreign interference is not limited to governmental targets but rather affects individuals and organizations across various sectors.

We know, from media reports and previous committee testimony, that there are considerable foreign interference activities targeting Canadian universities, businesses and technology. This is why broadened information disclosure will allow institutions to better understand and anticipate potential threats and to take proactive measures to safeguard their operations and intellectual property.

We're also supportive of the proposed measures to counter foreign interference under part 2 of the bill. The creation of new offences for foreign interference, including deceptive acts that undermine democratic processes and harm Canadian interests, is much needed. These amendments address the reality that foreign interference often targets individuals at the grassroots level, thereby indirectly influencing democratic processes and Canadian interests.

While intimidation, threats and violence are tactics used by foreign entities to silence dissent within diaspora communities, discrimination is another method employed to suppress opposition. We have seen cases in which individuals in Canada have faced job loss or eviction from their homes due to their political opinions.

We would be supportive of proposed amendments that acknowledge the tactic of discrimination and provide mechanisms to counter it effectively. We also support the creation of the foreign influence transparency registry. By imposing obligations on individuals and entities to register arrangements and disclose foreign influence activities, the Government of Canada can increase transparency and accountability.

However, it is important to expand the scope of the act beyond political processes. Much of foreign interference occurs at the community level, where it can suppress public discourse and indirectly influence democratic processes.

Let me illustrate how transnational repression as a form of foreign interference can have an impact on political processes. This is from a case study of a Hong Konger in Canada, which I heard about through my work at Hong Kong Watch. A pro-democracy activist from Hong Kong fled to Canada in 2020, after participating in the 2019 protests and encountering police altercations that led to the detention of her friends. She claimed asylum, settled in Calgary and continued her advocacy for democracy in Hong Kong. She is one of the founding members of a group of volunteers who assist persecuted Hong Kongers seeking asylum in Canada.

Since publicly criticizing the Chinese government, she has received anonymous threats on Telegram, including harassing messages about her appearances and advocacy, and graphic videos, including a bloody video of a woman suffering severe blunt force trauma to the head and a video of a beheading, with captions referencing her involvement in pro-democracy organizations. The sender also disclosed personal details about her life, including her boyfriend's name, her employer and her workplace address. She has reported these threats to CSIS and the RCMP.

As Bill C-70 is written, the anonymous sender in this case would not trigger a requirement to register as a foreign agent. This is not an activity directly related to parliamentary or legislative proceedings, development of a legislative proposal, development or amendment of a policy or program, decision-making by a public office holder or government body, elections, referendums or nomination contests. Rather, this is something that has silenced this individual. Due to fears for her safety, she no longer participates in pro-democracy advocacy for Hong Kong, despite permanently living in Canada.

Foreign states use transnational repression to discourage dissent by diaspora communities, thereby undermining democratic participation and the ability of elected officials to represent their constituents fully. Expanding the act to encompass all levels of foreign interference activities, including transnational repression and intimidation, will provide a more comprehensive safeguard against these threats.

With that, I conclude my remarks here.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you for your remarks.

Thank you, all. We will start our questioning at this point, beginning with Mr. Caputo.

Mr. Caputo, go ahead for six minutes.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

That's great. Thank you very much, Chair.

I thank all of the witnesses. We have had some wonderful witnesses here today. We've had excellent witnesses throughout, but this panel in particular really stands out to me.

Ms. Leung, Ms. Fung and Mr. Fadden, thank you for being here. I have only six minutes, but there's really so much to ask.

Mr. Fadden, I'm going to key in on the first note that I took from what you said. You said that this threat has been with us for some time. Now, we've heard from different people, but you have a fairly distinguished background in this regard.

How long has this issue been with us, and is it intensifying or are we just more likely to discover it right now?

[Richard Fadden]

I think it's difficult to pick a particular day or week or month, but I would say that it has been with us in a noticeable way since easily the last couple of years of Mr. Harper's government. It existed before then, but I think, with the passage of time, it has intensified and it continues to intensify.

The most noticeable increase in intensity occurred after President Xi became the leader of China. His activity is much more aggressive and proactive, and that's been manifested in all of the policies of the People's Republic, both with respect to foreign interference and more generally.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

All right. Obviously, this act is country-agnostic so far, but have you noticed this intensity from any other foreign state actors?

[Richard Fadden]

I think, Mr. Chairman, that China stands out, but I also think, as has been reported in the media, that Iran is becoming slightly more active. I think India is as well, not just with respect to the killing of Mr. Nijjar but throughout the community.

Russia operates, I think, in a slightly different way. If China covers the waterfront as much as they can, Russia tends to be more specific. They're more like a surgeon. They do intervene. I don't think that has necessarily increased in intensity a great deal, but they're there and they continue to intervene, although not necessarily through their diaspora. That's the one big difference between them and China.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

I see what you're saying.

You commented that there's been a fairly recent difference in intensity when it comes to foreign interference. Is that solely in terms of foreign state actors having a greater desire to interfere, or is there something happening here in Canada—a lack of enforcement, perhaps—that is playing into that?

[Richard Fadden]

I think it's a bit of both. As I said a minute ago, China in particular but also others have become much more aggressive and assertive, but I also think that, compared to our close allies, Canada has been a little bit slower in providing the state with tools to deal with this.

I'm not suggesting that it's been ignored, but I am suggesting that it's taken us a while to get there. The United States, the United Kingdom and Australia have dealt with this issue, I think, more quickly than we have. Your colleagues in Australia, for example, have enacted a variety of pieces of legislation to directly address both foreign interference and espionage.

I think the main difference is that, when an adversary goes through a list of countries it wants to attack, it will do something in each of them, but if there's one that is slightly less organized, slightly less structured to push back, the adversary will make a bit of an effort there.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Okay. Thank you.

Now, Ms. Leung, you said that interference “targets individuals at the grassroots level”, and you even talked about job losses and evictions, things that people in this room might not be used to hearing about. When I think of interference, certainly I think of different things than those. Can you expand a little bit on that? You talked about the silencing of individuals as opposed to the impacts on governments.

We have about a minute and a half. Are you prepared to expand on that for that time?

[Katherine Leung]

I can give a case study for both of these cases.

The job loss one involved a community member from the Hong Kong diaspora here in Canada who told me that he was employed by someone of Chinese descent here in Canada, and that person had very strong feelings about the Hong Kong pro-democracy movement.

Now, it's notable that he came to Canada under the Hong Kong pathway after having participated in the pro-democracy movement. His employer told him that it was not because of his political opinions that he was treating the community member in this way, but shortly after that, the man was mistreated to the point where he left his position.

The other case is that of a young woman who was renting a shared house in Toronto. She participated in a pro-democracy protest in 2019 in Canada, brought home posters, flyers from the protest and put them up in her room, which was her space. Her landlord then evicted her. It was shortly after that she found out that this landlord was a core member of the United Front in Canada.

That is a bit of context as to what that means.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Thank you.

I see that I only have 15 seconds, so I will pass the baton, at this point, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Caputo.

We'll go now to Mr. Bittle for six minutes.

Please go ahead, sir.

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, St. Catharines, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'll start my questions with Mr. Fadden. I appreciate a fellow lapsed lawyer. There are a few of them around the table on both sides.

I was wondering if you could talk a bit about how this legislation balances providing CSIS with modernized authorities while still ensuring transparency, oversight and independent review.

[Richard Fadden]

I think, principally, that the bill maintains quite heavy involvement of the Federal Court in anything being proposed. This is not to be trite, but a friend of mine was reading the bill and said it seemed like an employment opportunity for the Federal Court. I mean, the Federal Court is mentioned a lot in this bill.

If any of you were to ask me if I thought anything could be done to the bill to improve it, I would say to simplify it a bit. However, I understand there are a whole bunch of checks and balances written into it.

Fundamentally, the requirement for CSIS to obtain ministerial authority for the use of datasets and a whole variety of other things, both from the minister and as it goes to the court, will ensure they stay squarely within the law. The authority being given to CSIS to speak more broadly with civil society and the private sector will simply make these issues more understandable to everybody.

One thing that struck me since I've left government is how little people understand about these issues. Therefore, CSIS going out there and talking to the private sector and civil society, and getting feedback in the other direction, broadly speaking, will simply contribute to an environment where greater transparency and accountability will be easier.

I'm not suggesting by this that, all of a sudden, everybody will be cleared to the top-secret level and it will all go away. However, to my mind, there's a pretty careful balancing in the act. Again, if I had my druthers, I'd simplify it a bit, but I understand the checks and balances built into it.

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, St. Catharines, ON]

I appreciate simplicity. Despite being a lawyer and the excitement of a make-work project for lawyers, simplicity is generally the best way to go.

With the changes proposed in Bill C-70, how, in your mind, does this compare us with our Five Eyes allies, especially the U.S.?

[Richard Fadden]

It brings us very close to where they are.

We have to be careful not to compare directly. Our societies are different and whatnot. Most of our allies have had a registry for some time. Some are country-specific. Some are neutral, as Mr. Caputo suggested. The creation of foreign interference as a crime goes a long way to bringing us in line with our close allies. If it doesn't put us at the forefront, it goes a considerable distance.

To be honest, I think it will lessen the concerns of some of our allies about the caution with which we've approached some of these measures.