Public Safety Committee on Nov. 28th, 2024

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

I appreciate your point about the history.

There's also a present that you're describing, though, which is that the government of the day, the Liberal government, made a choice, and you've confirmed that choice. It made that choice in 2016 and 2017, and that choice contributed to the continuing ability of these networks to operate.

I know there's an institutional history, but something changed significantly when the Prime Minister made a choice about not disrupting these networks so that the public image effects of what he hoped for from the trip to India would be there. Then, as part of that trip, he signed an intelligence-sharing agreement with India.

I think you'd agree that the Prime Minister, knowing about these interference networks in Canada, choosing to sign that intelligence agreement in spite of what he knew, changed the dynamic, because that meant a kind of sharing of information between Canadian intelligence and Indian intelligence that didn't exist before.

What was your advice to the government at the time about that intelligence-sharing system, and what have been the effects that you've seen since that decision by the government?

[Prabjot Singh]

The community has been unequivocal, since as far back as the 1980s, that any kinds of intelligence and information co-operation or agreements with India are incredibly dangerous. They have led to the loss of life, potentially, in the past, and they are continuing to do harm in Punjab and in Canada today.

Even in 2018, when that agreement, that co-operation framework, was signed, the community was unequivocal and was very resolute that this agreement should not have been signed in the first place and that it should be suspended immediately, particularly given the revelations.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Why, then, did the Liberals choose to sign it, in your view?

[Prabjot Singh]

If you look particularly at that 2018 report by NSICOP, you can see it's heavily redacted. However, when you read between the lines, India was significantly pressuring the Government of Canada around the security co-operation issues and was amplifying this narrative of Sikh extremism.

When you read that report, officials from the government, including from the public service, are described as having a strong priority to convince India that Canada is taking their concerns seriously, and it took a number of steps, including signing that agreement to, I would suggest, appease India and to further foreign policy priorities.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Let me get one more question in.

I had an Order Paper question to the government, asking if any intelligence-sharing between Canada and India contained information about Mr. Nijjar. The government refused to answer that question either way. I was surprised by that. If the answer was no, it could have said no, but it refused to answer the question.

What's your reaction to the failure of the government to answer a question about whether intelligence was shared with respect to Mr. Nijjar?

[Prabjot Singh]

It's incredibly concerning. There needs to be immediate transparency and immediate action to put an end to that agreement and to any kind of co-operation that targets political dissidents in Punjab and in Canada. We have seen evidence of harm coming to individuals in Canada and in Punjab, on both sides of these interactions, that put members of the community in harm's way and that harm their well-being.

[The Chair, Liberal, Iqwinder Gaheer]

Thank you, Mr. Genuis.

I have Mr. Sarai next for five minutes.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to both of you. It's always great to be on this committee and to hear some of the great testimony that comes before us.

I'll first go to Mr. Elcock.

You were the longest-serving director of CSIS, serving your entire term. My colleagues already asked the question, but this is a follow-up question to that.

Do you recall any previous party leaders, in your years from 1994 to 2004, who were offered security clearance and refused to take it?

[Ward Elcock]

No, I don't.

It's never really come up before, frankly, nor has there, in my memory, ever been a suggestion that party leaders should have a clearance. I think this was generated by the events of the last year or so.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

You've never heard anybody deny if they've ever been offered to get the security clearance, not even just a party leader but any other person of significance who has been offered this for information-sharing purposes to protect the country for the safety or security of the country.

[Ward Elcock]

In most cases, that offer wouldn't have been made to anybody else. Party leaders have on occasion in the past been briefed, usually not at a highly classified level, but on both security and defence issues. There's never been a suggestion that party leaders should have a clearance. This is, I think, generated by the events of the last year.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

In that regard, there was a suggestion made by the Conservative Party leader that the Prime Minister could just walk over in the chamber to the other side and whisper the names of people who might be subject to breaches of security or controlled, infiltrated or influenced by foreign countries.

Have you ever heard before of top secret evidence being shared in a manner where you walk over and use the protection of Parliament from prosecution as a tool to pass over information?

[Ward Elcock]

No, I haven't. It would be an odd way, frankly, to do things.

The reality is that, even if the Prime Minister were to walk across the floor and provide the names of individuals, I'm not sure what the Leader of the Opposition would be able to do with it, since he would have no evidence to support the listing of the names. It's really kind of a silly way to try to achieve anything.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

That would be the same case for giving evidence or showing evidence. It would be a very silly or probably inappropriate method of showing evidence, say, for example, on this Indian involvement in Mr. Nijjar's assassination or the other matters before, including the other murders.

[Ward Elcock]

My point is that, if one were to provide sufficient information for it to be useful, one would be providing a lot of classified information. If you're going to provide a lot of classified information, then you really need to think about whether or not security clearance is required. If you're only providing a little bit of information, that may not be a challenge, but that little bit of information probably doesn't achieve anything.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Elcock.

Mr. Singh, we heard in a presentation that you gave earlier this week on the Hill, as well as from news reports, that not only is false information used in India to charge people under the UAP Act, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, but a lot of times, they use Canadian.... They don't source the evidence, but they'll use evidence that somebody was given money from here. It may be just a transfer of funds to help a family. It may be a speech in a gurdwara or a temple or on a political stage, and that was used to incarcerate.

We've also heard of evidence that India has provided that meant a Canadian government employee, a CBSA officer, was suspended for a very long period of time on absolutely false claims.

Do you think, after that fact, that Canada should share information with India in any regard?

[Prabjot Singh]

I don't think Canada should have been sharing any information with India in the first place, nor should Canada accept any information that's coming from India, as very clearly, as you've laid out in the example you gave and other evidence that we've seen, it not only leads to undermining the integrity of any kind of credible institution, whether it's a judiciary or a security agency, but also is leading to harm and very serious risks to members of the community, both in Punjab and in Canada.

With the kind of information sharing we've seen so far, particularly around that 2018 trip, once the government returned from that India trip and signed that co-operation agreement, we saw very quickly that there was what appeared to be an overcorrection whereby the security and intelligence community in Canada began targeting the community based off unfounded and unreliable evidence from India.

We've seen a number of impacts, including a Canadian permanent resident from Vancouver who has been incarcerated and harassed by Indian security agencies since approximately 2016, because India and security agencies have been trying to coerce and intimidate him to provide evidence against Hardeep Singh that was false. Because he refused to co-operate, he hasn't been able to leave the country since then and has been implicated in multiple false cases.

Any of those allegations against Bhai Hardeep Singh specifically and others as well have been found to be completely unfounded and have not led to any convictions.

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

What is the conviction—

[The Chair, Liberal, Iqwinder Gaheer]

Thank you, Mr. Sarai. That concludes your time. Actually, you're a bit over time.

Ms. Michaud you have the floor for two minutes.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Singh, I'm going to quote part of the testimony provided to the committee by Michael Duheme, the Commissioner of the RCMP:

Over the past year, we have seen a number of situations where people have been intimidated, killed or harassed. On some occasions, we have also had to invoke the duty to warn, which is used when we have information deemed credible and imminent regarding the safety of an individual. We then have an obligation to meet with that person and warn them that their life is in danger.

What relationship has your organization had with the RCMP or security agencies in Canada over the past number of months or years? Obviously, the situation has evolved quickly in recent months, particularly with regard to criminal activities carried out by agents of India.

What relationship do you have with the RCMP, specifically? Do you feel safe?

Has that type of a warning requirement been directed at any of the members of your organization?

Finally, what did you think of the RCMP's public release, which revealed details of this ongoing investigation in order to reassure Canadians?

Has that reassured some of the members of your organization?

[Prabjot Singh]

There are a number of issues there that I'd like to address.

First, when it comes to the duty to warn, it's very important to note—and the RCMP confirmed this when they were cross-examined during the foreign interference commission as well—that the RCMP will go to a number of individuals within the community. I believe it's been publicly reported that there have been over a dozen individuals who have been warned of an imminent threat to their life without being provided any information about where that threat is emanating from and without any resources or support to actually confront that.

When you're looking at a political activist being targeted by a foreign country because of their political opinion and their community leadership, and the RCMP is showing them a slip of paper saying that they're being targeted by another country and their life is at risk, what they're then essentially provided with is the option to disengage from public life and stop exercising their charter rights to engage in political expression and political activism, or continue to engage in public life and face a risk to their life.

When it was put to the RCMP, I believe the commissioner's response, and I'm paraphrasing, was roughly something to the effect that it's the individual's choice. I think the entire system, particularly with the threats that we're seeing from India, and the government's response, the lack of resources or supports, is shocking to most Canadians. It is very concerning and something that needs to be acted upon.

[The Chair, Liberal, Iqwinder Gaheer]

Thank you, Mr. Singh.

Mr. MacGregor is next for two and a half minutes.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Singh, the Sikh community in Canada, as you said, has been aware of Indian intelligence activities for decades now. What we've “discovered” over the last year is that the Sikh community is finally feeling validated. We've been trying to tell you about this, and hopefully we're shining a light on just how serious this is.

How does the level of foreign interference in Canada relate to the political temperament in India itself under a Modi-led government? Has there been a link between the level of foreign interference and how malevolent it's been and the political temperament in India? One way or another, we're going to have to continue having relations with India as a country. In terms of how we chart a path forward, do we have a chance of improving that with a Modi-led government, or do we need to wait until the political climate there changes somewhat?

Do you have any thoughts you can offer on those questions?

[Prabjot Singh]

I think the answer to that question is related to what I was just about to finish saying, which is that with the RCMP's announcement, in terms of reassurance, the only reassurance the community can have in this situation is action that ensures the accountability not only of the lower-level individuals who perpetrated the violence but of those at the highest levels of government who actually directed this in the first place.

I think that touches on your point very nicely. It's important to understand that this aggressive activity has definitely increased since 2014 in the rise of the Modi-led BJP and the RSS conglomerate that's been active and on the rise in India. I think you have to understand that Hindu nationalist mindset and its authoritarian approach domestically not only to completely persecute and target religious minorities, but also to stamp out any political dissent.

I think that Hindu nationalist ideology also informs the foreign policy, the approach and the activities of the Indian government, particularly in some of their foreign policy narratives about India as a vishwaguru, the enlightener and teacher of the world. That approach to global politics is ingrained in that Hindu nationalist chauvinistic approach, and I think that hubris and that arrogance are part of the reason that India felt that it could get away with this.

Even more importantly and more concerningly, I think, the reason that India felt it could get away with this is that it feels that Canada, the U.S. and other countries are trying to actively court India as part of a global strategy to counter or contain China.

In terms of addressing this issue, first, as I said, is absolutely the accountability of the individuals who directed the violence against the Sikh community and who need to be held accountable. More importantly, though, Canadian policy-makers need to reflect on the place of India and its government in this world. Having a trade, strategic or military partner that is as volatile and unpredictable as India, that's engaging in extrajudicial assassinations all around the world—not just a one-off in Canada, but multiple, all around the world—is, I think, somewhat of an indication of how India also operates domestically. Alongside that, the flip side of that arrogance is also the simmering and increasing tensions domestically.

What you're looking at is a tinderbox of nations that have been imprisoned within the Indian state and within that construct, and the fault lines within that country are bursting at the seams. I think the assassinations are also a demonstration of the Indian administration's and regime's desperation to neutralize and eliminate any political threats that it sees from the Sikh political community in actually championing justice and human rights for the entire subcontinent.

[The Chair, Liberal, Iqwinder Gaheer]

Thank you.

Next is Mr. Uppal for five minutes.