Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for the invitation to speak today.
The horrific events we're watching unfold in Ukraine are demonstrating that Russia is prepared to employ its modernized military without provocation in ways that are fundamentally anathema to Canadian interests and values, and that we in Canada find difficult to comprehend.
In response, we have moved with urgency and ingenuity to help Ukraine defend itself and deter further Russian aggression in Europe by strengthening eastern Europe's defences. We should act with similar urgency and ingenuity to ensure that Canada and North America are better defended against potential Russian aggression closer to home. Russia is challenging Canadian and western interests in multiple places around the world and with many different means, including cyber and disinformation activities.
In my comments today, I will focus on the impact of Russia's military modernization over the last two decades, and the increased threat it poses to Canada, the United States and North America. Russian aircraft, ships and submarines can now carry advanced cruise missiles that could accurately hit targets in North America at long ranges, as can other long-range Russian missiles, including hypersonic glide vehicles.
We cannot at present detect and track these threats well enough, nor can we prevent them from damaging targets here in Canada. We need to quickly improve our ability to do both. As a result of the Canada First defence strategy in 2008, and “Strong, Secure, Engaged” in 2017, Canada has been progressively improving our ability to defend Canada over time, including through the purchase of a fleet of modern fighter aircraft, aerial refuelling tankers, surveillance platforms and a modern naval fleet.
I was happy to hear in the last several weeks that the government is moving to further address the defence of the continent through the modernization of NORAD and continental defence. This will presumably involve a new policy framework and a combination of new equipment, the people to operate it, new or enhanced infrastructure training and the other support required to turn that equipment and those people into a useful military capability.
Let me offer some suggestions now for how we can turn this long-evolving commitment to act with our American allies to strengthen the defence of the continent into concrete action, by focusing on the equipment procurement needed to make that happen. However, some of these elements, I think, are applicable to the other activities we might want to consider.
First, defending Canada must be a priority of government. Successive governments have been improving our ability to defend Canada over the last decades and we have been discussing the modernization of continental defence for years, but those efforts have not moved ahead with the urgency required.
As a result, the pace of implementation has fallen short of expectations. Money has gone unspent year after year, and needed equipment projects have been delayed. The war in Ukraine is demonstrating the importance of having a capable modern military at the moment, when Russia or any other military power precipitates an international crisis, not when we in Canada can get around to doing it.
We need to continue implementing “Strong, Secure, Engaged” and move forward on the modernization of continental defence with urgency we have not seen recently. Doing so will require that this be made a top priority of the government, set by the Prime Minister and cabinet and clearly communicated throughout the Government of Canada and all of its department and agencies.
Second, a bigger defence budget is needed now. Canada's current defence spending plans are insufficient to deal with the threats posed by Russia and other powers like China. Our military, like everyone else's, is facing historically high inflation pressures that are exacerbated by procurement delays. We also have lingering maintenance and infrastructure deficits, as well as personnel shortfalls.
Looking forward, continental defence is an unfunded liability that the 2022 budget must address. Beyond our immediate spending requirements, how much we spend on defence sends a signal to both allies and adversaries of our commitment to our own defence, as well as to international peace and security more broadly. NATO's 2% of GDP spending target is an imperfect measures of allies' contributions to collective defence, but it is one that all allies, including Canada, agreed to meet. If we remain unprepared to reach our alliance spending targets, we should be prepared for our allies and adversaries to question our commitment to defence and international peace and security.
Third, and finally, more money is required, but more capacity is needed to actually use it. Canada is in the middle of the largest defence recapitalization effort since the Korean War. This is in large part because we're making up for lost time during the decade and a half following the end of the Cold War, when we invested insufficiently in our forces.
Many of the key combat fleets we operate today, including fighters and frigates, were purchased in the 1980s—which is the last time period when we spent at a 2% of GDP level—and those assets should have been replaced years ago. Today, we're trying to make up for lost time, using a procurement workforce that was cut in half in the 1990s and never fully rebuilt.
Moving our military modernization forward faster will require an increase in the procurement system's capacity, because we have too few people with the right skills at present to manage the projects that are already funded, never mind what may come this Thursday with the additional budget dollars.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.