Public Safety Committee on Oct. 1st, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Bezan.

We go now to Ms. O'Connell.

Ms. O'Connell, please go ahead. You have six minutes.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

I'm glad to see my Conservative colleagues take this study so seriously, and I sincerely hope that there isn't an attempt to shut it down or limit it, as our first witnesses have already highlighted pretty significant areas of concern. I think it's imperative that this committee do this work. I'd be quite disappointed after that line of questioning to see any sort of limitations of looking into this study coming from Conservatives, or any attempts to not continue with this study when this is our first day. I guess we'll see. I guess we'll see if there's action behind the words we just heard.

Moving to my questions, I found—and this is going to be directed at both organizations—that as a local MP I could honestly feel a shift and a difference in the narrative around the public perception of the invasion of Ukraine. For example, I remember in the early days attending vigils in my community in Uxbridge, which has a large Ukrainian population, and how quickly on social media that support for Ukraine started to erode. Even in our first debates on the Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement, it was pretty uneventful. There seemed to be all-party support. Then you started to see things shift.

A large part of that was changes in the narrative online, on social media accounts. When this came forward with regard to influencers being potentially and allegedly paid by Russia to look like and mimic Canadian organizations or Canadian social media pages, you started to put two and two together. I could very clearly see that shift, as just a local MP, with Ukrainians in my riding as one example, but overall I was hearing people start to defend Russia, or seeing Russian flags on the Hill and protests against anything really....

My first question is—and I'd like both of your perspectives on this—do you believe that for those with influencer accounts that were being funded, or allegedly being funded, by Russia, they really didn't know who was paying, or is there a world in which people wouldn't know that Russia is sending propaganda?

On the comment about if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, if you're repeating Russian propaganda and then claim you had no idea you were being paid by, or repeating, Russian propaganda.... Have you seen other examples of this claim, where they had no idea who was footing the bill? Maybe I'll start here, if you don't mind.

[Yuriy Novodvorskiy]

Even though, right now, these are still allegations, even a cursory search would show that these perspectives are coming from the Russian government. Many times, if not word for word, they're idea for idea. The idea is coming from the Kremlin and propagated in Russian government propaganda channels.

To address something said earlier, I agree with Ms. Chyczij. RCDA is dissatisfied with the Canadian government's response to the disinformation that we have seen permeating Canadian social media, but also in regard to enforcement of the measures that have been enacted, including sanctions.

We have questions as to how these sanctions are enforced, why violations of sanctions seem to be.... These investigations seem to be coming from the United States, not from within Canada.

Even if a lot of the disinformation seems to be happening in the United States, due to the interconnectedness of the Canadian-American ecosystems, narratives that originate there permeate, eventually ending up in Canada and affecting the national discourse here.

[Guillaume Sirois, Counsel, Russian Canadian Democratic Alliance]

To your prior comments about the changing narrative among your constituents, this is actually something that's increasingly backed by data.

There is some interesting analysis, including from Marcus Kolga, showing there are more and more Canadians exposed to the Kremlin narrative online. These narratives are having an impact on how Canadians think about the Ukraine war, for instance. This is not only a Ukraine war issue. It's also an issue that targets broader issues in Canadian politics, such as the housing crisis, inflation and even Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. That has been something the Kremlin has done in Canada for close to a decade, as my friend alluded to in his testimony—

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

I'm sorry. I don't mean to cut you off, but I am limited on time.

Do you think it's also problematic when politicians are being paid to fly around the world by institutions like the Danube Institute? It has been known to promote anti-Ukraine and, more so, Kremlin propaganda. Do you think it's problematic if Canadian politicians are also being paid by institutes that share that?

I'll start here, since I know I'm limited on time.

[Alexandra Chyczij]

Absolutely, because there is the possibility and the appearance of bias. All trips paid by other entities should be banned for Canadian politicians.

I beg to differ with my friend. I believe there was a Canadian social media influencer who was working for Tenet, Lauren Southern. She did produce videos on immigration crime, anti-white sentiment, anti-LGBTQ+ paranoia, residential schools, unmarked graves, inflation and the housing crisis. She said that Canada is on the brink of chaos and that Canada is becoming a communist hellhole under Justin Trudeau.

These are not just American-directed narratives. Canada was directly targeted.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Ms. O'Connell.

Mr. Fortin, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank the witnesses for being with us today.

As the testimony shows, the issue of interference, including Russian interference, is an important and troubling one.

I don't know if you are aware of other states that engage in interference in Canada. In your opinion, is there a significant difference between the types of interference and is there a way of distinguishing them?

In fact, in this case, we know that it is coming from Russia. Is there a difference between Russian interference and, for example, Chinese or Indian interference, or interference by other states? In your opinion, is there anything specific that would allow us to recognize the types of interference?

Mr. Novodvorskiy, do you have any comments on that?

[Guillaume Sirois]

I can provide some information.

Indeed, we are seeing a convergence of interests among the various states in an attempt to interfere in our democratic institutions. Every authoritarian foreign state has its own interests. There are certainly interests that are coming together to overturn the world order and create conditions that would be more tolerant of authoritarian actions such as those undertaken by Russia in Ukraine.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Do you think there is anything specific about Russian interference or is it simply the same problem, which should be fought in the same way, regardless of where the interference comes from?

[Yuriy Novodvorskiy]

The Russian government has devoted considerable resources to its propaganda via social media, more so than India and some other countries. I can't speak to potential Chinese efforts at foreign interference.

These methods are more sophisticated and come in through many different channels, different social media platforms, Russia Today, TV channels and other media in an attempt to essentially surround people with the same false narratives.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

How could Canada better protect itself from these tactics?

[Yuriy Novodvorskiy]

Here is one of the things I would bring up. One of the calls we mentioned is that ideally there should be one agency or institution clearly responsible and accountable for defending against these threats. The last I looked, it seemed like combatting disinformation was a responsibility shared among many different agencies, which potentially means that none of them are directly focused on this.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Ms. Chyczij, I apologize for pronouncing your name so horribly. Forgive me.

I think you wanted to comment on this.

[Alexandra Chyczij]

I think that Canada would be well served to follow the example of Finland, Norway and Denmark. They begin to teach critical thinking and disinformation detection in kindergarten. Now Finland tops the European media literacy index, which measures a nation's resilience to disinformation.

There was a program I was watching this morning on PBS, where a class of grade 6 students was being interviewed. Their ability to detect social media disinformation was truly astounding and would put all Canadians to shame. I believe that if we started this kind of teaching in our schools, we would be a better country for it.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

What you are proposing is interesting, but what would we say to children in a primary school? Would we talk to them about foreign interference? I have a hard time seeing how this could be applied in a concrete way.

[Alexandra Chyczij]

They don't tell them that Santa Claus doesn't exist. They use age-appropriate mechanisms to teach them fact from fiction. They teach them to think critically, to question and not to accept.

There was an American student in this school who said, “In America, whenever I had doubts about something, my teachers told me no, that if it's reported in the newspapers, it must be true.” It's that ability not to accept everything at face value.

I am certain that Finland, Norway and Denmark would share these programs with us. That's something that this committee could recommend.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

How long has this program been in existence in Finland?

[Alexandra Chyczij]

I don't know for sure, but certainly we have grade 6 students already, so it's been at least six years. Of course, Finland and countries neighbouring Russia are very much aware of disinformation. They share a border with Russia. They're going to build a wall between Finland and Russia. These countries have very much been the victims or the targets of attempts to sow disinformation.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Fortin.

[Rhéal Fortin, Bloc, Rivière-du-Nord, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

We go now to Mr. MacGregor for six minutes, please.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of our witnesses for being here today. It's greatly appreciated.

Look, no one around this table is a stranger to misinformation and disinformation. I wish I could show you what comes into my email inbox on a daily basis. Honestly, I think that if you look at a number of conspiracy theories...there are multiple Venn diagrams that could be constructed out of what we're talking about here today.

From my perspective, this is partially a frustrating thing. This committee and the topic of foreign interference have been pretty top of mind for the last couple of years. In fact, this committee conducted a study in 2022. The report was tabled in the House of Commons in March 2023. It was looking at Canada's security posture vis-à-vis Russia. We were looking at all kinds of areas of Russian involvement in cybersecurity espionage and in misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and we made a series of recommendations in that report. That's about a year and a half ago now.

Maybe I'll turn to the Russian Canadian Democratic Alliance with this question, because in your opening statement you wanted us to address this as a “national security threat”. You wanted to see one institution responsible. We made a recommendation to the government about examining the full extent of Russian disinformation targeting Canada: the actors, the methods, the messages and the platforms involved.

In response, the government said that in budget 2022 they had committed to providing $13.4 million over five years to renew and expand the G7 rapid response mechanism. I'm just wondering if you can comment on that, because if we've made a recommendation and they've provided a response, I'd like to have your feedback on how well that's working, so that maybe we can update our recommendation in this report.

[Yuriy Novodvorskiy]

I'll start by saying that whatever has been done, I think there could be.... There should be increased transparency as to the effectiveness, because from the latest news that we've heard, it is not clear to us what actions the government has taken beyond public statements.

I'll turn to Guillaume.