Mr. Chair, I think we would observe that the government's preference was for the language that was presented in the bill in the form in which it was introduced.
If it would be helpful to the committee, I can explain some of the considerations that were at play in the design of clause 52, which deals with restrictions on the things the commission may and may not investigate. You'll note that there is a subsection that deals with where the commission may refuse and a subsection that deals with where the commission must refuse, and so on.
The designed intent for the commission, as presented in the bill, was to give the commission the broadest possible latitude of decision making about what to investigate within the four corners of its jurisdiction, but not to give the commission discretion about making decisions about where the limits of that jurisdiction lie.
These amendments would, to varying degrees, grant the commission authority to make broader decisions about what would fall within it's mandate as a discretionary matter.
As my colleague pointed out at the last meeting, that could allow the commission to ensure that a type of complaint that was unforeseen does not fall through the cracks. On the other hand, it could also give rise to workload concerns. It could give rise to situations where the commission's mandate is brought into conflict with a space that is reserved in statute for another body.
What the amendments at 52 do, as Mr. Motz noted, is the line-drawing exercise or the balancing exercise around where the commission should be given the discretion about what falls within its mandate in addition to its absolute discretion about what is already defined as within its mandate. I think that is a question the committee is best placed to answer.