Thank you very much. I'm very honoured to be asked here to contribute to this very important topic.
In the five minutes, I have five points.
The first point is that Russia is an existential threat to Canada and it is growing.
The second point is that we have either ignored or appeased Russia since the signs of the type threat that we are dealing with, which has been developing since 2008. We are not talking about a threat that developed in February 2022. We're not talking about one that developed in March 2014. It is one that clearly has been indicating to us what it means to Canada and what it ultimately means to Canadian security.
This threat comes from Putin and the administration of Putin seeing an existential threat to his regime by the activities and the existence of NATO. NATO, of course, is the alliance in which Canada is a participant, along with NORAD, which means that any conflict that involves NATO will involve Canada.
Now, where does this threat come from? There are two major elements that drive the Russian threat to Canada. The first one is that we have seen Putin, even on his first days as acting president in 1999, move to reconsolidate the Russian empire. What do I mean by this? One of the very first steps he took as acting president was to intensify the war in Chechnya, which the Russians had come close to losing in 1994. They were subsequently successful in being able to put down the moves for secession. We see a series of military moves to expand Russian control starting with Chechnya and Georgia, and then when the Ukrainian war actually starts, which was 2014. We see that there is this effort.
The second part is the protection of the regime. Once again, we have tended to ignore the threat, but we see the manner in which the Russian regime has moved against any opposition within and even those opposition that are physically outside of Russia.
Perhaps the most important element of this threat that Canada has in fact been ignoring is the Russian way of war and its willingness to use that way of war to achieve its policy objectives, which places it on a direct collision course with NATO.
When we talk about Russia, there are at least three levels to their multi-domain processes of warfare.
The first one, which Dr. Fergusson also touched on, is the existence of the Russian commitment to use tactical nuclear war. We have tended to pretend, after the initiations under the Gorbachev regime of significant arms control movements, that this was a thing of the past. The reality is that in Russian doctrine, Russian force projection and Russian force delivery, we see that they are modernizing their tactical capability. We see the threat that Putin gives today to utilize nuclear weapons. This illustrates and is further amplified by the Russian commitment to also learn how to blind NATO countries.
We have seen the demonstration effect when the Russians demonstrated how they can shoot down one of their own satellites with their missile capability. In February of this year, they also demonstrated how they can cut cables and, hence, communications. All of this points to a very concrete tactic, so that if they indeed feel it necessary to use nuclear weapons, we would be involved.
They have also demonstrated a very strong willingness to engage in conventional war with means that I'm afraid we do not have a full appreciation of. Some of the evaluations coming out at this phase of the Ukrainian crisis illustrates that we did not pay attention to the Georgian war, the Chechnyan war and the Syrian war.
Dr. Fergusson has already touched upon cyberwarfare. I am more concerned about the weaponization of social media. I do think that the Russians are problematic, in light of some of the evidence that our American and British allies have shown.
Ultimately, we are facing a threat from Russia. It is growing and it is reaching the level of an existential crisis.
Thank you very much.