The one distinction I wish to draw here is that, when we're talking about it, let's be crisp that we're speaking about information operations run by state actors, because normal people have the right to be wrong. You can say pretty much anything you want, so leaving aside individuals and the various free speech rights that go along with that, when it comes to state actors, we haven't talked about leaning on the sanctions regime at all, so that was one thing I advocated in a fairly pronounced way when it came to Russia.
Make it harder for people, because no one wakes up in the morning with a sense of civic duty to do disinformation operations. People want to get paid for it, so if you can make it harder for them to get paid to run these things, that's great. If it's on TV or whatever, then yes, you have the regulatory mechanisms that are available, but, to be frank, most of this stuff is social media, and I just advocated using your intelligence apparatus to find who what they call “the trolls” are. There are bot farms, which are computer programs, and then there are the trolls who run those things. Find the trolls and sanction them, and then, to the extent that it's possible, if CSE can use some of its offensive cyber-capabilities under Bill C-59, hammer them and try to take them off-line.
The NSA did it before the last election, so you watched what happened to Russian disinformation. They made it technically more difficult.
There are tools available for this, so I would encourage a hard look at those.