Public Safety Committee on Oct. 24th, 2024

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Now we go to Mrs. Zahid.

Mrs. Zahid, go ahead for six minutes, please.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair. Thanks to all the witnesses for appearing before the committee.

My first question is for Mr. Ling.

Mr. Ling, you wrote in The Walrus in 2019 that the Russians could decide Canada's next prime minister. Do you still have that worry?

[Justin Ling]

I think it's absolutely possible they could if we don't mount the right defences. I think we mounted the defences relatively well over the last number of elections, and I think we also benefited from the fact that Russia had distractions that kept it from worrying too much about Canada. Certainly they used their propaganda arms to target our government, as well as the opposition parties, and to target Minister Freeland.

Certainly they have tried to weaken resolve here, but frankly, I think they have devoted most of their resources in the past to fuelling, let's say, the Brexit conversation, and fuelling nationalists across Europe in other avenues, so the fact is that if they put their mind to it, if they put their resources to it, I certainly think that would be a serious risk that we would have to face.

I think, frankly, that we do not have the mechanisms. As I think Ms. Jankowicz pointed out very well, we just do not have the mechanisms to appropriately attribute and to call that campaign out when we think it is happening.

I think the point of some of my remarks at the opening was to underline the fact that it's critically important that we actually figure out legislative or procedural changes that allow us to highlight when these operations are active—when we can identify people who are on the take, as it were, be they journalists in Canada or others—and I think until we do those things, we'll continue to be vulnerable.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you.

Next, what is Tenet Media and what is their role in this operation? How would you describe that?

[Justin Ling]

Certainly the allegations filed by the Department of Justice are still that: allegations. No one has been convicted. However, as laid out by the Department of Justice, Tenet Media was more or less a talent agency meant to finance partnerships with right-wing influencers in the U.S., to find them sponsorships and deals to finance their increasingly impressive revenue streams.

As we've seen from this indictment, it was financed to the tune of some $10 million by Russia Today. It wasn't just financed by Russia Today; Russia Today basically set the editorial line for much of the content produced by these influencers, edited the videos and asked them to share specific pro-Kremlin talking points. This was not some time in the distant past; this was last year, according to the indictment.

We have to believe that this is probably not the only operation to look like that. We know that since Russia Today has been either banned or sidelined in the west, Russia has been looking for other avenues to spread its message to captive audiences, particularly on the political right but also on the political left. We have to imagine that there are probably media organizations like Tenet Media that may be part of this alleged operation.

Just as a last point, it's frankly pretty embarrassing that this information had to come out from the Department of Justice. The Canadian government should have had a hand in revealing this information and tipping its hand in terms of what it knows about whether or not Tenet Media—or other groups like it—also delivered some of these services in Canada.

To highlight this last point, the closest we've gotten recently was a comment from the Prime Minister at the foreign influence public inquiry suggesting that Tucker Carlson and Jordan B. Peterson have been taking this Russian money. We've haven't received any evidence from the government as to whether or not it has anything to back that up.

It's a great example. If the Canadian government has intelligence that really prominent influencers and media personalities in this country and internationally are in fact taking Russian money, the government should put up or shut up. It should give us that information so that we can decide for ourselves, or it should retract those allegations, because I think it risks making us the boy who cried wolf.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

With regard to all of those risks that we have, what measures should Canada take to protect our democracy from foreign influence and interference campaigns like Russia's?

[Justin Ling]

I think Ms. Jankowicz got it exactly right. An actual regime of declassification for intelligence that connects to foreign influence operations is critically important. This is something that our security agencies cannot do on their own. This is going to require either policy changes or legislative changes.

As it stands, there is an overarching concern for protecting sources and methods or for protecting the sanctity of our judicial system. Both, of course, are incredibly important policies, but we also have to add a third plank to that. It is that when declassification or public attribution can actually be used to disrupt an influence operation or an information operation, it should be incumbent on us to declassify or release that information in order to arm the public in defence. Frankly, when we don't do it, it leaves us shadowboxing and making allegations and suppositions for which we don't have evidence.

That also maligns things like, for example, the “freedom convoy”. I don't think we actually have fantastic evidence or intelligence that supports the idea that Russia did anything more than trump it up in their state-owned media. If that intelligence exists, I think it should be released. If that intelligence does not exist and if there's no evidence for it, I think we should say so, because otherwise it risks us finger pointing and doing exactly what Russia wants us to do, which is to suspect each other and become paranoid so that it can break down the ties that keep our democracy working.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mrs. Zahid.

We'll now give the floor to Ms. Michaud for six minutes.

Please go ahead.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for their presence.

Mr. Ling, thank you for being with us here.

As you said, I understand that it's not usual for a journalist to testify before a committee. Usually, you cover them—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Just a moment, there's a problem with the interpretation.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

I can start again. I don't know if the interpretation is working.

Mr. Ling, you can wave if you can hear the interpretation.

You're still not getting the interpretation.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

We'll suspend just for a minute.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

The meeting is resumed.

Nous recommençons.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'm going to do a test.

I don't know if the interpretation is working or if the witnesses can hear me clearly in English. It looks like it is. Excellent.

So I was thanking all three of you for being here.

Mr. Ling, you were saying that it was unusual for a journalist to testify before a committee. Usually, you cover them. I especially want to thank you for taking part in this. You said at the outset that the foreign interference issue absolutely shouldn't be a partisan issue, and that it needs to be addressed more seriously.

I feel as though, over the past few weeks, we've been caught up in accusing one party and the other for not doing enough, of deflecting the debate on whether or not a party leader should get a security clearance. In short, I feel that, by having these debates, we're losing sight of the objective and the essential point, which is to counter this foreign interference.

I see you nodding. I imagine you agree with me. I'll let you answer, but I'd like to know something first. We realized that there had been foreign interference in our last election, and even in some leadership races. However, we're on the cusp of another election. It's no secret that this can happen from one day to the next.

Have we learned from this past interference? Do you think we're ready to call an election and counter foreign interference in the future? Is Canada ready for that?

[Justin Ling]

Thank you very much. I'll answer your question in English.

The short answer, and I'm going to do it backwards, is this: No, we have not learned our lessons.

I think you're absolutely right, to go to the first part, that this has become a largely partisan exercise, and given the state of polarization in this country, it's no great surprise that everything has. It's critically important that we step up to all types of foreign interference, especially when it helps our political party, but also especially when it hurts our opponents. I frankly don't think that has always been the case.

The rapid response mechanism that Prime Minister Trudeau developed with the G7, as well as the critical response team, whose name I can't remember, that was created inside PCO and operates during elections, are both fantastic ideas in principle. I think they were actually designed specifically for the Russian threat and need to be readapted to take into account how India, China and potentially other countries interfere. That's really important, but most of all they need to be recalibrated so that they can communicate with the public more effectively.

In the last two elections we've seen, that internal mechanism inside PCO seemed to not brief opposition parties, particularly the Conservatives, when it impacted them. The mechanisms seemed to be slow and maladapted and, most importantly, they didn't communicate with the public. It is very important that we tell the public when they are being targeted by foreign influence operations, because it's the only way to protect them from it. It's the only way people can protect themselves from it.

I think it is very important for attribution to become the centre of all of our disruption operations, because, frankly, we don't have the criminal prohibitions in place that we would need to do this. Our foreign influence registry is slowly being built, but it's not there yet. It is really important that we look to attribution and to public acknowledgement of interference as our best shield against it.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

All kinds of suggestions have been made over the past few months. We're talking about adding parliamentary committees on Indian interference, for example. There's the independent Hogue commission that's going on. There have been studies at the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. Right here, we're doing one on Russia. There was Bill C-70, and I think everyone agrees that good work was done, but that all of this is evolving extremely quickly.

In addition, we know, as Mr. Alexander said earlier, that social media platforms are the main media used, and they certainly don't do enough. All of this is evolving so quickly that Bill C‑70 may already be obsolete. All these suggestions and all these studies in parliamentary committee are therefore very interesting, but do we really need to create other committees to study the matter?

Of course, it's interesting to hear from witnesses who, like you, come to talk to us about all this and share their expertise with us, but at some point, the government will have to take action.

So what do you suggest? I can ask the other two witnesses as well, but what should the government do at this point?

[Justin Ling]

I'll keep it really short because I would like to hear from the other witnesses as well.

We don't need more committees. The committees and the inquiries that are happening now are fantastic.

However, we know that CSIS—and to some degree the CSE and sometimes the RCMP—have the intelligence, are running the operations and are collecting the signals intelligence, in some cases, that are necessary for attributing these campaigns. We should give them the mechanism to call interference out immediately, as opposed to studying it a year or five years after the fact.

I think it would make a fantastic difference and it would be very useful, particularly with astroturfing efforts that are increasingly common on Twitter but are also on TikTok and elsewhere.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

I don't have much time left.

Mr. Alexander, could you give a brief answer?

[Chris Alexander]

I think the main thing to do is to take a more serious approach, and really show the willingness to tackle these issues.

The reason we haven't painted the real picture of the convoy here in Ottawa is that a number of the leaders of this movement were radicalized on social media. We don't have access to what's going on in the heads of these people when they're in front of their phones. Major social media networks don't share trends on their platforms.

The money that partly funded this movement came from the United States, from the “make America great again”, or MAGA, networks. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or RCMP, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, don't necessarily understand what's going on within these networks, which are linked to Russia.

It's very complex to track a payment that's transferred from Bulgaria to Texas and then to British Columbia.

We're not up to the task, given all the threats we're facing, such as China's interference and terrorist threats. We're not necessarily making it a priority to counter the threat coming from Russia. Information needs to be strengthened. Our regulations and laws need to be strengthened.

As Mr. Ling said, you have to—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Excuse me, Monsieur—

[Chris Alexander]

—be prepared to say publicly and very quickly that Russia is responsible for this.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you.

I'm going to extend Madame Michaud's time a bit and give Ms. Jankowicz a chance to respond. I can tell she's desperate to do so.

Please go ahead.

[Nina Jankowicz]

Thank you, sir.

I think one of the most important things.... Obviously, we've all talked about declassification and how important it is to have rapid public communication in the face of disinformation campaigns, so I think that's agreed upon here.

I would just stamp my feet to the point I made earlier about updating legislation to reflect the realities of the Internet. This need not be overly burdensome on the platforms. They need to step up, but I think the chances of that happening in the political environment around content moderation right now are unlikely.

What I would suggest instead is those additional disclosures that I mentioned before. Russia is doing a lot of its work through information laundering. That's what this Tenet Media operation was. It was paying an intermediary to pay others who were already talking about these salacious, divisive topics. Make sure that there are disclosure laws around payments like that, and then make sure that those disclosure laws are actually implemented and that there are consequences for violating them. That's really important.

Other than that, it's more oversight and transparency over the social media platforms. It's not requiring them to necessarily take down certain content, but perhaps conducting audits. What are they doing to respond to foreign interference? What business practices do they have in place to make sure that there is no advertising or things like it being bought in rubles? What are they doing to deal with automated accounts, as I mentioned before?

All of that can be done without impinging on the freedom of expression of Canadian citizens, and I think that's something that should be considered.