It is my long-term observation that Russia is waging political warfare against western nations. By “political warfare” I imply, not necessarily limited to the context of the Russian activities, a grey area in international relations where nations influence the behaviour and thinking of others using methods beyond legitimate instruments, such as diplomacy and soft power, yet don't escalate to open military conflict using regular armed forces. Russian political warfare against the west is nothing new, but it has escalated since 2022, when western nations decided to provide political, military and economic support to Ukraine in its defensive war against the full-scale Russian aggression. As a country in the world's top 10 donors to Ukraine, Canada is one of the targets of Russian political warfare.
In the context of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, one prominent element of Russian political warfare against the west, including Canada, is information war in which Russia advances two types of narratives: strategic and tactical.
Strategic narratives reflect genuine, deep-seated beliefs of the Russian leadership linked to Ukraine or the broader context of the aggression. Strategic narratives demonstrate some internal logic and are generally coherent, although that does not imply that they are right or correct. Three major strategic narratives related to the Russian invasion and directed at the west, including Canada, are as follows: First, Russia is a global power that has a right to have its own sphere of influence, and Ukraine belongs there. Second, Ukraine, as part of the west, poses an existential threat to Russia. Third, NATO is using Ukraine to wage a war against Russia.
Tactical narratives serve as individual steps that aim to strengthen the validity of strategic narratives or respond to emerging themes and to current events and developments related to the Russian aggression. Unlike strategic narratives, however, tactical narratives are less coherent because they are extremely manipulative and usually appeal to emotions.
There are many dozens of tactical narratives produced by the Russian information warfare machine. I will highlight some of them that are especially relevant to Canada: Ukraine is run by Nazis. Russia defends Russian people from Ukrainian Nazis. Canada has an immense Nazi problem. All western sanctions are damaging for western businesses and households. Ukraine is one of the most corrupt countries in the world; it cannot be part of the west. Financial aid sent to Ukraine is being pocketed by corrupt Ukrainian leaders and officials. The west attacks Russia because of inherent western Russophobia, or hatred of Russians. Ukrainian nationalists heavily influence policy decisions of the Canadian authorities. western weapons given to Ukraine will end up with international terrorists or on the black market. Providing military aid to Ukraine does not help Ukraine win the war; it only extends the suffering of Ukrainians. The west should not oppose Russia because it can eventually use nuclear weapons.
Russian pro-regime stakeholders use a wide range of instruments in their attempt to deliver both strategic and tactical narratives to targeted audiences. I'll identify four major types of these instruments. The first type is official Russian channels: statements by the Russian president and his presidential administration, and statements by Russian ministries, especially the foreign ministry and the defence ministry. The second instrument is Russian state-controlled media, especially those producing contents in the English language. The third is social network accounts openly or secretly run by Russian pro-regime stakeholders. The fourth is western-based agents of malign Russian influence, be they academics, experts, journalists, celebrities, producers, politicians, businesses or religious organizations—namely, entities in western countries created and/or used by Russian pro-regime stakeholders to conceal the pro-Russian agenda of the people behind them.
While the main objective of the Russian information warfare, which relies on a variety of instruments listed above, is to reduced western support for Ukraine's defensive efforts, Russian pro-regime stakeholders appear to rely on a three-tier approach in evaluating the efficiency of their information operations.
The first one is delivery. One-third of the success of a particular information operation is the successful delivery of a strategic or tactical narrative to a targeted audience. If the targeted audience consumes that narrative, that is one-third of success.
The second tier is legitimacy. Two-thirds of success is when a malign narrative is not only consumed by a target audience but also becomes a legitimate point of view in western mainstream discussions—for example, in the media or in Parliament.
Third is acceptance. A complete success of a malign influence operation is achieved when a viewpoint rooted in a malign narrative produced by Russian stakeholders is not only seen as legitimate but is also accepted as the only correct perspective. [Technical difficulty—Editor]