There are very good surveillance programs in the U.S., and not just within the U.S.—American colleagues are surveilling overseas.
I think what we really lack in Canada—this is through conversations with my colleagues in Canada—is that we really don't do surveillance. We don't have a good surveillance model for our own country. We have very little in terms of surveillance for threats overseas that may come on an airplane into our country. Zoonotic events are not restricted to Canada. These events could happen anywhere on the planet and if it gets on a plane, in less than 24 hours the pathogen could likely show up on our borders in Canada.
I think that having some sort of a program that will complement.... I was listening to the previous panel about how moonshots could potentially be international collaborations. For zoonotic pathogens and for emerging infectious diseases, we absolutely need to work with our colleagues overseas. We can't go in and start sampling in countries overseas without collaboration from colleagues in that country.
Data sharing is another critical aspect. If you're trying to identify pathogens, why would somebody want us to surveil their country if their pathogen would have trade implications for them? An example is rinderpest in livestock.
Something we need to be cognizant of when we are designing these studies is empathy. I always use this in the classes I teach. Perhaps we must also identify what is mutually beneficial—not only identify threats, but propose solutions.