Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
It is reassuring to see how seriously the Public Safety and National Security Committee is taking the threat that Russian disinformation and influence operations are posing to Canadians, to our democracy and our society.
The points I am making today are my own and do not represent the position of any organization.
My research has focused on Russia's foreign and security policy for the past 30 years. During the past 10 years, I have also been focusing on the weaponization of information by Russia and other actors who threaten Canada and other western democracies. I look specifically at why Russia is exploiting information and how current operations fit into the larger context of Russian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.
As part of this research, I look at the effects of Russian information exploitation on Russia's neighbours as well as generally on democracies and what we can do to defend democracies against information attacks and other attempts to influence and undermine our societies.
I will focus on what the Kremlin is doing when targeting Canada, why it targets Canada, how it targets Canada, how current Russian operations fit into the larger context of Russian long-term goals and what I recommend we do to defend against Russian influence attacks.
What is Russia doing? Russia deliberately and systematically targets Canada and its allies 24 hours a day, seven days a week in the information space. The Kremlin sees itself in a war with the west and believes that—like in a zero-sum game—if the west has problems, Russian society is better off. This is how the Kremling sees things. It's important to note that this is not the position of all Russians; it's the thinking of the Russian president and the Russian political elite, who benefit directly from Vladimir Putin's corrupt authoritarian regime.
Russian interference and disinformation campaigns are not only directed at election cycles but are pervasive and persistent. The Kremlin seeks to leverage and exaggerate societal fault lines, to disrupt our political systems and societies as part of a strategy called “Russian reflexive control”, aiming at changing long-term worldviews and mindsets of citizens. The goal is to affect behavioural change in western countries towards Putin's personal goals.
All Canadian residents are targeted by Russian disinformation and influence operations, not just selected politicians. Targeting of Canadians and Canadian interests happens at home, but also globally and is not only aimed at generating an effect or impact in Canada.
Why is Russia influencing the west? For the Kremlin—like other authoritarian undemocratic regimes such as China—the sheer existence of democracies is a threat to its regime's survival. Countries like Canada show every day that the repression, violence, censorship and corruption we see in authoritarian regimes is not only unnecessary, but that it is harmful and fundamentally not in the interest of citizens. Russian citizens cannot compete with westerners, not in terms of living conditions, economic development, political stability or general happiness of the people. Therefore, the way we live and how much we thrive directly challenges and threatens authoritarian systems as it shows citizens living under authoritarian regimes how much better we live in democracies.
I'm going to move on to the conclusion right away, because I think I'm running out of time.
What can we do? I have five suggestions.
First, information policy needs to be revised across the board in the Canadian government. Second, we can adopt a sanctions framework, similar to that the EU just introduced last month, targeting individuals that support Russian influence and disinformation operations in Canada more effectively and better utilizing existing legislation. Third, we can adopt a DND information operation policy replacing the one from 2018. Fourth, we can focus more on the role of influencers in Russian influence campaigns. Fifth, we can hold Canadian companies accountable that are helping evade current Canadian sanctions.
I'll end there. Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your questions.