Public Safety Committee on April 5th, 2022

[Dr. James Fergusson]

It's a joint venture and, importantly, NORAD is the driver behind the issue surrounding NORAD modernization, which is North American defence modernization. It is the planning centre right now, which will start to move requirements forward, hopefully, over the near term.

In terms of processing information, because that is centralized at NORAD headquarters in Colorado Springs, that's by and large American. That, I would note, is what's known as their pathfinder initiative, which is going to try to deal with the use of artificial intelligence for the massive amounts of data that are going to pour in from the sensor system.

That's part of it, but the key thing to me is that because of the nature of the changing threat environment—the origins and the platforms relative to the missiles—it's time Canada and the United States sat down and started to seriously think about a functional, integrated North American defence command. We have close bilateral defence co-operation with the United States in the maritime and the land sectors, but because of the nature of the all-domain environment, we need to take the step that we took in 1957-58 for the air world. We now need to move it into a true, integrated North American defence command.

[Paul Chiang, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Thank you so much, Dr. Fergusson.

Dr. Huebert, could you expand on some of the cybersecurity threats that Russia poses to Canada, and some of the measures that are needed to address these threats?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Absolutely. What we're seeing, and what we can see from some of the open reports, is that the Americans, of course, had to deal with the interference in their 2016 election. A British House of Commons committee examined what happened with Russian interference in Brexit, and there have been studies on Russian interference in the Castilian independence movement in Spain.

What we are seeing, or at least what seems to be appearing—and this is something of course that is Dr. Kitchen's expertise—is a focus on areas where society can be divided. This is what everybody refers to when they talk about the weaponization of social media. What the Russians have discovered...And we can't leave the Chinese out, because the Chinese are also heavily involved, or at least that is what comes out of the open literature. They try to divide societies by focusing on the various feeds that exist. This is then followed by a hope that somebody within that society will pick up that cause and become the leader.

It's sort of the issue that Lenin referred to back in the early days of Communism. “Useful idiots” basically tried to divide society. The effort today is actually to have a way of separating and neutralizing any support for the type of collective actions we need.

With regard to other cyber threats, we also know the Russians have shown an increasing capability of being able to interfere in various electronic systems and cyber systems of other states. We've seen this with their ability to influence the Ukrainian electrical system prior to the onset of the war in 2014. We're seeing this in other locations

Once again, it's hard to know exactly how well-defended we've become in being able to harden that part of cyberwarfare. There's no question, whatsoever, that the attention the Russians and the Chinese are giving this is increasing, if the reports from the Americans and British are indications of this capability.

[Paul Chiang, Liberal, Markham—Unionville, ON]

Thank you so much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

I would now like to invite Madame Michaud to begin her six-minute block of questioning.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First, I thank the witnesses for being here. Their expertise is more than welcome, given what is happening in Ukraine. We have good reason to be concerned.

Ms. Kitchen, I'm going to start with you.

You mentioned direct threats, but also indirect threats, including disinformation, the use of social media, phishing campaigns and the use of ransomware.

Aluminerie Alouette in Sept-Îles, one of the largest aluminum smelters in America, fell victim to a Russian ransomware attack in late February. The Russian group claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it had harvested up to 20% of the smelter's data. It said it was directly related to the west's economic sanctions against Russia. We are not immune to these kinds of attacks, which put our businesses, our citizens, our critical infrastructure and our democratic institutions at risk.

How do we protect ourselves from this? Do you think Canada is prepared to deal with these kinds of threats?

[Dr. Veronica Kitchen]

I think there are many levels to this. There is a level at which individuals need to take personal responsibility, making sure they're using things like two-factor authentication to protect their own systems, and obviously, that also applies at the level of organizations.

From a governmental perspective, it is really, as has already been discussed, a question of co-operating, both between the private sector and public authorities. This also includes across borders, recognizing that these kinds of threats are not easily contained within domestic borders, because of the transnational nature of companies and groups.

As Dr. Huebert mentioned, there is this effort with disinformation to inspire others to take action, rather than taking action directly, so that's one of the ways you can see this crossover from the cyberworld into the physical world.

Certainly, it is very important to ensure that the types of software that run big systems like refineries are up to date and protected from the Internet.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

One company actually offered free credit monitoring protection to employees who had been affected. My impression is that this is a service that the company offered on its own, in good faith, to its employees. That said, it is an afterthought, not prevention.

I would like to come back to what the government can do to protect businesses. What can it do upstream? What can it do afterwards?

Ransoms are certainly being demanded; most of the time these groups want money. In fact, there was a CBC/Radio-Canada article that explained how this kind of group could demand a second ransom.

How can the government intervene? To your knowledge, is this kind of surveillance protection service currently available to Quebec and Canadian businesses?

[Dr. Veronica Kitchen]

I'm certainly not an expert on ransomware attacks and on cyber-attacks of that nature. Unfortunately, I'm not aware of any specific services that might be offered, but again certainly trying to stop vulnerabilities before they happen...and I think the government can have a role in providing information on the kinds of threats that might be faced and, on the side of disinformation, providing accurate information to help combat the tendency to be taken in by things like phishing scams and ransomware attacks could be helpful.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Ms. Kitchen.

Mr. Fergusson, do you have anything to add to this? I know you specialize in defence. Is it possible, to your knowledge, for the government to provide this kind of service? Does it need to modernize the services it offers to protect institutions and businesses from this kind of attack?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

I can't respond specifically. I'm like Professor Kitchen in my ability to answer these details. The key agency to provide information and notification is probably the Communications Security Establishment, CSE, but I don't know in detail how much they have moved in this area, because their work has always been dealing with the electronic world.

One of the dangers here—and I agree with Professor Kitchen that this is information—is stepping over the line with the government trying to regulate and to force on private companies certain procedures or certain systems. You could imagine a central system. That's going to be problematic because of the private sector issues involved, so care needs to be taken there.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

So it's not necessarily about interfering or imposing this service, it's about offering it and relying on the good faith of companies to put services in place to protect themselves.

Is that what you are saying, Mr. Fergusson?

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

You get the last word on this, Ms. Michaud.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Now I will move to Mr. MacGregor.

Sir, you have a six-minute slot. The floor is yours whenever you want to grab it.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Chair.

I will echo my colleagues in thanking the witnesses for helping inform our committee study into this very important and very interesting subject.

Dr. Fergusson, I'd like to start with you. Our committee's mandate is specifically to review legislation, policies and programs for government departments that are responsible for public safety and national security. I want to keep it focused on our internal security and efforts.

During your opening statement, I was taking notes and you made mention of the fact that there is no central agency to respond to cyber-attacks and that some restructuring may be necessary. In the United States there is an alphabet soup of different security and intelligence agencies that, to various extents, have capabilities to investigate cyber-attacks. Here in Canada the RCMP, CSIS and CSE also have their capabilities.

I'd like to invite you to expand on those remarks. Are you talking about more American-Canadian co-operation into an agency to take care of North American cybersecurity?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

I wouldn't necessary say that we need an agency, but we certainly need a structure with the United States. Remember, the United States is structured differently. All those agencies you're talking about all live in one house, the Department of Homeland Security. They are a bit of a step ahead of us, whereas, if you look at us, the RCMP are dealing with criminal activities, as a lot of ransomware is about crime, as hackers are out to make money. Then we have CSE on the intelligence side, as is CSIS, both coordinated under Public Safety.

Does Public Safety have the authority, and what are its links to Homeland Security in the United States? Are there regular meetings? Is there a bilateral committee? You can think about a variety of forms, for example, in the maritime warning world, where there are these developments, not just with the United States but also with the Five Eyes community.

I think it's important to look at those things in detail, such as whether we are structured right, particularly because the Internet cyberworld knows no borders. Information coming into Canada comes into the United States. It flows in patterns I don't know about or understand, really. Critical infrastructure is integrated with that in the United States, so we have a common interest as a function of our close relation of integration with the United States.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much for that.

Dr. Kitchen, I'd like to move to you.

Thank you for your remarks informing our committee about the disinformation campaigns. Some of the narratives concerning Russian aggression that are coming out of some of the elements of the United States Republican Party and even some news organizations like Fox News have certainly raised some eyebrows. We do have the American mid-terms coming up. There could be a shift in how the United States Congress is governed following those mid-terms.

Considering how successful some of the disinformation campaigns have been in the United States, do we as a country need to closely examine what the potential pitfalls are from that disinformation campaign in the United States?

[Dr. Veronica Kitchen]

Certainly. There are a few different ways to think about this. One is in terms of the effect it might have on swaying an American election, both in the sense of whether there might be Russian interference and also broadly in terms of the direction in which the American people will decide to vote. Certainly some administrations and some policy positions will be easier for Canada to deal with than others will.

The other thing to be concerned about is the fact that individuals inspired by these kinds of narratives to take political action, whether it rises to the level of criminal activity or security activity, could be on either side of the border. The media landscapes in Canada and the United States are very closely integrated. This is not to say that there aren't separate causes in both countries, but we do see groups being inspired by each other across the border, and also groups that simply exist transnationally that might take action.

Canada's maintaining and diversifying our relations with the United States can help to make sure that our interests continue to be heard, even if we have a change in government.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you.

I have a final question for Dr. Huebert. Is there anything that we as a committee should be examining or making recommendations to the Canadian government on with respect to Russian involvement in financial crimes in Canada, money laundering, etc.? Is there anything you might be able to inform the committee about on that particular subject?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

It goes beyond Russian involvement. It goes into international crime, and we suspect also that there is Chinese involvement. It is, of course, the issue of transparency. One of the difficulties we've always had, in terms of being able to determine just exactly what the involvement of others is in the financial system, is that it's very hard to trace, in terms of both any regulatory regime and any government action.

If I have any overall statement on that, it is that it has to have some greater visibility in terms of what the transactions are, and there has to be a move away from the privacy that often protects these types of actions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much.

Colleagues, that completes the first round of questioning. A quick look at the clock tells me that if I cut everybody's time in half in the second round, we'll finish more or less on time.

To begin, I would ask Mr. Lloyd to give us two and a half minutes.

The floor is yours, sir.

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

My first question is to Dr. Fergusson.

Considering the misinformation campaign, some people have been calling for censorship. Do you think that would backfire, if the government were to engage in censorship?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Definitely it's going to backfire. As I said, I don't agree that disinformation campaigns—and they're not all coming from Russia; there are issues about our information campaigns as well—have that much of a significant impact in terms of exploiting social differences. But if you—

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Thank you.

I've always felt that the best way to fight misinformation is to fight it with true information, and so I'll ask the same question of Dr. Kitchen.

Do you think it would be more effective to fight misinformation with a vigorous campaign of putting forward true information? Do you think censorship would be effective or would it backfire?