I think it's fundamental because that's the way that we basically develop our ability to respond, whether or not that's for defence specifically or many of the other aspects of national security. You certainly need good human capital, but, fundamentally, those people need tools, and the procurement system is the way that we give them the tools to do their jobs, whether these are airplanes, ships or computer systems.
There's a whole range of issues with our procurement system, but I think, fundamentally, to the point of my opening remarks, we need to decide how important this is to us. Is procuring this type of equipment and gaining this kind of capability—again, whether it's for defence or other agencies in the national security community—something that matters to us? If so, how much relative to all of the many other priorities of government? That's part one.
Part two is that we need to calibrate better what we're doing with the workforce and the amount of work required to do it against the human capital available to us. You need resources, both financial and human, to get all of this done, and I don't think that match has been calibrated appropriately for about a decade and a half now. Until we fix that, we can't really expect to see much of a different result.
To be fair, successive governments have increased how much we are spending on this kind of procurement, and that's gone up progressively over the last 15 years. We're now spending more money on this than we have at any point, by my math, since basically the Korean War, if you adjust for inflation. The problem, though, is that we took a decade and a half off doing any of this, so the requirements to catch back up to a status quo level are far in excess of what they would have been if we had stuck to a regular spending pattern over time.
Beyond that, there's a whole number of other issues with the procurement system, from conflicting government priorities and some of the institutional structure, but I'll stop there.