Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, members of the committee. It's a pleasure to be with you again.
I think I would start by just noting what we all know, that Russian disinformation campaigns pose a grave threat to our democracy, but they also follow what we refer to as a calculated disinformation kill chain. It begins by pinpointing societal vulnerabilities and then crafting deceptive content to exploit these weak points. Through amplification by bots and fake accounts, these false narratives gain undue prominence and are further spread by unwitting influencers. By manipulating the public's reaction, these actors sow discord and confusion, achieving their goal of undermining our democratic processes.
Now, in response, Canada has implemented a number of measures. One of them is the rapid response mechanism, which monitors and addresses foreign information manipulation. We also have the digital citizenship contribution program through Heritage, which supports these efforts by promoting digital literacy and raising public awareness.
Looking ahead, we must, however, do more to strengthen our defences. First, by expanding our sanctions regime in coordination with our allies, we can impose tangible consequences on those perpetuating disinformation. Second, by utilizing the Communications Security Establishment's offensive cyber-capabilities, we can disrupt disinformation networks at their source, following the successful model that the NSA, in the United States, used in advance of the last election. Finally, we must implement a national digital resilience strategy that engages all levels of society.
This strategy would involve collaboration with provincial and territorial governments to embed digital literacy in school curricula, ensuring that students from an early age are equipped with the critical thinking skills needed to navigate the digital world. Additionally, agile adult education programs, led by educational institutions and supported by community organizations, would provide vulnerable populations and the wider public with the tools to recognize and counter disinformation.
Public awareness campaigns coordinated through community hubs like libraries and local cultural institutions would reinforce these efforts by ensuring that digital literacy becomes a national priority.
Let me pause there for a moment: Digital literacy must become a national priority. By fostering collaboration between government, civil society and educational institutions, we can create a unified and resilient front against foreign information manipulation and interference by helping Canadians critically assess the information they encounter and reducing the societal impact of disinformation.
Recent intelligence assessments, including CSIS's report entitled “Moscow's War in the Ukraine: Implications for Russian FI Activities in Canada”, highlight the ongoing risk we face. While Canada differs from other Western nations in its level of exposure to Russian foreign influence activities, these operations do persist and target specific groups, including the Russian diaspora in Canada, to promote disinformation about the conflict in the Ukraine.
According to CSIS, Russia is using pro-Russian proxies and witting or unwitting influencers to amplify narratives aimed at discrediting Canada's policies on the Ukraine and smearing the Ukrainian diaspora. These attempts are particularly concerning given the size of the Russian-speaking population in Canada and the Kremlin's focus on exploiting divisions within Canadian society. Furthermore, the CSIS report stresses that while Russian foreign influence activities have declined in some areas due to its loss of reputation in Western countries, we cannot afford to underestimate the continuing threat. Russian state-linked actors remain committed to using disinformation to undermine social cohesion and trust in Canadian institutions and to counter Canada's strong stance on Ukraine.
Our understanding of this threat continues to evolve, and there has been important recent research that highlights valuable insights. The report, entitled “Canadian Vulnerability to Russian Narratives About Ukraine”, authored by my co-panellist, Marcus Kolga, who is testifying, reveals that a significant portion of Canadians, indeed, 71%, have been exposed to at least one Kremlin narrative. Many believe these narratives or are unsure of their falsehood. This highlights the urgent need for comprehensive media literacy programs and increased public awareness to counter the spread of Russian disinformation in Canada.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and I will look forward to questions.