Public Safety Committee on Oct. 5th, 2026

[A/Commr Josianne Phénix]

There's already communication among those departments. If there's adverse information that comes up, as you mentioned before, and we need to review somebody, we are able to communicate with our partners, whether it's CSIS or the chief security officer from another department, to share that information for their assessment.

[Amandeep Sodhi, Liberal, Brampton Centre, ON]

Thank you.

This question is for all of the officials, so feel free to add anything that you would like.

Everyone around this table shares the objective of having a strong and effective screening system. From your perspective, what aspects of Canada's current security screening framework are working particularly well, and where do you see the greatest opportunities for improvement?

[Vanessa Lloyd]

Thank you for the question.

I'll start by saying that each organization takes its responsibilities extremely seriously in regard to security clearance, which in effect allows individuals access to Canada's most sensitive systems and classified information. That system, under the revised security screening directive, works quite well. I believe that each of our departments would say that in our cases, we perform those functions with extreme rigour and due diligence.

The distinction that my colleague from the Treasury Board made about the differences in the parts of the process relating to the full information considered by a decision-maker—a deputy head who is hiring an individual—also means that some of the information goes to different parts of the system.

I will emphasize that what CSIS is looking at, for example, is whether the information provided about the applicant by a requesting department has links to any concerns we have in our holdings related to national security investigations and national security threats. What we do not look at is all of the bulk of the information collected in the suitability portion of a department's responsibility or all of the information amassed in the reliability status.

We are not entitled to ask for that information or to share that information back.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you very much, Ms. Sodhi.

Mrs. DeBellefeuille, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Lloyd, can you tell me what level of security clearance is required to do an internship at NATO, as Ms. Zhang did?

[Vanessa Lloyd]

Thank you for the question, Mrs. DeBellefeuille.

As my colleague from the Treasury Board Secretariat mentioned, the nature of the work is—

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

You know the nature of her work. What level was required?

[Vanessa Lloyd]

It depends on the position.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

You know her position, Ms. Lloyd. Just tell me if it was secret or top secret clearance.

[Vanessa Lloyd]

I won't talk about a specific case, but for the committee's information, I can say that, according to the standard, internships at NATO require a secret security clearance.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

What I understood from the testimony is that this person was employed by Global Affairs Canada before leaving for NATO. Could an employee move from one department to another to avoid security clearance reviews and slip through the cracks?

This person worked at the Canadian Space Agency, Statistics Canada, the European Space Agency and the Standards Council of Canada, before ending up as an intern at NATO, without anyone within the government realizing that she had defrauded the Public Service Commission.

Is it possible for a highly intelligent employee to move from one department to another without ever having their security clearance reviewed?

[Richard Bilodeau]

I'll start, and then I'll ask Mr. Hatfield to add to my answer if necessary.

When we hire someone at the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we always verify the validity of their security clearance, which is transferred. It is also the department's responsibility, when someone comes to work there, to ensure that they can be trusted, taking into account the position they are filling. If it's a position that requires secret or top secret security clearance, it's up to the department to verify the clearance.

In my field, there are more positions that require top secret security clearance. When we have to raise an employee's security clearance level, we must conduct a new background check. We ensure that we follow the policy. As the receiving department, we have a responsibility to verify the validity of the security clearance.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

We know that, Mr. Bilodeau. It's in the committee analysts' notes. I want to understand something else.

Before joining NATO, Ms. Zhang was employed by a government department. She applied for an internship. You told me that, according to the standard, internships at NATO require a secret security clearance, which requires a review every five years. That means this person left a department—which was not yours, as I understand—that the department let her go without reviewing her security clearance and that NATO accepted her without ensuring that the security clearance had been verified. That's my understanding.

It's not the fault of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness because she's not your employee, after all. You're all absolving yourselves of blame by saying that each department is responsible, that it's doing its best and that it submits requests to the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I understand that. It's convenient to say that in committee, as it shifts the blame from everyone. However, this person still managed to obtain an internship that requires a secret security clearance without having her status validated and reapproved, despite everything we know today—such as the fact that she was using fake names and multiple Facebook accounts. I've never conducted a background check, but it seems to me that this is information that can be easily found.

So it's possible to move from one department to another without ever having your security clearance verified. Mr. Hatfield, as an experienced public servant who has worked in many departments, have you ever seen anything like this?

[Adam Hatfield]

According to the policy, it is not possible to hire someone without verifying their security clearance.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

So what happened? Does that mean the verification was not done?

[Adam Hatfield]

I'm not in a position to speak to the particulars of this case because Treasury Board does not get involved in the forensics of a case, but I can say that the policy is very clear that when someone arrives, either the clearance is verified working with the previous government department or it is redone. There is no circumstance where a government department would hire somebody—

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Mr. Hatfield, I have another quick question for you.

When a thorough background check is conducted on a Canadian of foreign origin for a position that requires secret or top secret security clearance, is it also necessary to investigate their family and relationships in their country of origin? Does it go that far?

[Adam Hatfield]

Part of the security screening process at any level is identification of immediate family, and certainly at a top secret or a secret level, an assessment of foreign influence or the potential for the individual to be coerced because they have family overseas who might be vulnerable. That is absolutely part of the criteria that are looked at.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you very much for that exchange.

Ms. Kirkland, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Rhonda Kirkland, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Lloyd, when CSIS conducts security screenings, does it have access to findings of fraud or misconduct made by the Public Service Commission?

[Vanessa Lloyd]

Thank you for the question.

Again, I will emphasize this and maybe make a point of language precision. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service supports the broader security screening continuum of the various parts of the activities that we've been talking about. Our responsibility is to provide an assessment, not advice or recommendations, to the requesting department of whether there are indications with respect to that individual that could affect their loyalty to Canada and their reliability related thereto. Our responsibilities in that sphere relate strictly to threats to the security of Canada as defined under the CSIS Act.

[Rhonda Kirkland, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Would you consider a person who commits fraud when applying for another position across the public service to be a threat to security or to Canada?

[Vanessa Lloyd]

Again, thank you for the question.

The aspects of honesty and trustworthiness relate to the reliability status part of the continuum that we're speaking to, and they could be relevant, as my colleague and Mr. Hatfield indicated, to aspects of influence on an individual in terms of their future behaviour. When we look at the information provided by an individual in relation to their application, we would look to determine whether we have, in our holdings, any information that indicates that the individual has or is and could be involved in threats to national security—that relates to espionage, foreign interference and terrorism threats.

[Rhonda Kirkland, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

What if it were a potential CSIS employee?

[Vanessa Lloyd]

Thank you very much for the question.

At CSIS, as a high-security organization, its employees are assessed to a higher standard than secret, as we've been speaking about today, which requires the—