Thank you, and thank you for the invitation.
I want to begin my brief comments with a concern I have. I think it's very important that the committee and the government do not overreact, if not go into panic, with regard to existing vulnerabilities both in the cyberworld and defence world of Canada from Russian capabilities.
Certainly the war has heightened the attention, but as I would argue to you, these vulnerabilities have been here for a long time now. We need to recognize, given the adversarial relationship that exists between Russia and Canada, Russia and the west, that this is not a new Cold War. There are other issues and other threats out there which have to be taken into account in trying to respond to the Russian side of this equation.
In terms of the cyberworld, what I would point out in my central concerns is primarily the question of whether the government and particularly our relationship with the United States as a function of economic integration and the integration of critical infrastructure is structured properly to deal with the vulnerabilities that exist. There is no central agency as in the defence world, in this case NORAD, to coordinate responses to potential Russian cyber-attacks, whether they are for espionage reasons or attempts to undermine or sabotage critical infrastructure. I think this is an important issue. NORAD for some time has sought to be, or believed that it could be, responsible for the cybersecurity world, cyber-defence in North America. I still argue that this is very problematic.
Some restructuring is necessary, I believe, particularly in the relationship with the United States, but the cyberworld is a unique world from the defence world, not least of all because the critical infrastructure is by and large in the hands of the private sector. Private sector issues, of course corporate issues, with regard to threats have different dynamics and different concerns on the corporate side relative to government. This is not just the federal government, but also includes the provincial government.
In terms of disinformation, I'm not one who believes that Russian disinformation, Chinese disinformation or anyone's disinformation campaigns really have much of an effect at all. I think that's highly overblown and exaggerated. Espionage has been around and that is a concern, but that's a concern to ensure that government and military cyber-networks are closed and secure.
Canada has no capacity except to deny access as best it can across the spectrum. We have no ability to retaliate in terms of a cyber retaliation, so I think we need to think about those things in particular.
In the physical world, the defence world, I would point out to the committee that for a long time, Russian strategic doctrine has been one of first use of nuclear weapons. The Russians have developed a new set of capabilities beyond their ballistic missile capacities. These are in the world of longer and longer range cruise missiles and the future nuclear-powered cruise missiles and hypersonic vehicles, all of which are nuclear and conventional capable. It's hard for defence, of course, to know what is coming, if it's coming. We have significant gaps and vulnerabilities which have existed for over a decade in terms of the ability of NORAD, and as a result Canada, to be able to detect these threats, to track them, to discriminate, and then to be able to cue interception capabilities.
Interceptors are another issue. The F-35 is a step forward, but there's a broad need to rethink the way Canada in conjunction with the United States via NORAD undertakes and modernizes North American defence to reduce our vulnerability and to be able to deter potential Russian threats. This will affect the way Canada and the United States—North America—respond to threats that originate overseas as we see today in Ukraine.
I shall leave it there. I look forward to your questions.