Public Safety Committee on Oct. 5th, 2026

[Vanessa Lloyd]

Thank you for the question. I will try my best to answer multiple of your questions.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Is there an investigation? That's it, please.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

You have just a few seconds.

[Vanessa Lloyd]

I can confirm, as the minister and the Prime Minister have said, that CSIS is involved in the ongoing investigation as it relates to this particular case.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, MP Caputo. I'm sorry to interrupt.

Ms. Acan, go ahead for five minutes, please.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

We all agree that there is an issue that we need to discuss, but to find out who is guilty is to understand what the gaps are in the policies and work on those.

As mentioned, the Treasury Board establishes the policy framework for security screening. Mr. Hatfield, could you please walk us through the security screening process once again?

[Adam Hatfield]

It begins first and foremost with a consideration of the position that is being staffed or the contract that is being let, in the situation that it's a contract. What level of screening is required for that position, based on the duties and functions?

Second, when a candidate is presented to occupy that position, it's a process of gathering information about that individual, with that individual's consent. Some of that information comes directly from the individual. Some of it comes from security agencies like the service and the RCMP, and some of it comes from an external source, such as a financial credit agency.

Then the decision-maker takes all of that information, puts it on the table and looks at it collectively to understand whether they see reason for doubt as to the reliability and loyalty of this individual. If there is doubt, the individual is pulled into the process. They are required to be informed that there is doubt and to be provided with an opportunity to answer to that doubt. The decision-maker then makes a decision. If it's a negative decision, the person has to be informed, has to be told why and has to be told what avenues of recourse are available to them. If it is a positive decision, they have to be informed as to what level of responsibility they now have for the information and the facilities that they might now have access to because of the level of screening they have.

Then we enter a process of continuous assurance. Screening is not just a “one and done”. Once the initial screening is awarded, the person is subject to a regular cycle of updates and verifications to ensure that their reliability and loyalty are assessed on a continuous basis. When they leave the public service, that clearance is then deactivated as necessary.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

Thank you very much.

Today you made it very clear to us that the deputy heads of departments retain the final decision in granting clearance and other routine screening decisions. Is that correct?

[Adam Hatfield]

That is correct.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

Okay. When was this policy established?

[Adam Hatfield]

Security screening started during the Second World War. It has evolved very considerably over time. Potentially of interest to this committee—

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

When are the deputy heads put in as the main persons in these considerations?

[Adam Hatfield]

Per the Financial Administration Act, deputy heads are designated as accounting officers responsible for the prudent management of their departments. That includes security management. By dint of being a deputy minister, those individuals inherit responsibility for the security of their organizations and of their people. Because of that, it flows from there that they are the ones ultimately accountable within their organizations for the decisions they make.

Treasury Board policy flows from that and informs them how they exercise their security responsibilities, but it is the Financial Administration Act that puts that responsibility on them.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

What year was it?

[Adam Hatfield]

The Financial Administration Act, I believe, was first written in 1867. I could not tell you when.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

The final decision that was made by—

[Adam Hatfield]

I don't have that information.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

I believe the policy changed to giving the decision to the heads in 2014.

Given that CSIS and the RCMP provide the intelligence and security assessments, do you believe there's a risk in having the final clearance decision made by a single deputy head?

[Adam Hatfield]

The design of the system today.... Again, given the fact that different organizations operate in very different security environments and in very different threat environments against different organizations, giving the deputy head the final say is currently the policy in place.

To change that—to say to a deputy head, for example, that they are not empowered to make that decision—would be like saying that they're required to accept somebody else's positive or negative decision about somebody they're hiring. That would undercut their own responsibility as accounting officers to manage the department.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

In your view, does concentrating that authority in a single decision-maker create any vulnerabilities or increase the risk of error?

[Adam Hatfield]

I would argue that in fact it is distributed across the system. Every deputy head is responsible for their own department. Together, collectively, they assure the security of the government as a whole, but there's no one person making decisions across the entire federal government.

[Sima Acan, Liberal, Oakville West, ON]

Earlier you mentioned that updates were done in the policy framework in January 2025. Where are we with that implementation?

[Adam Hatfield]

When that policy was promulgated, departments were given two years to become fully compliant. This past January, a check-in with all government departments required them to provide an update and to identify whether they saw any barriers to full implementation. I'm pleased to say that not a single government department indicated any barriers to implementation.

In January of this coming year, we will—

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

I'm sorry to interrupt.

Thank you very much.

Mrs. DeBellefeuille, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

So, Mr. Hatfield, you're delighted. You're telling us that, since the new policy was implemented in 2025, no department has fallen behind schedule and everything is going well. However, there was still one case in 2026 of a person working for Global Affairs Canada who needed a secret security clearance to do an internship and still managed to be hired.

Now, we are asking ourselves questions. If the implementation of the new policy is going so well, how can you explain to the committee members what happened in July 2026? You can't tell us that everything is going very well and that you're satisfied when there's such a glaring example of a botched investigation, poor research and a lack of communication. Call it what you will, but I don't get the impression that the implementation of your policy is going all that well because the result, in 2026, is pretty bad, isn't it?