Thank you, Mr. Chair.
To my friends and colleagues around the table, I make it very clear to my friend from Kildonan—St. Paul and to Melissa Lantsman as well that I haven't changed my position at all.
I don't own any flip-flops. I don't flip-flop; I stand on principle. I was trained as a lawyer—I'm honoured to have been admitted to the bars of Nova Scotia and of Ontario—and so, when I went through the process of getting top secret security clearance, I was very mindful of what I could and couldn't say.
I was quite sure when David Johnston, as former special rapporteur, opened the door for the first time that leaders of opposition parties could seek top secret security clearance and potentially obtain it—you don't get it as a right—had something in my past been uncovered that would make me subject to blackmail or intimidation or to being compromised through any form of interference, then I wouldn't have obtained top secret security clearance. I would have been denied it.
Now, I go to the matter of, “Did my story change?” No, not one bit. I read the unredacted version of the report of the committee of parliamentarians.
I think it's important for me to explain to my colleagues how I navigated this: How do you obtain top secret security clearance, read information that must, by law, remain secret, and still talk about it? Well, the answer is that you're careful as you navigate, and so, before I spoke publicly, I shared with security agencies the notes that I planned to use in the press conference.
I want my colleagues around the table to know that some things I had intended to say, which I thought would be non-controversial and not reveal any secrets, included the exact number of people who were considered “witting” or “semi-witting”.
I repeat again that I do not believe any of our colleagues currently serving in Parliament, at least in terms of the report I read.... There may be other information, and certainly the Prime Minister had other kinds of briefings that I haven't, but based on the text of the report of the committee of parliamentarians, into which our colleagues from the Liberal Party, Bloc Québécois, NDP and Conservatives put an enormous amount of work.... Our colleagues read 33,000 pages of top secret security material and condensed it into a report that they could all stand behind, and then, with some deletions and other modifications to make it publicly accessible, it became public information.
I was able to read the report unredacted. I stand by every word I said, but before I said a word—because I wasn't gagged, clearly, and I was able to talk about it—I went through my notes with security experts to make sure I didn't inadvertently violate any laws of Canada or place at risk any of our intelligence assets.
To my colleagues around the table, I want you to know that I actually edited and changed what I was going to say in the press conference, not taking out names but even the number of people who might be considered “semi-witting” or in any way potentially compromised. That's to say again—I repeat—that to my knowledge, no one currently serving in Parliament, in the House of Commons, was compromised or is serving the interests of a foreign government.
There are some people who were referenced as “semi-witting”, but I was told clearly that even the number, the numerical categorization of how many people might fall into that category, could not be said publicly without placing at risk the lives of our intelligence assets around the world.
I want my colleagues to understand that this isn't a game. This isn't politics. I'm not playing games here. I'm telling you how it is when you navigate, with top secret security clearance, what you can say and what you can't say. The amendment to this motion to release all the names sounds grand if you operate in ignorance of the law and of how security and intelligence operatives and intelligence and security information gathering operates in the real world, where there are bad people. We have to be careful as members of Parliament not to allow political rhetoric to get in the way of what we do to serve Canadians.
I just wanted to clear that up. I hope it helps. We can't just say, “Release all the names” unless we're operating in ignorance of the ongoing knock-on effects that it could have in terms of endangering the lives of intelligence assets of Canada.
I navigated this as carefully as I could because I think it's really critical that Canadians know as much as we possibly can share without violating national security.
I think this committee is on a good path in choosing to have an investigation. Again, I do believe it's important to clear up any suggestion that foreign interference had an impact on the Conservative leadership race. That's an obvious point. That's already out there in public. That's on page 32 in paragraph 72 of the public version of the committee of parliamentarians' report. I think Mr. Poilievre would want to know exactly what is referenced there and get a top secret security clearance. Unless there's some reason he thinks he won't get it, I can't see any reason why he wouldn't want to obtain it.
I think I've made it clear and I think Mr. Singh as leader of the New Democratic Party has made it clear—Mr. Blanchet is still in the process of getting his top secret security clearance—that we believe we can serve the people of Canada and share the information that we can share without breaking the law and help all Canadians understand.
Again, I wrote each individual leader of all the parties in the House of Commons to please get top secret security clearance so that we can meet as a group, as a unified force, and tell foreign powers, whether Russia or the People's Republic of China or India or any of the sources of foreign interference, that we operate in Canada as a solid wall and we tell foreign powers, “We're not giving you space here. We unify. We pull together.” For that, it would certainly be helpful if all the leaders of all the federal political parties obtained top secret security clearance so that we could work together without the risk of violating the security establishment and the safety and security of non-Canadians somewhere else around the world who are sharing information with our operatives. Those people must not be placed at risk because of reckless political rhetoric here at home.
I do wish that this committee is able to continue on the study and that the accusations of one party versus another are kept to a bare minimum. I guess it's impossible to avoid it altogether, but I haven't changed my story—not one bit. I do believe you can have top secret security clearance and navigate that responsibility. It's an onerous responsibility to respect the security establishment of this country, navigate it and share with Canadians that we have, in terms of elected members of Parliament, not one person who has actively worked against the interests of Canada.
There is, as we said, the category that the committee used, and the language that they used, of “witting” or “semi-witting”. It's unusual language, but that's the language they used. There are some people in that category. On my reading of the unredacted version of the report, the MPs in the semi-witting or witting category have not committed acts that fall into the category of proactive betrayal of their country's interests. Those names, and even the number of people in that category, I have been warned by people in our security establishment must not be shared publicly. Therefore, I'm uncomfortable with the idea that we can taunt various people to just make it all public. I'm not hiding anything. I do my best to be transparent. That's why I'm grateful for the chance to take the floor again.
I hope that has helped clear things up. I do hope we can all be on the same side here of getting as much information as we can. We've moved from where we were when David Johnston was made special rapporteur with the concern of how much foreign interests had interfered in our elections. We're now looking at very clear accusations that the RCMP uncovered—a network of operatives reporting to a criminal element within India, operating on Canadian soil to endanger lives. They're very different categories of foreign interference. They all require deep respect and a degree of caution in how we go forward so that we don't betray any information that must be kept secure and secret in the interests of our ability to work with Five Eyes partners and be understood to be a country where secure and secret information remains respected and stays secure and secret.
Thank you very much.