Public Safety Committee on April 28th, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Good morning, everyone.

To our witnesses, our apologies for the delay. When the bells ring, members of Parliament pay attention. We've done our duty. We're now ready to go and I will call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 20 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

I'll start by acknowledging that we are meeting on the traditional unceded territory of the Algonquin people.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of November 25, 2021. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application. Members and witnesses participating virtually may speak in the official language of their choice. At the bottom of the screen, you will find that choice of floor, English or French.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motions adopted by the committee on Thursday, February 17, 2022, the committee is resuming its study of the rise of ideologically motivated violent extremism in Canada.

With us today by video conference is Brandon Rigato, lead research assistant on hate and extremism in Canada, from Carleton University. We also have with us Dr. David Morin, from the Université de Sherbrooke, who is co-chair of the UNESCO Chair in Prevention of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism.

Up to five minutes will be given to opening remarks, after which we will proceed with questions.

Mr. Rigato, I now invite you to make your opening remarks. The floor is yours, sir.

[Brandon Rigato, Lead Research Assistant on Hate and Extremism in Canada, Carleton University, As an Individual]

Dear committee members, thank you for the invitation to speak to you today. I'll use my time to briefly discuss my doctoral research, which is a study of right-wing extremism across Canada, undertaken in the school of journalism and communication in the faculty of public affairs at Carleton University.

While there's a lot I could say regarding the far-right spectrum across Canada, in this witness statement I will focus on one group I have studied as a way to show a range of behaviours, actions and risks that help us understand IMVE.

The group is the Three Percenters, which I have been tracking since 2018. They are now, as of June 25, 2021, a listed terrorist entity in Canada. In the past the Three Percenters, a group steeped in violent white supremacist ideology, openly called for and supported violent action, and while they have now been exposed and stopped, it is likely that current and future groups with a similar ideology have learned from the Three Percenters. However, while other extremist movements and groups may copy their organizational tactics, those same patterns can help us identify and overcome attempts at subterfuge from the next iteration of the Three Percenters and similar groups.

Today's brief discussion will trace what offline behaviours were encouraged by the Three Percenters' members, what values and beliefs they urged members to uphold and how their online discussions matched their various “About Us” sections on their websites and social media pages. These examples link to many of the issues the committee is examining. Whereas many researchers focus on what leads to individuals embracing or leaving extremist movements, my research tracks and identifies how right-wing extremist groups maintain the followers they have attracted. I trace the many ways right-wing extremist groups such as the Three Percenters cultivate digital and non-digital spaces for members to feel emboldened to express and potentially act on their most hateful and violent views.

The Three Percenters utilize several activities to form and sustain their members' resolve. The first is active and mandatory participation from “real” members, those who meet in person and take part in offline training in airsoft, where they simulate tactical military drills. The tactical training includes map reading, first aid and practical applications that benefit a military force. Accompanying such training is a code of conduct that leadership expects members to embrace and follow.

According to the Three Percenters Alberta chapter—and this is a direct quote—“Members shall use their training and capabilities to protect the public at all times, both on and off duty”. Moreover, they say, “A prospective member must be a patriot and possess a sense of the concept of Judeo-Christian values in an ethical (rather than theological or liturgical) sense. These values have been emphasized primarily by political conservatives.”

Here we get a sense of what Three Percenters expect physically, spiritually and ideologically of their recruits. Clearly the group appears to present as simply patriotic Canadians, yet by tracking their online dialogue, my data shows that their content is racist and grounded in white nationalism. The Three Percenters are radically opposed to Muslims, refugees and non-white immigration broadly. They are also engaged in the harassment of progressive politicians across Canada.

The discussions and content that transpired on the Three Percenters' social media pages are where I will focus my final remarks.

While the Three Percenters and other right-wing extremists attract a smaller number of individuals into offline activity, there is a hotbed of content that appears daily online and across platforms calling for and celebrating violence towards Canadian newcomers, non-Christian Canadians and Muslims. Their focus extends beyond domestic politics and concerns. All too often, the focus is on stories of refugees breaking laws anywhere in Europe and North America or a story of what they perceive to be a misogynistic attack anywhere in the Middle East. Any and all content they construe as socially progressive and friendly to Muslims is disparaged and fuels the hateful cycle that provides the life force for the Three Percenters and other right-wing extremists.

The Three Percenters are one example of many right-wing extremist groups across Canada that call for and celebrate violence. Rightly, the Three Percenters are a terrorist entity, given their active participation in military training to quell what they understand as a Muslim invasion. However, the digital platforms and social atmosphere that permit such hate and sustain their violent outlook will too easily morph into another threat in the form of new IMVE groups and individuals who will continue to foster and support violence targeting non-white and non-Christian Canadians.

With that, I will conclude my remarks. I would be pleased to take your questions or address other aspects of the committee's concerns.

Thank you for giving me the time to appear today.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much.

I would now invite Dr. David Morin to take the floor for up to five minutes.

Sir, whenever you're ready, the floor is yours.

[Dr. David Morin, Co-Chair, Université de Sherbrooke, UNESCO Chair in Prevention of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen, honourable members, for this opportunity to have a discussion with you.

Mr. Chair, I'd like to keep track of my time because, as you know, professors are not nearly as disciplined as MPs in keeping to their speaking time. I'm counting on you to keep me in line.

My opening address has three parts. I'll get right to it.

What are we up against today in terms of violent ideological extremism? It is, of course, a complex reality with many different strands. Like my colleague who spoke earlier, I would like to draw your attention to the right-wing extremism ecosystem.

Our data show that this ecosystem is a form of cohabitation made up of convergences and divergences between the various leanings.

The first important point in part one of my presentations pertains to the extreme right, typified by the attacks in Quebec and in London, Ontario. There is also anti-government sentiment. There was also the attack in Moncton in 2014. And misogyny is what led to the two attacks in Toronto a few years back. There are also some relatively new movements, including conspiracy theories, which of course are nothing new. Added to this is religious fundamentalism, and sometimes even a branch of "alternative science".

A glance at the number of arrests since 2020 that have been linked to public safety and extremism—not to mention national security—shows a strong presence of these far right anti-government and conspiracy theory movements. The latter underpins all the others, to a certain extent. And of course—we can talk about it again later—this brings us to the recent events in Ottawa which, in the midst of the pandemic, found fertile ground, scapegoats and supporters.

I'd like to highlight two important points at this stage.

First of all, a distinction is often made between the radical right, which would like to be involved in institutions, and the violent extremist right. It's an important distinction, to some extent, but they are nevertheless interconnected, and are often objective allies. We'll return to this later, because it's a very important point. I would also like to talk about the growing number of violent protests. In the western world, there has been a 250% increase in such demonstrations over the past five years. This shows that there is no clear-cut distinction between extremist agendas and occasional violent flare-ups. Many ordinary citizens were at the attack on the Capitol. The second important point in part one is the widespread rise in violent ideological extremism in the western world. What is involved is a rise in right-wing extremism, whether in the power structure or in the streets, an increase in hate crimes, which increased by 25% in Canada in 2020 over the previous year, along with violent demonstrations and attacks. There was a 250% increase in extreme right terrorism incidents between 1970 and 2019. This means increased social polarization.

Why is this is a growing phenomenon? There are many reasons. I will mention three that affect you more directly. First, there was the loss of confidence in institutions, that is to say you the politicians, we the scientists, and also the media. The data demonstrate a very clear connection between this loss of confidence and the rise in extremism. Secondly, digital social networks and alternative media are like particle accelarators for extremism. We'll likely be returning to this issue. Thirdly, there are the global and local contexts of the day. There is the pandemic, the economic crisis—there was the 2008 financial crisis and now, inflation—along with various other related conflicts, like the migrant crisis at Roxham Road in Quebec, and the environmental crisis. In short, it's an outburst of anger that you have to know how to listen to.

The third and final part of this opening address is about the repercussions on Canada's democracy. I believe that there are two major pitfalls to be avoided. The first is underestimating the threat and the risk to democracy it represents. What we are dealing with is an enemy within. In matters of national security, the tendency is to be less mistrustful of what appears to be close to us. How long did it take for us to really show concern, and for the enforcement agencies to address the problem, even though it had been underscored by many researchers as early as the 2010s? We originally thought that Canada was immune. It's true that Canada probably has a more consensual political culture than other countries, starting with our American neighbour. I nevertheless believe that we can agree, and that there is consensus on the fact that Canada is not immune. The second major pitfall is overestimating the strength and capacity of resilience.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

You have 10 seconds left, please.

[Dr. David Morin]

We are taking democracy for granted, and in my view, doing nothing is not an option. As to what we should be doing, that's another problem.

I'll conclude by saying that history has taught us that it's the majorities, not the minorities, that overthrow democratic regimes.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much.

We will now move into the first round of questions. The first block goes to Mr. Van Popta.

You have six minutes, sir, whenever you're ready.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley—Aldergrove, BC]

Thank you very much.

Thank you to our witnesses for being here. I apologize once again for the delay. I know your time is important and your evidence is going to be important to us as well.

I'll start with Professor Morin.

You talked about the impact on Canadian democracy rising out of, I suppose, misinformation and disinformation. I wonder what comments you might have about the potential for foreign interference in our electoral systems and whether that's a real threat. Certainly the perception of it has proven to be damaging to us.

[Dr. David Morin]

Thank you for your question.

That is indeed an issue. I'll have to be careful here, because I'm also currently sitting on the committee that is examining the new regulations on harmful online content. I will therefore keep my comments fairly general.

It's clear, Mr. Van Popta, that disinformation is a major issue. It's true that people often view violent and hateful content, and that disinformation often falls into a grey zone; fake news, for example. What we're talking about here are the parameters for freedom of expression.

But for foreign interference, it's important to point out that countries that are not interested in being nice to us, to put things prosaically, play upon the divisions that already exist in the country, and they stick a knife into an existing wound, adding noise to the noise and increasing social polarization. I think that it's essential to provide for regulatory mechanisms with more teeth, and that can—as we have seen in the Ukrainian context—monitor certain media, as has been done in Europe, and here as well. Russia Today and Sputnik are examples of propaganda media used by the Russian government.

It's true that disinformation—which surfaced during the pandemic and had a marked impact on public health and public safety—and alternative media are part of the problem. The Government of Canada is currently looking at this very closely, with the approval of all members.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley—Aldergrove, BC]

Thank you for that.

I want to get into the studies that the government has been undertaking with the Communications Security Establishment and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. It's enough of a concern for them to have undertaken the study on the impact of foreign interference in our electoral system. Those studies predated the 2021 election.

Do you have any comment about that? There have been some newspaper articles on how perhaps foreign interference had an impact on some of the ridings in my home province of British Columbia, for example.

[Dr. David Morin]

One important point I'd like to make is that interference in a democracy and the integrity of our democratic systems need to be taken into consideration in matters of violent extremism. That's unquestionable.

On the other hand, I think that it also has to be taken into account between election periods. We might have to do something to enhance the crisis management system. This would enable all of the stakeholders to cooperate when there are things like massive disinformation campaigns right before elections. It's a key issue.

Our intelligence agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, has for some time now been willing to identify certain countries that have been interfering in our systems and processes. That's something new in the Canadian intelligence landscape.

It's a major task, and one that people need to know about. I'm not yet convinced, Mr. Van Popta, that all of the members, or even Canadian society generally, are fully aware of these issues. I'd like to suggest that one option worth considering would be to give Canadians a better explanation of these matters, because while our front line is the law enforcement agencies, we may well ask who is in the second line?

So I believe that it's essential to make Canadians more aware of these issues so that they can be front-line responders, with the law enforcement agencies backing them up. Allow me to make a comparison. It's as if we entrusted teachers with the entire task of educating our children. It doesn't work. The front-line workers in children's education are the parents. I would say that the same is the case for national security as it relates to disinformation and foreign interference.

Thank you.

[Tako Van Popta, Conservative, Langley—Aldergrove, BC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

I will now move to Ms. Damoff.

You have a six-minute block. The floor is yours.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to both of our witnesses for their patience in starting this meeting and for being here today.

Mr. Rigato, you've done extensive study on the Three Percenters. We know our security agencies see far-right extremism as the greatest threat to Canadian safety. We've heard testimony about these movements monetizing and selling t-shirts. When we list a group—like we did the Three Percenters and others, starting in 2019—we're cutting off finances to them. That's essentially what the listing does.

Could you speak about whether cutting off financing is effective, in the first place? Second, do you have any recommendations on anything else we could be doing with organizations like the Three Percenters?

[Brandon Rigato]

Although cutting off funding is highly effective for some of these more organized groups, unfortunately the groups that I followed are often individually backed by ardent supporters and ideologues. Cutting off the funding will stop some of the problems that stem from being able to financially bolster a movement. We can't overlook the fact that these are, often, ideologically motivated people who will do it free of cost. Some of the most vociferous posters have no funding, other than their own BitChute channels.

As far as other alternatives are concerned, I would be very tuned into how VPNs are utilized. We can crack down on what people are accessing here in Canada, but anyone with a Netflix account knows that you can jump onto an American account and then you get better films. It's the same thing with extremism, unfortunately. You can dodge these government checks and balances quite easily.

It doesn't answer your question or provide any useful help, unfortunately. It just raises more concerns for IT people.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you.

Dr. Morin, you talked about these groups having an anti-government focus and, among other things, conspiracy theories.

One of the things that is troubling is the validation of these movements by people in authority, so elected officials. I would talk about Randy Hillier, for example, who was part of many of the conspiracy theories and part of the “freedom convoy” that found its way into Ottawa.

What impact does it have when elected officials validate these kinds of far-right movements?

[Dr. David Morin]

Is that question for me, Mr. Chair?

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Yes.

[Dr. David Morin]

Okay.

We've done research, including a Canada-wide survey on belief in conspiracy theories. The survey will soon be presented to the Quebec government. The data are rather worrisome, showing that up to 25 % of Canadians believe more or less strongly in conspiracy theories. Needless to say, this 25% rate does not mean that all these people are diehard conspiracy theorists, but there is a hard core of 9% or 10%, and some of the remaining 15% could swing either way.

I'm telling you this because there's nothing new about conspiracy theories. I recall that in the early 2020s, CSIS, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, was still reluctant to treat them as an extremist threat. Now, I don't think there is any doubt about it. Our data also show that some conspiracy theorists are in favour of violence. We have psychometric scales to measure things like that. Now I'm not saying it applies to all of them, but only to some of them. It's an anti-democratic approach that is being used by other extremist movements, on the left and the right.

That was just a partial answer to your question, Ms. Damoff. As I was saying earlier in my opening remarks, we often tend to separate what is called radical thinking from violent extremism, and that's understandable. The police often say that they don't investigate ideologies, but crimes, and focus on the violence component.

Nevertheless, comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon has shown that there are connections. When a radical statement is made by a particular fringe of any political party, it contributes to some extent to the normalization of a form of extremist language. As my colleague Mr. Rigato was explaining just now, it may include xenophobic and anti-feminist comments. It also goes some way towards justifying the most extremist among them to make similar comments. Conversely, it can allow the generally pro-democracy radical fringes to say that they are not as bad as the extremists who promote violence.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

You have 10 seconds left, please.

[Dr. David Morin]

It's therefore extremely important to acknowledge that things are interconnected, and I could use Ottawa as an example. What we saw here were pro-democracy people alongside people who are anti-democracy, which caused the movement to veer towards violence.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jim Carr]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Larouche, the floor is yours for six minutes of questioning. Whenever you're ready, proceed, please.

[Andréanne Larouche, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Morin, I'd like to begin by mentioning that my alma mater is the University of Sherbrooke and that my summer reading was Le nouvel âge des extrêmes, by Sami Aoun, someone we are both acquainted with, I believe, and who is also my former professor. It's a pleasure to have you here with us at the committee today.

Mr. Morin, you were recently appointed by the Department of Canadian Heritage to a group of experts whose task is to look into a legislative framework for online hate and harmful content. In addressing that issue, will it be possible to draw inspiration from what is happening elsewhere, and will the European legislative measure adopted for dealing with problematic content on major platforms like Facebook and Twitter be studied? You spoke at length about how alternative media and social media contribute to radicalization. Do you think that Canada should adopt that model?

[Dr. David Morin]

Thank you very much for your question.

I'm delighted to hear that we have the same alma mater. I also forgot to note that it is located on the traditional land of the Abenaki.

To answer your question about the expert group, it and the government are examining precisely what you referred to, which is the digital services legislation recently announced by the European Commission.

Several of its regulatory aspects are indeed very interesting. I won't say more about them, because the expert group's deliberations to date will be released in public notices. If I were to say any more, I'd be giving my own interpretation. It's difficult for me to predict what direction this will take.

However, there are some very interesting aspects with respect to the sorts of entities and the types of content that require regulation. There is much discussion about it, and that takes me back to the member's initial question, which was what we ought to be doing about disinformation. By this I mean information that falls within the freedom of speech criteria, but that may be very harmful. It's a problem. Many Canadians feel strongly about freedom of speech. The parameters are complex.

The final factor is what kinds of obligations can be applied to all these entities? There are large entities, which could ultimately be subject to many requirements, and smaller entities, on which it is sometimes more difficult to impose them, but which are nevertheless platforms that contain a lot of harmful content. These parameters are under discussion.

I will conclude by saying that digital social networks are obviously a key issue. However, I would remind you that the greatest crimes in history and the rise of various forms of extremism did not need to wait for social networks to come along in order to spread their propaganda. So we need to address the issue of social networks, but it's also important to have initiatives in the field, in the offline world. For example, there is growing extremism in some specific working environments. Our concerns are to determine how to reach these segments of the population that are at greater risk and more radicalized, to prevent them from preaching to the converted and influencing those who could be most problematic.

Thank you.

[Andréanne Larouche, Bloc, Shefford, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Morin.

While it's clear that social media contributed to the problem, you're right to remind us that there is more to it than that.

In your book, Le nouvel âge des extrêmes, which I read in my final year of applied politics at the University of Sherbrooke, it can clearly be seen that you researched the growth of far-right movements, particularly over the past few decades. There was a rise in extremism on social networks, but also elsewhere in the field. You have often asked how we can reach out to these people. What I would like to hear about are the main features of these far-right groups

How do today's far-right groups differ from those of 10 years ago?

Can you explain how the far-right movement grew and what drove this growth?