I think Ms. Jankowicz got it exactly right. An actual regime of declassification for intelligence that connects to foreign influence operations is critically important. This is something that our security agencies cannot do on their own. This is going to require either policy changes or legislative changes.
As it stands, there is an overarching concern for protecting sources and methods or for protecting the sanctity of our judicial system. Both, of course, are incredibly important policies, but we also have to add a third plank to that. It is that when declassification or public attribution can actually be used to disrupt an influence operation or an information operation, it should be incumbent on us to declassify or release that information in order to arm the public in defence. Frankly, when we don't do it, it leaves us shadowboxing and making allegations and suppositions for which we don't have evidence.
That also maligns things like, for example, the “freedom convoy”. I don't think we actually have fantastic evidence or intelligence that supports the idea that Russia did anything more than trump it up in their state-owned media. If that intelligence exists, I think it should be released. If that intelligence does not exist and if there's no evidence for it, I think we should say so, because otherwise it risks us finger pointing and doing exactly what Russia wants us to do, which is to suspect each other and become paranoid so that it can break down the ties that keep our democracy working.