Thank you very much.
I'm here, of course, to address Bill C‑26. This is a bill that grants the government sweeping new powers. We have concerns that there is no accompanying regime of checks and balances to safeguard rights. I'd like to speak to some of these points on behalf of a legal charity dedicated to defending fundamental freedoms.
As drafted, the bill threatens to undermine our privacy rights as well as the principles of accountability and due process, which form the bedrock of our democracy. The powers proposed by the bill risk impacts on the charter-protected rights of privacy, freedom of expression, equality and the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Of course we understand that cybersecurity is a huge imperative. We do not believe or accept that cybersecurity ought to come at the cost of civil liberties.
The proposals that the CCF is pleased to sign on to, along with other civil liberties groups, align with other international approaches such as those taken by our partners in the U.K. and Australia, both of which place a far greater emphasis on proportionality, accountability and privacy rights.
The issues raised by this bill apply to Canadians in our everyday lives. For example, under the bill, if someone's device or smart appliance were hacked and used to target a government website, the federal government could order their telecom service to be shut off in an order that could be kept secret from the public. The affected person or business would never even know that it was the government that ordered their service disconnected.
The bill also does not provide a mechanism for restoring service to individuals or businesses who lose it, which obviously interferes with basic livelihood in 2024.
I'll speak to a few substantive issues.
The bill raises the spectre of new and pervasive surveillance obligations. It empowers the government to secretly order telecom providers to “to do anything, or refrain from doing anything” . This opens the door to new obligations on private companies as well as to other risks of encryption standards, which pose an inconsistency with privacy rights.
There are no guardrails in the bill. The bill lacks proportionality, privacy or other checks that might constrain abuse of the new powers it grants the government. These are powers that are backed by steep fines and even potential imprisonment for non-compliance.
We propose adding a proportionality test and an obligation to consult with experts to help ensure that the minister does not use small problems to justify disproportionate actions. Adding a proportionality requirement will bring Bill C‑26 more in line with our counterparts in Australia and the U.K.
Next, I'd like to talk about some privacy concerns.
The bill empowers the government to collect broad categories of information from operators. It may be enabled to obtain identifiable personal data, which can be distributed to domestic and other, perhaps foreign, organizations. The bill does not have a mechanism for limiting what Ottawa can do with the data it collects, nor does it specify periods for data retention or measures to deal with possible negligence with people's data.
We find that the secrecy provisions undermine accountability and due process. The bill enables the government to shroud its orders in secrecy with no mandatory public reporting requirements. Of course we understand the need for confidentiality, but the public ought to have a sense of how these powers are being exercised, and to what effect, if our elected decision-makers are to be held to account.
This excessive secrecy has clear implications for the freedom of expression rights of the public as well as the media, as protected by section 2(b) of the charter.
Finally, I'd like to speak about the use of secret evidence in court, which is authorized by Bill C‑26.
Even if security orders made under the act are subject to judicial review, the bill could restrict applicants' access to evidence, which is a violation of the rules of natural justice. The minister is permitted to request that some of the government's evidence be heard in camera solely by the judge. The applicant for the review is not permitted to access information that—this is from the statute—“in the judge’s opinion...would be injurious to international relations”—