Evidence of meeting #125 for Public Safety and National Security in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was russia.

A video is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Chris Alexander  Distinguished Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Canadian International Council, As an Individual
Justin Ling  Freelance Investigative Journalist, As an Individual
Nina Jankowicz  Chief Executive Officer, American Sunlight Project

The Chair Liberal Ron McKinnon

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting 125 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format.

I would like to remind participants of the following points.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. All comments should be addressed to the chair.

Members, please raise your hand if you wish to speak, whether participating in person or via Zoom. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted on September 19, 2024, the committee is resuming its study of Russian interference and disinformation campaigns in Canada.

I would like to welcome our witnesses today.

As an individual, we have the Honourable Chris Alexander, distinguished fellow at both the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and the Canadian International Council. He is also a former Canadian ambassador and a former minister of citizenship and immigration. Welcome, sir.

We have Justin Ling, a freelance investigative journalist, who I believe is online.

From the American Sunlight Project, we have Nina Jankowicz, chief executive officer, also by video conference.

Welcome to you all.

I now invite Mr. Alexander to make an opening statement. Normally we would limit this to five minutes, but I understand that you're looking for six, so we'll accommodate you as best we can. Thank you.

Please go ahead.

Chris Alexander Distinguished Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Canadian International Council, As an Individual

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

For 10 years Russia has been invading Europe's largest state. A full-scale onslaught began in 2022, as you all know, challenging the alliances, institutions and principles Canada fought two world wars to uphold. Moscow's genocidal war of aggression recalls the horrors of Hitler and Stalin, yet we've still not committed fully to defeating this aggressor or to Ukraine's victory.

Why is that? Part of the answer is Russian disinformation, Russian active measures and Russian interference. According to Jakub Kalensky, deputy director of the community of interest on hybrid threats at Europe's centre of excellence in Helsinki, Russia produces over 60% of the disinformation worldwide and 80% in Europe. Its main vectors of distribution are still social media platforms, as Meta recently confirmed to you, but grey zone media, influencers and other proxies, as well as state propaganda outlets like Russia Today, are also major threat actors. They torque debates and magnify niche conflicts into societal breakdowns. On Twitter/X, the owner himself regurgitates Kremlin talking points and rolls out the red carpet for Russian and other state-sponsored bots.

No, Meta, TikTok, YouTube and other platforms are definitely not doing enough. We still have no idea how much Russian-backed, Chinese-backed and Iran-backed spending influences our politics or our elections. Meanwhile, unregulated promotion of political extremism and polarization has tipped newsrooms across Canada into free fall, causing a dangerous loss of self-awareness in local communities and national debates.

Far from being marginal players, Russian information assets and active measures are often kingmakers in our elections. In other words, to prevent Ukraine's victory, Russia is investing heavily in propaganda and political and cognitive warfare to ensure that we never make the military commitments needed to win.

Let me give you two Canadian examples, one past and one present.

Over 2018 and 2019, the anti-immigration People's Party of Canada, the yellow vest movement, trucker protests and Wexit all began. Then COVID hit. By early 2022, truckers were blockading Ottawa and several border crossings. You know the history. To be clear, these protests did attract ordinary people with genuine grievances over vaccine mandates, but many of the ringleaders and extremists who joined them had been radicalized online by Moscow-backed active measures. Their funding came from shadowy corners of the MAGA demimonde, even as far away as Bulgaria, and had all the hallmarks of Russian influence.

The blockade's timing coincided with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Attempts to replicate these convoys, some successful, took place in every NATO country, as well as Australia and New Zealand. Russian state propaganda promoted this story relentlessly. Russia Today did 250 reports on Canada's protests alone.

What was Moscow's motive? It was to distract a country with a huge Ukrainian diaspora as the Kremlin launched its war of aggression. Did it work? In a word, yes. We continue to underestimate Moscow's strategic ambition. Beyond reconquering Ukraine, they want to disrupt and destabilize democracies, roll back American and allied influence, and break the EU and NATO. They sow discord and erode trust with anti-immigrant, xenophobic, anti-LGBTQ, anti-west and anti-women campaigns, as well as hate speech, separatism and disinformation about elections or health issues, as the trucker blockade, the yellow vest movement, the PPC, Wexit, the anti-vax movement, pro-Hamas protests and many extreme elements that play into elections in Canada and allied democracies have shown us.

I am now on the second issue, which relates to a current matter. Seven documents tabled before you originate in the pre-1991 archives of the Ukrainian KGB. They are in the hands of Canadian national security officials, because they are evidence of a serious effort to undermine Canada's national security and collective self-defence. They have also been authenticated by several of the world's leading experts on KGB documents.

In a nutshell, these records document a KGB operation to talent-spot, recruit, develop and run as an agent a Canadian citizen who has been a prominent journalist in this country for over three decades. His code name in these KGB files was “Stuart”. His recruiter, handler and paymaster over the period discussed here, from 1982 to 1990, was another agent, code-named “Ivan”. Some of the world's leading experts on KGB documents have attested to their authenticity. If “Stuart” continued as an agent after 1990, as there is now every reason to believe he did, we have no access to those files, because they are in Moscow.

These documents illustrate the challenge our democracies face. For decades Moscow has been recruiting and paying policy-makers, influencers, politicians, journalists and others to act as their proxies, to undermine trust in our institutions and to dissipate our political will. Even at the height of so-called glasnost, when so many believed Moscow's imperialism and global subversion campaigns had ended, such recruitment was still happening.

The agent described in these documents was an illegal, working for Directorate S of the KGB's First Main Directorate, which today has the same name and purpose in Russia's External Intelligence Service, or SVR, as Mikhail Mikushin and the Vavilovs previously did in Canada, as well as the 10 illegal agents arrested and expelled from the U.S. in 2010.

This journalist has been prolific, publishing as many as 200 articles per year in Canada and the U.S. since 1990. His recent subjects are instructive. There are countless stories about Ukraine's Nazi links or Nazis in Canada, defamatory pieces about the family of Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, provocative takes on procurement and other issues at the Department of National Defence and in the Canadian Forces. In short, these are themes that Moscow would be delighted to promote. They also aim to weaken Canadian support for Ukraine.

Previous efforts to expose this journalist's long-running covert ties to Moscow have resulted in attempts to intimidate current and former Canadian parliamentarians, including my former colleague James Bezan as well as Canadian Army officers.

Canadians need and deserve quality, independent journalism now more than ever. We need to bolster our national security and defence and to back Ukraine's victory fully. Moscow's information war, its active measures and continuing espionage are a serious hindrance to all of this.

In 1945, the Gouzenko revelations resulted in a royal commission that turned Canada into one of the Cold War's most reliable allies. I call upon you, the foreign interference commission, our governments, intelligence, and security and law enforcement agencies at all levels to work together to end the impunity with which Russia has operated in Canada. We need to acknowledge, assess and attribute active measures, disinformation, influence operations and other malign activities that originate in Moscow and act to disrupt and prevent such activities and hold the perpetrators to account.

Thank you very much.

The Chair Liberal Ron McKinnon

Thank you, Mr. Alexander.

We will go now to Mr. Ling to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Go ahead, sir.

Justin Ling Freelance Investigative Journalist, As an Individual

Thank you so much for having me here today. I will do my best to keep to time.

Off the top, really briefly, I want to recognize that my being here as a journalist is a little awkward. I'm used to covering these hearings, not testifying before them. I agreed to explicitly because I think this ought to be a non-partisan matter. The fact that I agree so fully with Mr. Alexander, someone whom I have sparred with in the past, should be a testament to the fact that this should be an issue around defending our country from adversaries so that we can more robustly debate our domestic politics among one another, for better or for worse.

I have been covering Russia's illiberal and colonial activities around the world for more than a decade now. I have spoken at great lengths to American, European, Ukrainian and NATO leaders about this challenge, including visiting the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga. I've built relationships with Ukrainian leaders as well as Russian dissidents trying to dismantle Vladimir Putin's empire. For my work, I've been sanctioned by the Russian regime. I've been targeted in the past by Russian information operations and by the Kremlin's “useful idiots” over here.

I will be pleased to answer all your questions on any of these topics.

Today I mostly want to talk to you about one specific story from the past. It's about my connection with a man named Kirill Kalinin who was, at least according to his business card, the press secretary for the Russian embassy in Ottawa.

Over about two years, Kalinin and I corresponded, usually through the official Twitter account of the Russian embassy in Ottawa. I regularly reached out to seek comment and perspective from Kalinin and the embassy more broadly. I found myself chatting with him quite frequently. It was through these messages that Kalinin began to pitch me stories and suggested research that I ought to pursue.

Kalinin, for example, touted the existence of “a very interesting archive at the embassy” that was full of information about Nazi war criminals hiding among us here in Canada. This is similar to what Mr. Alexander was just describing to you.

It could prove, Kalinin claimed, “a big connection to the Ukrainian Canadian Congress”. This would be a trend through a lot of our conversations going forward.

Other times, Kalinin would try to sell the narrative that political parties in Ottawa—all of them—were being duped into a reflexive anti-Russian bias or discrimination.

Kalinin and I kept up our correspondence for many years. We even got beers together a couple of times in Ottawa. I, of course, always disclosed this relationship in anything I published.

On one occasion, he asked me if I was interested in a story. He asked me if I knew that Chrystia Freeland had a Nazi grandfather. What I can tell you—I'm not going to recap the whole story, since I believe we're all familiar with it—is that when he first pitched this to me, there were no publicly available sources, research, news articles or anything of the like that were making this allegation in the public record. In a follow-up message, he pointed me to a box of records at the Alberta archives all about Michael Chomiak, who was Chrystia Freeland's maternal grandfather.

I declined to pursue the story, but I can tell you that in the months that followed, this story started popping up in a variety of supposedly independent blogs, touting the line that Freeland had inherited this supposed Nazi ideology from her grandfather.

Very clearly, I was not the only one being pitched this story. Robert Fife of The Globe and Mail asked Freeland about the Russian smear campaign. After that, it became national and international news.

This story should have invited us to have a conversation about Russia's malign skullduggery happening in the capital. It's a conversation that Mr. Fife had tried to start. Unfortunately, we started scoring on our own team. Commentators began insisting that the only disinformation here was the allegation that Russia was responsible for the story. Others refused to accept Russia's fingerprints. At one point, TeleSur, Venezuela's propaganda outlet, published a curious story claiming that it was the Communist Party of Canada that had dug up these records.

Anyway, I'll cut a bit of a long story short and say that Kalinin was eventually removed from the country in 2018—a call that I think was right.

However, I think the entire saga asks us to become more serious about this issue and to become more serious about how we expose and accredit and attribute foreign malign information operations here in Canada. They often are not as well-organized, purposeful, effective and nefarious as we give them credit for. A lot of the time, they are slapdash, amateur and even, in the case of Kalinin, friendly. Foreign interference is often less cut and dried and less transactional than we think. A lot of the time, it is interpersonal relationships, and this sort of thing is very hard to criminalize or legislate against.

Sometimes sunlight, as I'm sure we're going to hear in a minute, is the best disinfectant. I think the indictment filed in the U.S. about Tenet Media and its connections with Russia Today exposes how effective it can be to just put on the record the intelligence we have.

I'll try to wrap up right now and say that if I can make one recommendation—and I hope I can talk more about this in the Q and A—it's that we need to get more serious about attribution, about publishing the intelligence and the evidence we have of these information operations, and about giving people the information necessary to defend themselves against these information operations and to disrupt them at the very source.

Thanks so much.

4 p.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Ron McKinnon

Thank you, sir.

We go now to Ms. Jankowicz to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Please go ahead.

Nina Jankowicz Chief Executive Officer, American Sunlight Project

Thank you.

Distinguished members of the committee, it's an honour to address you today.

My name is Nina Jankowicz, and I lead a U.S. non-profit, the American Sunlight Project, which is dedicated to increasing the cost of lies that undermine democracies.

I'm also the author of How to Lose the Information War, a book that examines European responses to Russian disinformation.

I've spent a decade studying this topic. I teach a graduate-level course on it at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and I have advised governments, including Ukraine's, on their responses to the Kremlin's influence campaigns.

My message to you today is not optimistic. Despite increased awareness of foreign-backed online influence campaigns, democracies like Canada and the United States are more vulnerable to them today than they were eight years ago.

The Kremlin continues to actively exploit deepening fissures in our societies in order to amplify democratic discord. Social media companies have rolled back their efforts to address disinformation on their platforms and have restricted access to their data, making it difficult to hold them to account. Researchers studying this phenomenon, including me, have been baselessly attacked as censors, enduring harassment and violent threats for our public interest investigations. However, my own organization has seen evidence of Russia's continued attempts to manipulate democratic societies.

American Sunlight recently identified what we call the “sleeper agent network” on X. It consists of over 1,100 likely automated accounts that post hundreds of times per day and that repeatedly retweet overt Russian propaganda within 60 seconds of its being posted.

Despite Elon Musk's promise to rid his platform of bots, some accounts in this network have been active for over a decade, springing into action at key moments. In that time, they have generated over 100 million posts on divisive issues, from the war in Ukraine to disinformation on the recent hurricanes.

They've also become involved in Canada's information space. In the past six months alone, they have amplified false narratives about the “freedom convoy” and about Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland hundreds of times.

More evidence of Russia's continued online influence campaigns includes the recent indictment from the U.S. Department of Justice. The DOJ identified a scheme in which two Canadian nationals allegedly set up Tenet Media, a shell company that ferried $10 million U.S. from Russian propaganda network RT to conservative YouTube influencers with millions of collective subscribers.

The influencers posted about divisive issues, from alleged racism against white people to censorship to trans rights. Canada is mentioned over 300 times in the videos, while Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is mentioned 60 times. The genius of this scheme is that while RT was paying influencers to create the divisive content that they were already creating for a built-in audience, Russia was simply adding fuel to the fire.

These two case studies show that Russia is still active in undermining our democracies and that the current paradigm of playing “whack-a-troll”—focusing on stopping Russian disinformation and influence efforts at the source—is not the best use of our resources. Russia increasingly attempts to dupe users into trusting local, authentic, seemingly independent sources of information. Conveniently, these are sources that social media platforms are much less likely to moderate.

What, then, can Canada do to respond to Russian and other foreign disinformation campaigns while preserving freedom of expression?

One effective reform is to simplify the declassification process so that Canada's intelligence agencies can quickly release information related to exigent national security threats, election security or foreign state-backed disinformation campaigns.

The U.S. and the U.K. governments found success with this tactic when declassifying information about Russian troop movements prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This helped to shore up public support for Kyiv.

A public notification process like this also undermined the effects of the so-called “Macron leaks” during France's 2017 election, essentially prebunking the claims made by Russia-enabled disinformers.

Second, Canada should strengthen and clarify its laws governing influencers and online political content. Neither the Canada Elections Act nor the Competition Act stipulates that influencers paid to create political content must disclose the source of their funding, unless that source is a political entity. This is a loophole that bad actors like Russia can exploit.

Finally, Canada should continue to invest in robust information literacy programs. It's important for these programs to be targeted to local communities and delivered by trusted local messengers, educating not only school-age children but voting-age adults as well.

In particular, Parliament should consider earmarking funding for programs that marry existing local efforts, such as tech literacy courses, with information literacy education. This programming should not label content as good or bad, trustworthy or not trustworthy, but give citizens the objective tools they need to navigate today's polluted information environment. They would then be a better equipped to approach content from Russia or elsewhere with healthy skepticism, protecting democracy from the front lines.

Thank you.

The Chair Liberal Ron McKinnon

Thank you, indeed, as well.

We'll start our first round of questions with Mr. Bezan.

Mr. Bezan, please go ahead for six minutes.

4:05 p.m.

Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

Thank you, Chair.

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing.

Mr. Alexander, it's great to see you again and to have you here.

You worked in Moscow as deputy head of mission for the Canadian embassy. Is that right?

4:05 p.m.

Distinguished Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Canadian International Council, As an Individual

Chris Alexander

That's correct.

4:05 p.m.

Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

Are you fluent in Russian?

4:05 p.m.

Distinguished Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Canadian International Council, As an Individual

4:05 p.m.

Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

These documents that you've dropped on the table today are quite disturbing. Have you been able to get that authenticated as being true to fact?

4:05 p.m.

Distinguished Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Canadian International Council, As an Individual

Chris Alexander

Yes, and it's not just me. I've been aware of the documents and able to read them for many months. I'm not sure exactly how many months it's been. They have been shared with, as I mentioned, national security authorities in Canada, and I believe other jurisdictions, and many hands, not just mine, have gone to the people they know in the world of expertise around KGB documents to authenticate them.

Every authority that has come back—and these include some of the best authorities in the United States and several in Europe, including Estonia, Ukraine, and the U.K., I believe, as well as a specialist in paper quality and manufacture, because the documents were made at a certain time using paper that came from a certain place—has authenticated these documents and has confirmed that they are what they claim to be.

4:05 p.m.

Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

Okay.

This individual, “Stuart”, as his code name is, is currently working still as a journalist.

4:05 p.m.

Distinguished Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Canadian International Council, As an Individual

Chris Alexander

That's correct. You will see in the documents that he is named there very clearly in cursive handwriting as “David Pugliese”. He has been working as a journalist in Canada ever since.

4:05 p.m.

Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

That reporter is very familiar to me, as he reports also on national defence.

Is that why the KGB would have been interested in making use of him to collect information to share with the Kremlin and use his cover as a journalist to do so? Would he have been duping CAF members and the Department of National Defence and others?

4:05 p.m.

Distinguished Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Canadian International Council, As an Individual

Chris Alexander

Absolutely.

His subsequent career—and I'm not sure for how many years, as I haven't analyzed it completely—did focus for quite a long time on national defence and national security issues. Those issues would, for obvious reasons, have been of great interest to Russia's intelligence services, particularly in this recent period when they've been engaged in overt aggression against Ukraine and other countries.

At the time when he was recruited, which is what these files tell us the story of, it's not clear what he was going to do as a journalist. He was starting out. I think the Ottawa Citizen is mentioned as a first employer. I'm not sure what he was working on at that time, but later one of his main areas of focus was national security and national defence, as you say.

4:05 p.m.

Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

I think we'll need some time to digest the information that's in here.

I'm just wondering if this has been handled. You said it was handed over some time ago to Canadian intelligence agencies. Which intelligence agencies would have received this intel?

4:05 p.m.

Distinguished Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Canadian International Council, As an Individual

Chris Alexander

From what I know—I was not the person doing the handing—it was given to counter-intelligence authorities and law enforcement authorities within the Department of National Defence, as well as CSIS.

4:05 p.m.

Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

Okay.

Do you believe those briefings would have been carried up the chain and investigated and shared with the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Public Safety?

4:05 p.m.

Distinguished Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Canadian International Council, As an Individual

Chris Alexander

I can't speak for the highest levels, but I know from my experience of working with these agencies over many decades that they are absolutely assiduous in briefing their superiors; and this would have been considered a very serious matter that would have required internal attention.

It's also an issue that was probably looked into even before these documents arrived, so it may have been an opportunity to connect some dots.

4:10 p.m.

Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

I want to change topics a bit.

We know that the Government of Canada, through the Canada Media Fund, recently financed through TVO a Russian propaganda film called Russians at War to show the appearance of empathy for those Russians who have invaded Ukraine. It was definitely filmed illegally on Ukrainian territory.

I'll direct this to all three witnesses. How has Russia been successful in making use of, again, a former RT reporter who was able to produce and direct this film using taxpayer money here in Canada?

Chris, do you want to kick off? Then we can go with Mr. Ling and then the other witness.

4:10 p.m.

Distinguished Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Canadian International Council, As an Individual

Chris Alexander

Sure.

I think the dynamic at work in that case was a Russian reaction to our reaction of sanctions.

Russia Today was sanctioned by Canada and other G7 countries, and by Ukraine earlier, shortly after the full-scale invasion in 2022. It had been a very effective channel for propaganda. It was on our cable packages. It was available to many Canadians. We would run into people who watched it and see the reporters around Canada, as I mentioned.

That was no longer available, so they tried to find other ways to get Russia Today's propaganda in front of Canadian audiences. Film festivals were one way to do it. This is a film that was clearly made with that objective in mind and should be considered a war propaganda film, in my view.

4:10 p.m.

Conservative

James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB

I'm running out of time here. I have just one final question.

Today it was announced that the Government of Canada has removed Denis Kamyshev, who is a director of Gazprombank, from the sanctions list. He was sanctioned in 2022, and they have now taken him off that list. Minister Joly made that decision yesterday, I believe.

How dangerous is it for us to take people off the list who are actually helping fund Putin's war machine and their invasion in Ukraine?

4:10 p.m.

Distinguished Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Canadian International Council, As an Individual

Chris Alexander

In my view, it sends absolutely the wrong signal. Gazprom, whether someone is a former executive or a present one, was central to that war machine and central to Russia's intelligence operations and their disinformation operations. There are many more people who, in my view, could and should be sanctioned—some resident in Canada, some resident elsewhere—to strengthen our hand in helping Ukraine win.