First of all, I reject that we require exceptional circumstances. That's not the law. That's not what the statute says. I think that's important because Correctional Service Canada and the Parole Board are always looking for these exceptional circumstances. The way they define “exceptional circumstances” would mean that there are no circumstances in which they would ever make disclosure of the personal information of an offender, even though it's the personal information that's going to be disclosed at a public hearing.
In the Dagg case, the Supreme Court of Canada says that the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act have to be read in harmony. The purpose—and I just have it in front of me—of the Access to Information Act is as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to enhance the accountability and transparency of federal institutions in order to promote an open and democratic society and to enable public debate on the conduct of those institutions.
That's the legislative purpose.
Then section 19 of the act takes you to the Privacy Act, and it's the Privacy Act that then says that they can disclose the information if the “head of the institution feels that “the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure”.
It's clear that—