Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I will speak in English, but feel free to ask your questions in either official language.
Ideologically motivated violent extremism and seditious activity in Canada and other western countries are being exploited by foreign actors. Russian misinformation and disinformation on open source social media platforms are undermining police and the sitting government. The lack of awareness and education in the area of IMVE, sedition, and foreign actor interference has caused tangible national security vulnerabilities. Such activities did not end with the illegal Ottawa occupation. Bad actors can mobilize political opinion and instigate various levels of potentially illegal activities.
IMVE, seditious intent, separatists' activities and the impact of foreign actor interference have been underestimated within the regional and national security architecture for some time. Jihadi terrorism has dominated efforts and left law enforcement vulnerable to miscalculation in the absence of sufficient early warning and strategic intelligence to adapt its posture to a fluid threat picture.
The effective narrative of bad foreign and domestic actors in perpetuating conspiracy theories and false narratives will continue to inspire further actions against the state. Thresholds for actively investigating foreign actor interference by federal law enforcement agencies are rather high, often requiring major criminality or establishment of direct ties to a foreign state. This is too high a bar. It leaves local and federal police services in a difficult position to establish it. This enables a permissible environment for foreign actor influence.
Proactive intelligence probing is required on IMVE activity in Canada to assess associated risks with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
I shall now jump to seven recommendations.
First, Canada's national security architecture needs to take a more active and assertive role in addressing IMVE and foreign actor interference. It's important to distinguish that IMVE does not include political activism and radical thought. IMVE in Canada is driven by hatred and ideologically extreme core values, with a propensity towards advocacy of violence and, recently, seditious and separatist ideation.
Second, more education and awareness are needed to highlight the impact of IMVE and foreign actor interference, not only on national security, but on human security, and to acknowledge the relationship between the two. Foreign actors have effectively capitalized on propagating division within our society and weakening public confidence in our institutions, such as public health and law enforcement.
Third, response to foreign actor interference needs to be reimagined. A more robust framework is needed for federal agencies to act more proactively in coordination with the police of jurisdiction, who are the ones more connected to the communities being affected by FAI. More cyber capabilities are needed not just to identify misinformation/disinformation, but also to counter it actively. The intelligence establishment needs to improve its public outreach and education.
Fourth, Canada's national security architecture needs to be more responsive and nimble to a changing and complex threat environment as influenced by geopolitical trends and developments.
Fifth, foreign actor laws similar to those in Australia need to be introduced to allow more tools for law enforcement, but only if conditions in recommendations three and four are met. Current laws and capabilities are rarely utilized. We need to seek opportunities to apply existing laws to proactively preserve Canada's national interests in alternative ways that can be equally effective in hardening the operating environment.
Sixth, push-back against FAI and IMVE doesn't have to be merely through criminal charges. Intelligence probing and active engagement is essential to be in a position to not only diagnose the risk better, but also to ensure a more inhospitable operating environment. Lack of arrests or charges should never serve as a barometer of risk.
Seventh, special prosecutors need additional resources to respond to the complexities of IMVE, FAI and organized crime.
In closing, I should acknowledge that this brief was co-authored with John Khoshandish of the York Regional Police.